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The studies in this thesis contribute to a growing stream of papers showing that capital
structure decisions are not only influenced by corporate determinants, but also by fluctua -
tions in investor tastes and capital available for investment. This is a relatively new way of
looking at corporate decisions, but is also given the deserved importance in the literature.
This view contrasts with the traditional approach in the literature that largely considered
corporate decisions to be distinct from the decision process of investors. Chapters 2 and 3
use convertible debt issuance to analyze the impact of intertemporal variation in investor
demand on corporate decisions, and the market reaction to these decisions. Chapter 2
shows that convertible debt issuance, pricing, and design decisions are influenced by
demand forces from investors. Chapter 3 finds that a shift in the convertible bond investor
base from long-only investors towards convertible arbitrage funds resulted in an
increasingly negative stock price reaction, induced by short-selling pressure. Thus, the first
two studies in this thesis provide more evidence of corporate opportunism, using data on
issuers of convertible debt. The fourth chapter uses data from repeat issuers of equity, and
provides evidence in line with the hypothesis that investors take opportunism into account
when firms issue new equity. In addition, the paper shows that firms’ choice of capital
structure is influenced by their past behavior.
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Corporate finance decisions have traditionally been seen as being driven by a firm’s 
fundamentals. This view considers capital structure as the result of decisions made 
exclusively by firms, which demand capital to finance investment opportunities. The role of 
investors in this process has been given limited attention, even though investors, as the 
suppliers of capital, represent the counterparty to corporate transactions. This dissertation 
consists of three empirical studies that find evidence showing that capital structure decisions 
are not only influenced by corporate determinants, but also by variations in investor 
preferences and capital available for investment. Chapters 2 and 3 use convertible debt 
issuance to analyze the impact of intertemporal variation in investor demand on corporate 
decisions, and the market reaction to these decisions. Chapter 4 provides evidence in line 
with the hypothesis that investors take opportunism into account when firms issue new 
equity. In the introduction to this dissertation I provide the context for the remaining chapters. 
I give particular attention to recent evidence on the influence of investor-related drivers on 
corporate finance decisions, and contrast this with the traditional perspective of capital 
structure. 
 
 
1.1   Impact of the supply of capital on corporate finance 
decisions and security prices 
 
In the neoclassical framework, markets are efficient and the supply of funds is perfectly 
elastic at a price that reflects fundamental value. In such a framework, the demand for capital 
is driven by investment opportunities, and capital structure is determined by firm-specific 
characteristics. Firms choose between debt, equity, or convertible debt financing so as to 
minimize contracting costs that arise due to asymmetric information, agency problems, 
financial distress, and tax considerations.  
Under the assumption that the supply of funds is perfectly elastic, there is a limited role 
for managers to exploit market inefficiencies by issuing overpriced securities. A recent strand 
of literature, however, contends that changes in the supply of funds do have an effect on 
corporate finance decisions and asset prices. Baker (2009) argues that changes in the supply 
of capital can be caused by two factors, i.e., changes in investor tastes and changes in the 
funds available to investors. Baker notes that increases in the supply of capital can result in 
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profitable financing opportunities, insofar as managers respond to these increases by 
opportunistically setting a higher price on their securities. Stein (1996), and Baker, Ruback, 
and Wurgler (2007) develop a theoretical framework for the impact of the supply of capital 
on corporate finance decisions. 
Several papers provide empirical evidence that corporate finance decisions and security 
prices are indeed influenced by changes in the supply of capital. A first group of studies 
focuses on changes in investor tastes. Lowry (2003), Helwege and Liang (2004) and Dorn 
(2009) find that investor optimism drives demand for IPOs. Baker and Wurgler (2004) show 
that managers cater to increased investor preferences for dividend-paying firms. Manconi and 
Massa (2009) find that firms with more fragmented ownership have more difficulties in 
catering to shareholder preferences for dividend payouts. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler 
(2009) find evidence that managers choose to maintain share prices at a low level in response 
to investor preferences for low-priced firms. Aghion and Stein (2008) provide a theory in 
which managers cater to the stock market’s preferences for sales growth versus profit 
margins. Polk and Sapienza (2009) show that firms cater to investor preferences for the level 
of firm investment by altering their investment policy. Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) 
provide a review of how market inefficiencies influence other corporate events. 
A second group of studies examine the impact of the funds available for investment on 
corporate finance decisions and prices. Massa, Peyer, and Tong (2005) use inclusion in the 
S&P 500 index to estimate the impact of equity supply on security issuance and investment. 
Faulkender and Peterson (2006) examine the impact of access to bond markets on leverage. 
Leary (2009) and Lemmon and Roberts (2010) find a supply effect of bank loans and high 
yield bonds, respectively, on investment and financial structure.  
 
 
1.2   Evidence of investor-driven corporate finance in the 
convertible bond market 
 
Convertibles are bonds that can be converted into equity at the option of the investor. 
Convertible debt represents an important source of financing: convertible issuance by U.S. 
corporations amounted to $61.6 billion in 2007, compared with $71.8 billion raised from 
seasoned equity issues and $388.5 billion raised from straight debt issues (Securities Data 
Company New Issues Database). The first part of Section 1.2 reviews theories that rely on 
firm-specific characteristics to explain convertible bond issuance. The remaining parts 
explain how the unique characteristics of convertible bonds make them an ideal instrument to 
test for the influence of investor demand on issuance activity. 
 
 
1.2.1  Traditional motivations for convertible debt issuance 
 
The literature presents several viewpoints on why firms issue convertible debt. Green 
(1984) demonstrates that, due to the convexity in their payoffs, convertible bonds are useful 
in reducing contracting costs associated with asset substitution behavior of shareholders. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) show that convertible bonds substitute for straight debt if 
information asymmetry about the riskiness of the firm’s assets is high, since convertibles are 
less sensitive to risk as a result of their option component. Convertibles reduce this risk-
shifting problem by allowing bondholders to participate in any potential upside, thus 
lowering the potential payoffs of shareholders. In the Stein (1992) framework, firms with 
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high financial distress costs issue convertibles as an alternative to equity to alleviate equity-
related adverse selection costs. On the whole, these theories predict that convertibles are most 
useful for firms with high costs of attracting straight debt or equity financing. Using a 
security choice model that incorporates convertible debt, straight debt, and equity, Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward (1999, 2003) find empirical evidence consistent with these hypotheses.  
Another implication of the theoretical convertible debt models is that, irrespective of 
firm-specific characteristics, convertible debt issuance should be more attractive during 
windows with higher economy-wide costs for attracting debt or equity financing. A number 
of empirical studies have therefore examined the impact of aggregate debt- and equity-related 
financing costs on the convertible debt issuance choice. Alexander, Stover, and Kuhnau 
(1979) and Henderson (2005) conclude that managers do not time convertible issues during 
conditions that are favorable for convertible issuance, since convertible bond prices rise after 
issuance. Hoffmeister, Hays, and Kelley (1987), and Mann, Moore, and Ramanlal (1999), 
however, do find evidence that convertible debt issuers try to time the market. Dutordoir and 
Van de Gucht (2007) show that firms with high costs of attracting standard financing tools 
time their convertible offering during periods with low debt- and equity-related financing 
costs. Krishnaswami and Yaman (2008) find that companies are more likely to substitute 
convertible debt for straight debt during periods with high economy-wide debt-related 
financing costs. 
 
 
1.2.2  The effect of investor demand on convertible debt issuance 
  
While there is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on the characteristics of 
convertible bond issuers, only a few papers have studied convertibles from an investor 
perspective. Kim and Stulz (1992) show that convertible bond issuers in the U.S. took 
advantage of relatively higher investor demand for convertibles in the Eurobond market, 
caused by a temporary tax advantage, by pricing their Eurobond issues more attractively. 
Choi et al. (2010) document that increases in convertible arbitrage hedge funds flows have a 
positive impact on convertible debt issuance. Other studies find that convertibles are likely to 
satisfy certain investor needs that cannot be fulfilled through a combination of straight debt 
and equity. For instance, Ammann, Kind, and Seiz (2007) find that convertible bond returns 
cannot be fully explained by factors typically used to explain stock and bond returns. 
Eckmann, Lutz, and Sperl (2007) document that the value of a convertible reflects the 
interaction between its debt and equity components, rather than just their sum.  
The main goal of Chapter 2 is to examine the impact of investor demand for the particular 
payoff structure of convertible debt on convertible bond issuance activity. Our key hypothesis 
is that companies cater to temporal fluctuations in investor preferences for these specific 
features of convertible debt. We sequentially examine the influence of investor demand on 
aggregate convertible bond issuance numbers, convertible bond underpricing, and convertible 
bond design. Our results suggest that the characteristics of convertible bonds create a 
clientele attracted by factors peculiar to these instruments and mostly unrelated to straight 
debt or equity features, thus reinforcing the notion of convertible debt as a separate asset 
class.  
We regress quarterly U.S. convertible debt issuance volumes between January 1975 and 
December 2007 on lagged values of six measures for investor demand, and find that these 
measures are able to explain a substantial part (35.3%) of the variation in aggregate 
convertible issues. Our results hold after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and firm-
specific characteristics and are robust to using alternative measures of convertible debt 
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issuance volumes and investor demand. We also show that most of the proxies for time-
varying investor demand for convertibles do not influence aggregate equity or straight debt 
issuance volumes, which corroborates our hypothesis that convertible bonds are an 
independent asset class catering to a specific clientele.  
Having established that convertible bond issuers cater to fluctuations in investor demand, 
we subsequently examine whether issuers are able to obtain better prices on their offerings in 
periods with heightened investor demand for convertible bonds. Several earlier papers have 
documented that convertibles tend to be underpriced at issuance (e.g., Henderson, 2005; Chan 
and Chen, 2007; Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld, 2009). We find that convertible debt 
underpricing is significantly lower following increases in investor demand for convertible 
bond offerings, suggesting that issuers opportunistically exploit windows with high investor 
preferences for convertible financing. Our underpricing analysis controls for macroeconomic 
conditions, firm-specific characteristics affecting the corporate supply of convertible 
securities to investors, and security design features.  
Finally, we document that issuers adjust the design of their convertible bond offerings to 
investor preferences. We find that, ceteris paribus, issuers tend to structure their convertible 
debt offering to be more equity-like during periods when investors are more risk averse. One 
possible explanation for this result is that risk averse investors may prefer to include equity-
like convertibles in their portfolio as an alternative to regular (more risky) common stock.  
Overall, our findings provide strong evidence that security issuing firms are aware of 
changes in investor demand, and use this knowledge to optimize their issuance, pricing, and 
security design decisions.  
 
 
1.2.3  Convertible arbitrage-related pressure on stock prices 
 
Existing event studies on the announcement effects associated with convertible debt 
offerings generally focus on convertibles issued during the 1970s and 1980s. A common 
finding of these studies is that convertibles induce negative abnormal stock returns that are 
intermediate in size between the announcement effects associated with seasoned equity and 
straight debt offerings (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward, 1999). This pattern is consistent with the signaling model of Myers 
and Majluf (1984), which predicts that relatively more equity-like security offerings are more 
likely to be perceived as a signal of firm overvaluation. 
Chapter 3 is inspired by the observation that convertible bond announcement effects have 
sharply declined over the past decade, whereas there is no corresponding decline in equity or 
straight debt announcement returns. While convertible offerings announced between 1984 
and 1999 induce average abnormal stock returns of −1.69%, convertibles announced in the 
period 2000 to 2008 are associated with average abnormal stock price declines that are more 
than twice as large (−4.59%).  
The main hypothesis in this study is that the sharp decline in observed convertible bond 
announcement returns is attributable to a substantial change in the buy-side of the convertible 
bond market. Convertibles traditionally appealed to long-only investors looking for 
diversification benefits and indirect participation in equities (Lummer and Riepe, 1993). 
However, Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2009) show a dramatic increase in the importance 
of convertible arbitrage funds since the end of the 1990s. To exploit underpriced convertible 
issues, convertible bond arbitrageurs buy the convertibles and short the underlying common 
stock. If demand curves for stock are downward-sloping, the supply increase associated with 
this arbitrage-related short selling should result in a negative stock price effect.  
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Therefore, our key prediction is that the observed highly negative “announcement” effect 
of recent convertible bond issues may partly reflect temporary price pressure associated with 
the activities of convertible bond arbitrageurs. In line with our hypothesis, we find that the 
difference in announcement-period returns between convertibles issued in the period 1984 to 
1999 (labeled “Traditional Investor period”) and convertibles issued in the period 2000 to 
September 2008 (labeled “Arbitrage period”) is no longer significant after controlling for 
arbitrage-induced short selling. Our findings remain intact when controlling for issuer-
specific, security-specific, and macroeconomic determinants of convertible bond 
announcement effects. 
Further analysis strengthens the arbitrage explanation for the evolution in convertible 
bond announcement effects. We find significant positive abnormal stock returns following 
Arbitrage-period convertible bond issues, as the short-selling induced price pressure is 
gradually absorbed by the market. In contrast, we find no evidence of such a reversal for 
issues made during the periods when hedge funds were less involved in purchasing 
convertibles. 
 
 
1.3   Corporate opportunism and seasoned equity offerings 
 
The first two studies in this thesis provide more evidence of corporate opportunism, using 
data on issuers of convertible debt. In the fourth chapter I examine whether investors take 
opportunism into account when firms issue new equity. While market timing of equity 
offerings is extensively documented in the literature, its effects on future equity offerings by 
repeat issuers are less known. Given that market timing represents a price risk for purchasers 
of the equity offering, I expect offerings perceived as more likely to be timed, to be issued at 
a greater discount to the pre-issue market price. 
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are on average followed by negative long-run abnormal 
returns (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). A popular 
explanation for this underperformance is that issuers are able to time the market and raise 
equity when the cost of capital is abnormally low. Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) view managers as being better informed than investors and are able to issue 
equity opportunistically when they anticipate that their share price is likely to decline. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) provide survey evidence in support of this view. Market timing 
can also be viewed in a rational framework, with firms choosing to issue equity in more 
favorable economic periods when asymmetric information is lower (e.g., Choe, Masulis, and 
Nanda, 1993; Lucas and McDonald, 1990). Another possible explanation for post-issue 
underperformance, suggested by Ritter (2003), is that both investors and managers are 
overoptimistic about the prospects of issuing firms.  
In the fourth chapter, I examine the effects of past market timing on underpricing of 
subsequent equity offerings in the United States over the period 1980-2007. I capture possible 
market timing behavior based on the abnormal returns following a previous issue, and find 
that underpricing of equity offerings is greater if firms are more likely to have timed the 
market previously. The additional discount by past market timers can be seen as 
compensation for the perceived risk that these issuers will time the market again. I also find 
that the effect of past market timing is most pronounced for issuers that did not experience a 
change in their CEO in the period between issues. This finding is consistent with recent 
evidence by Baker and Xuan (2009) that the identity of the CEO matters in assessing past 
firm performance. I also find that underpricing is less sensitive to positive returns that follow 
a previous issue, than it is to negative returns. In line with prospect theory, this asymmetric 
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effect could imply that investors are more concerned about potential losses compared with 
gains. An alternative interpretation of these results is that investors view a share price decline 
following a previous issue as market timing, but do not view a price increase as the ability of 
managers to successfully time profitable investment opportunities.  
A corollary of the relationship between market timing and underpricing of subsequent 
equity offerings, is that the choice between debt and equity financing will also be influenced 
by past market timing. I find that firms that had timed their previous equity offering are more 
likely to switch to debt for subsequent financing. This suggests that past market timers 
anticipate the higher discounting and switch to debt in order to avoid additional dilution of 
share value. The higher cost of equity implies that firms’ financial constraints increase if they 
had timed the market with previous issues, especially if they are unable to subsequently 
switch to debt. Finally I document that, whereas SEOs are underpriced by more if returns 
following previous SEOs are more negative, they are not underpriced by more if returns 
following previous IPOs are more negative. This suggests that investors view IPOs as being 
less indicative of the market timing motives of follow-on equity issuers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
Do convertible bond issuers cater to 
investor demand?1 
 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
Convertibles are bonds that can be converted into equity at the option of the investor. 
Convertible debt represents an important source of financing: convertible issuance by U.S. 
corporations amounted to $61.6 billion in 2007, compared with $71.8 billion raised from 
seasoned equity issues and $388.5 billion raised from straight debt issues (Securities Data 
Company New Issues Database).  
While there is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on the characteristics of 
convertible bond issuers (Green, 1984; Brennan and Kraus, 1987; Brennan and Schwartz, 
1988; Stein, 1992; Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 1999, 2003), only few papers have studied 
convertibles from an investor perspective. Ammann, Kind, and Seiz (2007) find that 
convertible bond returns cannot be fully explained by factors typically used to explain stock 
and bond returns. Eckmann, Lutz, and Sperl (2007) document that the value of a convertible 
reflects the interaction between its debt and equity components, rather than just their sum. 
Thus, convertibles are likely to satisfy certain investor needs that cannot be fulfilled by 
means of (a combination of) straight debt and equity.  
The main goal of this chapter is to examine the impact of investor demand for the 
particular payoff structure of convertible debt on convertible bond issuance activity. We 
sequentially examine the influence of investor demand on aggregate convertible bond 
issuance numbers, convertible bond underpricing, and convertible bond design. 
Baker (2009) argues that changes in investor demand can be caused by two factors, i.e., 
changes in investor tastes and changes in the funds available to investors.2 Based on this 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on De Jong, Duca, and Dutordoir (2010). It has benefited from comments by Ettore 
Croci, John Doukas, Mara Faccio, Bruce Grundy, Mathieu Luypaert, Elvira Sojli, Mathijs van Dijk, Chris Veld, 
and participants at the 2009 European Financial Management Association Meeting in Milan, the 2009 BAA 
Scottish Area Group Conference in Stirling, the 2009 Corporate Finance Day in Antwerp and at seminars at 
University of Groningen and Maastricht University. I gratefully acknowledge Trustfonds for providing financial 
support. 
2 In line with Baker (2009), we define investor tastes as “a broader notion of investment sentiment that includes 
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in a way that is unrelated to corporate fundamentals”.  
8  Chapter 2 
 
definition, we construct six proxies for investor demand for convertible instruments. To 
capture fluctuations in investor preferences for the option-like features of convertibles, we 
use the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) risk aversion measure and the Garleanu, Pedersen, 
and Poteshman (2009) option demand measure. To capture general investor preferences for 
convertibles, we include the percentage of convertible debt over-allotment options exercised, 
as well as abnormal stock returns around convertible bond announcements. To measure 
capital available for investment in convertible debt, in turn, we use flows into convertible 
bond mutual funds and flows into convertible arbitrage hedge funds.  
We regress quarterly U.S. convertible debt issuance volumes between January 1975 and 
December 2007 on lagged values of these six investor demand proxies, and find that 
measures for investor demand are able to explain a substantial part (35.3%) of the variation in 
aggregate convertible issues. Our results hold after controlling for macroeconomic conditions 
and firm-specific characteristics and are robust to using alternative measures of convertible 
debt issuance volumes and investor demand. We also show that most of the proxies for time-
varying investor demand for convertibles do not influence aggregate equity or straight debt 
issuance volumes, which corroborates our hypothesis that convertible bonds are an 
independent asset class catering to a specific clientele.  
Having established that convertible bond issuers cater to fluctuations in investor demand, 
we subsequently examine whether issuers are able to obtain better prices on their offerings in 
periods with heightened investor demand for convertible bonds. Several earlier papers have 
documented that convertibles tend to be underpriced at issuance (e.g., Henderson, 2005; Chan 
and Chen, 2007; Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld, 2009). We find that convertible debt 
underpricing is significantly lower following increases in investor demand for convertible 
bond offerings, suggesting that issuers opportunistically exploit windows with high investor 
preferences for convertible financing. Our underpricing analysis controls for macroeconomic 
conditions, firm-specific characteristics affecting the corporate supply of convertible 
securities to investors, and security design features.  
Finally, we document that issuers adjust the design of their convertible bond offerings to 
investor preferences. We find that, ceteris paribus, issuers tend to structure their convertible 
debt offering to be more equity-like during periods when investors are more risk averse. One 
possible explanation for this result is that risk averse investors may prefer to include equity-
like convertibles in their portfolio as an alternative to regular (more risky) common stock.  
Overall, our findings provide strong evidence that security issuing firms are aware of 
changes in investor demand, and use this knowledge to optimize their issuance, pricing, and 
security design decisions.  
Our main contributions to the literature are the following. First, we contribute to a 
relatively new stream of studies examining the influence of the availability of capital from 
investors on corporate finance actions and security prices. As pointed out by Baker (2009), 
corporate finance studies have traditionally focused on the corporate supply side, thereby 
implicitly assuming that the equilibrium demand by investors is perfectly competitive and 
elastic at a price that reflects the fundamental value of future cash flows. A number of recent 
studies show, however, that corporate finance actions can also be influenced through investor 
demand channels. Massa, Peyer, and Tong (2005), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Leary 
(2009), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010) obtain evidence of an impact of the availability of 
equity or (bank) debt financing on corporate finance decisions and/or security prices. Most 
relevant to our study, Choi et al. (2010) document that the supply of capital from convertible 
bond arbitrageurs and mutual funds has a positive impact on recent convertible bond issuance 
volumes.3 Our study complements Choi et al.’s work in the following ways. First, while these 
                                                          
3 As argued by Baker (2009), the terms “demand” and “supply” can be assigned to investors or firms, depending 
on the perspective that one takes. In this chapter, we use the terminology “investor demand for convertibles” and 
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authors focus on the supply of capital by convertible arbitrage hedge funds and mutual funds, 
we examine the impact of a wide range of other measures for time-varying investor tastes for 
convertible debt on convertible debt issuer behavior. As such, we acknowledge Baker’s 
(2009) statement that investor demand for securities depends both on investor tastes and on 
the availability of funds for investment. Second, while Choi et al. study an era in which 
convertible hedge funds play a very important role (i.e., from the mid-1990s onwards), we 
examine a much larger period spanning from 1975 to 2007. As such, we are able to show that 
the impact of investor demand on convertible bond issuance activity is not exclusively driven 
by the large influence of hedge funds over recent years. Third, we offer the additional insight 
that investor demand fluctuations do not only affect aggregate issuance volumes, but also 
convertible debt pricing and design decisions. 
Our work also contributes to the literature on the impact of catering incentives on 
corporate finance decisions. Previous studies have shown that catering incentives shape 
corporate finance choices regarding the market of securities issuance (Kim and Stulz, 1992), 
dividend payments (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Manconi and Massa, 2009), stock splits 
(Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler, 2009), and investment levels (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). 
Our results suggest that the characteristics of convertible bonds create a clientele attracted by 
factors peculiar to these instruments and mostly unrelated to straight debt or equity features, 
thus reinforcing the notion of convertible debt as a separate asset class. 
Finally, we contribute to the existing literature on convertible debt financing. Previous 
studies on convertible debt issuer motivations and/or convertible debt design mainly focus on 
the influence of issuer-specific (Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 1998, 1999, 2003; Dutordoir 
and Van de Gucht, 2007) or macroeconomic (Alexander and Stover, 1979; Hoffmeister, 
Hays, and Kelley, 1987; Mann, Moore, and Ramanlal, 1999; Krishnaswami and Yaman, 
2008) determinants. Our study complements these papers by showing that, next to firm-
specific and macroeconomic characteristics, temporal fluctuations in investor preferences for 
convertible securities also play an important role in explaining convertible debt issuance, 
pricing, and design.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides the 
testable predictions. Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology. Section 2.4 provides the 
empirical results, and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
2.2   Testable predictions  
 
2.2.1  Impact of investor demand on convertible bond issuance  
 
Convertibles should not be considered as a simple combination of debt and equity. The 
reason is that these instruments also incorporate an option component, resulting in 
asymmetric payoffs that cannot easily be replicated through a combination of underlying 
assets. In theory, investors could replicate the convertible debt payoffs by purchasing a 
combination of a straight bond and a call option on the underlying stock. However, only a 
limited fraction of convertible bond issuers have call options outstanding. Moreover, 
outstanding call options typically have a very short maturity (shorter than one year), while 
convertibles usually have a maturity in the order of 20 years (Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 
1998). In addition, the risk profile of convertible bond issuers is typically substantially 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“corporate supply of convertibles”. Alternatively, Choi et al. (2010) use the terminology “investor supply of 
capital (for convertible investment)” and “corporate demand for convertible financing”.  
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different from that of straight bond issuers (Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 1999, 2003), which 
could make it hard for investors to find a comparable straight bond in the market. Finally, 
convertibles can include a number of security design features such as soft callability that are 
not present in straight bonds (Korkeamaki, 2005). For these reasons, it is fair to assume that 
synthetically-constructed convertibles cannot fully satisfy investor demand for convertible 
bonds.  
Our key hypothesis is that companies cater to temporal fluctuations in investor 
preferences for the specific features of convertible debt, by deciding to issue convertibles 
(instead of equity or straight debt) during periods when investor demand for the particular 
payoff structure of convertible debt is higher.  
 
 
2.2.2  Impact of investor demand on convertible bond pricing 
 
Chan and Chen (2007), Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2009), and de Jong, Dutordoir, 
and Verwijmeren (2010) (among others) document that convertible bonds tend to be 
underpriced at issuance. Potential reasons for convertible debt underpricing include 
illiquidity, small issue size, and complexities associated with the valuation of hybrid 
securities (Lhabitant, 2002). Of course it could be questioned why a firm would ever want to 
issue an undervalued security in the first place. A potential explanation lies in the profile of 
the typical U.S. convertible debt issuer, i.e., a firm that has difficulties attracting standard 
(equity or debt) financing instruments (Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 1999, 2003). 
We predict that initial convertible bond underpricing levels (i.e., offering discounts) are 
negatively influenced by proxies for investor demand, since convertible issuers exploit the 
higher demand for their offerings. Baker (2009) labels such behavior “corporate 
opportunism”. While the impact of investor demand on convertible bond underpricing has 
never been formally examined in the academic literature, several business press articles 
provide evidence of the importance of investor demand in explaining convertible bond prices. 
For example: 
 
“In what could be a sign of good demand, Gap Inc., the largest U.S. clothing 
retailer, on Wednesday cut the coupon and boosted the conversion premium on the 
$1 billion of seven-year convertible senior notes.” Reuters (February 27, 2002). 
 
 
2.2.3  Impact of investor demand on convertible bond design 
 
A convertible can be considered as a combination of a straight bond and a call option on 
the issuer’s equity. An attractive feature of convertibles is that the issuer has a lot of 
flexibility with respect to the structure of his offering. By manipulating the different 
convertible debt design parameters (e.g., conversion premium, callability, maturity), the 
issuer can make the option component (also frequently labeled “equity component”) of the 
convertible bond smaller or larger in size.  
Previous studies (e.g., Lewis, Rogalski and Seward, 1998; Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2009) 
document that firm-specific and macroeconomic characteristics play an important role in 
explaining convertible debt design choices. We predict that the structure of convertible debt 
offerings may also be influenced by temporal changes in investor tastes. More particularly, 
during periods with stronger investor preferences for more equity- (option)-like securities, 
convertible debt issuers may structure their offerings to have a larger equity (or option) 
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component. This prediction relies on the dual assumption that (i) issuers are aware of investor 
preferences, and (ii) issuers take these preferences into account in their design decisions. 
Offerings that cater to investor preferences may be sold faster and/or at a more favorable 
price.  
 
 
2.3   Data and variable measurement 
 
2.3.1  Data set 
 
We obtain data for U.S. convertible bonds issued between January 1st 1975 and December 
31st 2007 from the Securities Data Company New Issues Database (henceforth SDC). We use 
quarterly numbers of convertible debt offerings to measure aggregate convertible debt 
issuance (IssuesCD). We use a quarterly instead of a monthly frequency to allow for 
sufficient time between the observation of demand changes and the actual convertible issue. 
The use of a quarterly frequency is also in line with Lowry (2003) and Pastor and Veronesi 
(2005), who study time series of initial public offerings. We consider the number of issues a 
better measure than dollar volumes, since volumes may yield biased results if a small number 
of firms have large dollar issues. As will be shown further, our main findings remain 
unaltered when using dollar volumes instead of issuance numbers.  
In line with Lowry (2003) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005), we deflate the number of 
issues by the number of firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges at 
the end of the previous quarter. We construct an index for the number of listed firms (with the 
number of firms listed in 1975 taking the value one) and use this index as denominator to 
avoid having to divide by a very large number. After excluding financials (SIC codes 6000-
6999) and consolidating multiple tranches of convertibles issued by the same firm, we obtain 
a sample of 3,497 issues corresponding to a total of $900.8 billion expressed in year-2007 
USD. We follow a similar procedure to construct the number of U.S. public common equity 
issues (IssuesEQ) and straight debt issues (IssuesSD), thus obtaining a sample of 12,272 
seasoned equity offerings and 22,284 straight debt offerings with total year-2007 dollar 
values of $1,613.6 billion and $6,196.7 billon, respectively. Figure 2.1 displays deflated 
numbers of convertible debt, seasoned equity, and straight debt issues. The pairwise Pearson 
correlation between the number of convertible and equity (straight debt) issues is 0.57 (0.44). 
Both correlations are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. These significant 
positive correlation numbers are consistent with the notion that convertibles have both equity-
like and debt-like components.  
 
 
2.3.2  Measures for investor demand for convertible debt 
 
We construct six variables to measure time-varying investor demand for convertible 
securities. The first four measures capture changes in investor tastes, while the last two 
measures capture changes in the funds available for investment in convertibles. Whereas each 
proxy measures a slightly different aspect of investor demand for convertible debt, the 
proxies are of course related to each other. For instance, a stronger investor taste for 
convertible debt may result in increased flows into convertible bond funds. The use of six 
different proxies enables us to capture investor demand for convertibles more accurately than 
if we would focus on a single measure.  
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Our first two proxy variables measure temporal variations in investor preferences for the 
typical payoff pattern of convertibles. Since convertible bonds offer option-like payoffs and 
downside protection relative to equity (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988), we expect these 
securities to become more desirable in periods of heightened risk aversion. Several studies 
show that risk aversion varies over time (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Kumar and Persaud, 
2002; Brandt and Wang, 2003). We construct a proxy for risk aversion (labeled 
RiskAversion) based on the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit-based model. This model 
relates risk aversion to surplus consumption, which is a measure of how much instantaneous 
consumption deviates from a slowly-moving external “habit” level. An above-habit increase 
in consumption is associated with a decline in risk aversion. We calibrate the model in the 
same way as Campbell and Cochrane, using quarterly data for real nondurables and services 
consumption obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables. A 
second proxy, OptionDemand, captures investor demand for the option-like characteristics of 
convertibles. Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) show that the difference between 
implied and realized volatility on the S&P 500 index is a good proxy for option demand. We 
obtain implied volatilities from the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
(VXO), which measures the market's expectation of 30-day volatility as implied by S&P 100 
(OEX) index options. We then compute the daily difference between the VXO implied 
volatility and the realized volatility on the OEX index measured over the 60 trading days 
prior to the VXO observation. We take the quarterly average of daily differences as our 
measure of option demand. Data used to compute this measure are available from the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange website from 1986 onwards.  
Investor preferences for convertible bonds could also be driven by other factors than the 
typical option-like payoff structure of these instruments. For example, certain windows may 
be characterized by (irrational) fads during which investors prefer convertible bond financing 
over other investment instruments (see, e.g., Baker, 2009). We develop two proxies to 
measure such general (i.e., not necessarily payoff-related) investor preferences for 
convertible bonds. First, we include the ratio of the number of convertible debt issues for 
which the over-allotment option has been exercised by the issuer to the total number of 
convertible issues in each quarter (labeled OverAllot). Similar to issuers of common equity 
and straight debt, issuers of convertibles commonly incorporate an over-allotment option into 
their offering, which they exercise if demand for the offering exceeds the initial offering 
amount. The over-allotment option normally allows for an additional 15% of offering 
proceeds to be issued at the issuer’s discretion. We obtain information on the exercise of 
over-allotment options from SDC. Second, in line with other studies on the impact of catering 
incentives on corporate finance actions (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Baker, Greenwood, and 
Wurgler, 2009), we include abnormal stock returns around recent convertible debt 
announcements (AbnRet) as an investor demand measure. The rationale behind this variable 
is that more favorable announcement returns should reflect a higher investor appetite for 
convertible debt. We apply standard event study methodology outlined in Brown and Warner 
(1985) to calculate abnormal stock returns over the window (–1, 1) around the convertible 
debt announcement dates (obtained from SDC). We use the return over the CRSP value-
weighted market index as a proxy for the market return, and estimate the market model over 
the window (–240, –40) relative to the announcement date of the offering.  
Our final two proxies capture the amount of capital available for investment in 
convertible bonds. Flows into equity funds have previously been used to capture demand for 
equity (Cha and Lee, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2007). In a similar vein, we use flows into 
mutual funds specializing in convertible debt investments as a measure for investor demand 
for convertible debt. We obtain data on mutual fund flows (Mflows) from the CRSP 
Survivorship-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database. To identify mutual funds investing 
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predominantly in convertible bonds, we follow Agarwal et al. (2006), who select funds that 
have “CVR” stated as a Strategic Insight (SI) objective. We also incorporate funds with “CV” 
as their Lipper Objective Code. Moreover, in line with Wermers (2000), we include funds 
that have at least 50% of their holdings in convertibles over their entire reporting period.4 A 
total of 126 funds report their inflows over (part of) the 1975-2007 period. We use data 
beginning from 1986 since prior to this year the number of funds investing primarily in 
convertibles is very low (below ten).  
Next to mutual funds specialized in convertible bonds, hedge funds have also played a 
very important role in the convertible debt market since the mid-1990s (Choi, Getmansky, 
and Tookes, 2009; Choi et al., 2010). These funds typically hold a long position in the bond 
to take advantage of convertible bond underpricing, and hedge this position by shorting the 
issuer’s stock. As shown by Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2009), arbitrage-related short 
selling results in downward stock price pressure around the convertible bond issuance date. 
de Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2010) find, however, that the negative issue-date price 
pressure associated with arbitrage-related short selling tends to be very short-lived, since it is 
caused by an uninformed supply shift that is quickly absorbed by the market. Thus, 
downward stock price pressure associated with hedge fund activity is not likely to be a strong 
deterrent of the decision to cater to these funds.  
We obtain data on flows into convertible bond arbitrage hedge funds from the TASS Live 
and Graveyard sub-databases, which provide coverage from 1994 onwards. We select those 
funds that state convertible arbitrage as their primary investment category and that have a 
U.S.-oriented geographical focus, and convert all asset values to USD. A total of 164 funds 
report their inflows over (part of) the 1994-2007 period.  
We measure mutual fund flows (Mflows) and hedge fund flows (Hflows) in a similar way 
as Choi et al. (2010). First, we calculate dollar flows for each fund using the change in total 
net assets over quarter t adjusted for the returns of the fund, as in Equation (1). We then 
aggregate flows and total net assets across funds for each quarter and divide the change in 
total flows by total lagged assets to obtain percentage quarterly fund flows [Equation (2)].  
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In these equations, Assetsit refers to total net assets of each fund in quarter t, and rit is the 
asset return from quarter t–1 to t, calculated from the net asset value of each fund. 
Panel A of Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for convertible issuance numbers and 
for each of the investor demand proxies. The largest number of offerings (86.2) occurs in the 
second quarter of 2003. The first quarter of 1978 is the only period without any convertible 
issues. In line with previous studies (Kim and Stulz, 1992; Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 
1999, 2003), we find that convertible debt announcements induce a negative stock price 
effect (AbnRet of –1.4% on average). Average percentage flows into hedge funds are slightly 
                                                          
4 The SI and Lipper objectives are classifications of mutual funds. “CVR” and “CV” are the categories referring 
to convertible bond mutual funds used by the SI and Lipper objectives, respectively.  
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higher than flows into mutual funds. The Dickey-Fuller unit root test results reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for all variables, except for OverAllot. However, this variable cannot 
grow indefinitely, since its value is bounded between zero and one by construction. The unit 
root test results therefore indicate that we can include all variables as such in the time-series 
regressions, without having to take their first differences.  
Panel B presents pairwise Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the investor demand 
proxies. The proxies tend to have rather modest correlations (always smaller than 0.43 in 
absolute value), which is in line with the notion that they capture different aspects of investor 
demand for convertibles.  
 
 
2.3.3  Macroeconomic financing costs proxies 
 
In our empirical analyses, we control for intertemporal variations in financing costs by 
including a number of widely-used macroeconomic variables (all obtained from Datastream). 
The real interest rate (Rate) serves as a proxy for bankruptcy risk, as in Krishnaswami and 
Yaman (2008). This variable is calculated as the difference between yields on 10-year U.S. 
Treasury Bonds and the inflation rate, defined as the continuously-compounded annual 
change in the U.S. consumer price index. Following Korajczyk and Levy (2003), we control 
for business conditions and expected investment opportunities by including the term spread 
(TermSpread), defined as the difference between yields on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds and 
3-month U.S. Treasury Bills. Both the real interest rate and the term spread are averaged over 
the three months prior to the convertible bond issue date. We include the market runup 
(MktRunup), calculated as the return on the S&P 500 index over the quarter preceding the 
issue date, to control for general market conditions. To capture uncertainty about market 
returns, we include the annualised market return volatility (MktVolat), calculated using daily 
returns on the S&P 500 index over the quarter preceding the issue date. Finally, we control 
for investor sentiment (Sentiment), following several studies that highlight its importance in 
security issuance decisions (see, e.g., Lowry, 2003; Helwege and Liang, 2004). As a 
sentiment proxy we take the average level of the University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index over the three months prior to issuance. 
 
 
2.4   Impact of investor demand on convertible debt issuance, 
pricing, and design 
 
In this section we describe the empirical results on the impact of investor demand proxies 
on aggregate convertible bond issuance volumes, pricing, and design.  
 
 
2.4.1  Impact of investor demand on the aggregate convertible bond 
issuance volumes 
 
In the first step of our analysis we examine the importance of the six investor demand 
proxies in explaining aggregate convertible bond issuance fluctuations. Regressions are all 
estimated by means of the Newey-West technique to obtain heteroskedasticity- and 
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autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. We include an autoregressive AR(1) parameter to 
correct for residual serial correlation. Table 2.2 reports the results. 
In Columns (1) to (6), we separately include each of the investor demand proxies, while 
controlling for the macroeconomic financing costs proxies described earlier. Column (1) 
indicates that RiskAversion has a significant positive impact on convertible debt issuance 
volumes, which is in line with our prediction. To test the robustness of this result, we 
construct two alternative measures of risk aversion. The first measure is based on Chiu 
(2006), who uses the difference between flows into government bond funds and flows into 
equity funds as a proxy for risk aversion (a larger difference implying higher risk aversion). 
We identify equity and government bond mutual funds using a similar procedure as for 
convertible bond mutual funds. We use values for this proxy from 1982 onwards, since there 
are less than ten funds prior to this year. Our second alternative risk aversion measure is 
based on Kumar and Persaud (2002)’s hypothesis that, if risk aversion increases, investor 
demand will shift away from risky stocks to less risky securities, thus inducing a negative 
correlation between stock returns and lagged stock return volatility. Consistent with these 
authors, we measure risk aversion as the correlation between current returns and lagged 
volatility across Fama-French 48-industry portfolios. We calculate returns as monthly stock 
returns summed per quarter, and (annualized) volatility from monthly stock returns measured 
over the 12 months preceding the quarter. The coefficients of both of these alternative risk 
aversion proxies (untabulated) are statistically significant with the predicted sign, which 
further supports the notion that convertible issue volumes are positively influenced by the 
level of risk aversion in the economy.5  
Columns (2), (3) and (4) show that our other three investor taste proxies (OptionDemand, 
OverAllot, and AbnRet) also have a significant positive impact on aggregate convertible 
bond issuance volumes. The results are not only statistically, but also economically 
significant. For example, the coefficient on OptionDemand suggests that a one-standard 
deviation increase in this variable leads to 4.3 additional convertible issues per quarter, and 
the coefficient on OverAllot indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in this variable 
leads to an additional 7.2 convertible bond issues per quarter. 
In Columns (5) and (6), we report the impact of flows into mutual funds and hedge funds 
on convertible bond issuance activity. We find that the coefficients on Mflows and Hflows 
are both positive and significant. Thus, in line with Choi et al. (2010), we obtain evidence 
that convertible issuance responds to changes in the availability of investor capital. One 
alternative explanation is that investors increase their investments in convertible mutual funds 
and hedge funds when they expect a higher convertible bond issuance in the near future. To 
address this potential reverse causality issue, we conduct Granger causality tests with lag 
lengths of two quarters over the research window (starting in 1986 for Mflows and in 1994 
for Hflows) (untabulated). The relation between Mflows and IssuesCD seems to be bi-
directional: Mflows Granger causes IssuesCD (F-statistic for joint significance of lagged 
values of Mflows regressed on IssuesCD is 18.29), but we cannot rule out that flows into 
mutual funds are also influenced by anticipated issuance activity (F-statistic for joint 
significance of lagged values of IssuesCD regressed on Mflows is 5.61). On the other hand, 
we find strong evidence that Hflows Granger causes IssuesCD, but not vice versa (F-statistic 
for joint significance of lagged values of Hflows regressed on IssuesCD is 6.91, while F-
statistic for joint significance of lagged values of IssuesCD regressed on Hflows is 1.62).  
In Column (7), we include all investor demand proxies to assess their joint influence on 
convertible bond volumes. Together, the investor demand proxies account for more than one-
third (35.3%) of the temporal variation in convertible bond volumes. We find that the 
                                                          
5 Results of all untabulated analyses described throughout this chapter are available upon request from the 
corresponding author.  
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coefficients on OptionDemand, Overallot, and Mflows are significant with the predicted 
signs, while the coefficients on RiskAversion, AbnRet, and Hflows are no longer significant. 
Some loss in the significance of the individual proxies is expected, since all proxies are 
designed to capture investor demand for convertible bonds. In Column (8), we repeat this 
analysis while controlling for macroeconomic financing costs measures. Findings remain 
similar. Due to the inclusion of Hflows, the regressions in Columns (7) and (8) can only be 
estimated from 1994 onwards. We obtain similar results when we estimate the regressions in 
Columns (7) and (8) without Hflows included. With respect to the macroeconomic financing 
costs proxies, we find that convertible debt issuance volumes are positively influenced by 
equity market returns (as proxied by MktRunup), although the coefficient is only statistically 
significant in four out of the eight regression specifications. The finding of a positive impact 
of equity market conditions on aggregate convertible bond issuance volumes is in line with 
Hoffmeister, Hays, and Kelley (1987) and Mann, Moore, and Ramanlal (1999).  
In summary, the findings reported in Table 2.2 provide support for our hypothesis that 
security-issuing companies cater to investor demand for convertible debt. To check whether 
the results in Table 2.2 may be driven by a common trend in issuance numbers and investor 
demand proxies (potentially causing spurious correlation), we re-estimate the regressions 
including a time trend variable. Results of these untabulated regressions are virtually similar 
to those presented in Table 2.2. The time trend variable itself is significant in only two 
regressions. We also examine the robustness of our findings to the use of different issuance 
volume measures. Results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.3. Each of the estimated 
coefficients in Table 2.3 is derived from a regression of an issuance measure (column) on a 
single investor demand proxy (row), as well as on the aggregate financing costs measures 
specified earlier and an AR(1) term. The table thus represents the results of 30 separate 
regressions. For space reasons, we only show the coefficients for the investor demand 
proxies.  
The first column of Table 2.3 uses quarterly dollar volumes of convertible issues, 
obtained from SDC. All dollar values are deflated by the dollar market capitalization of the 
U.S. equity market at the end of the prior quarter, downloaded from Datastream. We 
construct an index for the equity market capitalization, with the market capitalization in 1975 
taking the value one, and use this index as our denominator to avoid having to divide by a 
large number. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the quarterly number of convertible 
issues deflated by the total number of convertible, common equity and straight debt issues 
over the quarter. The dependent variable in Column (3) is similar, but based on dollar 
volumes instead of issuance numbers. The results in Columns (1) to (3) indicate that the 
findings on the impact of investor demand proxies reported in Table 2.3 are largely robust to 
using alternative measures for convertible bond issuance fluctuations.  
Columns (4) and (5) provide the results of analogous regressions with quarterly numbers 
of seasoned common equity and straight debt issues (obtained as outlined earlier) as 
dependent variables. If the six demand proxies effectively capture investor demand specific 
to convertible bonds, we expect these proxies to have a weaker impact on equity and straight 
debt issue volumes than on convertible bond issue volumes. In line with this intuition, 
Column (4) indicates that none of the proxies for convertible debt demand have a significant 
impact on seasoned equity issuance, except for Mflows. When we orthogonalize Mflows with 
respect to flows into mutual funds specialised in common equity investments, it becomes an 
insignificant determinant of equity issuance volume. In Column (5), only OverAllot has a 
significant coefficient. When we regress the quarterly number of equity (straight debt) issues 
on all six of the investor demand proxies, we obtain an adjusted R2 of 1.1% (15.1%) 
(untabulated), which is substantially lower than the adjusted R2 of 35.3% obtained for an 
analogous regression with convertible debt issues as the dependent variable reported in 
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Column (7) of Table 2.2. Together, these findings suggest that the six investor demand 
variables capture sources of demand that are specific to convertible debt.  
As a final robustness test, we analyse whether the findings on the impact of investor 
demand on aggregate convertible bond issuance remain intact when controlling for security 
issuer (i.e., “supply-side”) characteristics. The literature provides two main rationales for the 
use of convertible debt. According to the theories of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus 
(1987), and Brennan and Schwartz (1988), convertibles serve as tools to alleviate costs 
associated with straight debt financing. According to the model of Stein (1992), in turn, 
convertibles serve as instruments to mitigate equity-related adverse selection costs in the 
presence of high financial distress costs. On the whole, these models imply that the typical 
convertible bond financing candidate has high costs of attracting traditional financing 
instruments (Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 1999, 2003). Over time, characteristics of security 
issuers may shift towards or away from this ideal profile of convertible issuers. If these shifts 
in security issuer characteristics coincide with shifts in investor demand, our investor demand 
proxy variables may actually pick up shifts in supply-side characteristics.  
To control for this possibility, we use a two-step methodology similar to the approach 
used by Fama and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004) in their studies of dividend 
issuance decisions. We first estimate a logistic regression model for the choice between 
convertible debt and traditional financing instruments (equity and straight debt) over the 
period 1975-2007, using firm characteristics as explanatory variables. The prediction errors 
of this model represent the propensity to issue convertible debt that cannot be explained by 
firm-specific features (labeled “residual propensity”). In a second step, we average residual 
propensities across firms for each quarter. This quarterly time series is then regressed on the 
investor demand proxies, as well as on macroeconomic control variables (all explanatory 
variables are lagged one quarter). If the investor demand variables remain significant under 
this alternative specification, we can conclude that our findings are not mainly driven by 
shifts in firm characteristics.  
The first-step logistic regression has an indicator variable equal to one for convertible 
offerings and equal to zero for equity or straight debt offerings as dependent variable. As 
independent variables, we include a number of standard firm-specific financing costs proxies 
used in prior studies on the characteristics of convertible debt issuers (see, e.g., Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward, 1999, 2003; Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2008). We retrieve firm 
characteristics from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual database, and measure these 
variables at the fiscal year-end prior to the convertible bond announcement date, unless 
mentioned otherwise. The symbol “#” denotes a Compustat data item. We include the 
following variables: StockRunup cumulative stock return over the window (–240, –40) 
relative to the announcement date ; Slack cash and short-term investments (#1) divided by 
total assets (#6) ; FixedAssets plant, property and equipment (#8) divided by total assets ; 
Tax income tax (#16) divided by total assets ; MB Market to book value, calculated as the 
number of shares (#25) multiplied by the share price (#199), divided by the book value of 
common equity (#60) ; LogAssets natural logarithm of total assets (#6) ; Leverage Long-
term debt (#9) divided by total assets ; and AssetGrowth Growth in total assets (#6) 
calculated over the year prior to the offer .  
We also control for idiosyncratic and systematic firm risk using the following proxies 
suggested by Hoberg and Prabhala (2009): ResVolat idiosyncratic risk, computed as the 
annualized standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily excess stock returns on 
returns over the CRSP value-weighted market index, estimated over the window (–240, –40) 
relative to the offering announcement date ; and SysVolat systematic risk, computed as the 
annualized standard deviation of the predicted value from a regression of daily stock returns 
18  Chapter 2 
 
on returns over the CRSP value-weighted market index, estimated over the window (–240, –
40) relative to the offering announcement date . Panel A of Table 2.4 presents the results of 
the logistic regression model. Compared to issuers of standard financing types, convertible 
issuers have significantly higher financial slack, leverage, growth opportunities (as proxied 
by AssetGrowth), and risk (as proxied by ResVolat and SysVolat), and a significantly smaller 
stock runup, portion of fixed assets, tax to total assets ratio, market to book value, and firm 
size. Overall, these results corroborate the notion that convertible bond issuers tend to have 
high costs of attracting equity or straight debt financing.  
In Panel B, we regress the residual of the logistic regression on lagged quarterly values of 
the investor demand and macroeconomic financing costs proxies. Except for Hflows, all 
demand proxies have a significant impact on issuance volumes with the predicted sign. 
Similar to the findings reported in Table 2.2, the coefficients on OptionDemand, OverAllot 
and Mflows remain significantly positive when all investor demand variables are included in 
one regression equation. We can thus conclude that our findings on the impact of investor 
demand on aggregate convertible bond issuance volumes are largely robust to controlling for 
firm-specific characteristics.  
 
 
2.4.2  Impact of investor demand on convertible debt pricing  
 
Having established that investor demand positively influences aggregate convertible bond 
issuance, we now examine whether issuers opportunistically exploit fluctuations in investor 
demand to obtain lower offering discounts (i.e., smaller initial underpricing levels) on their 
convertible offering. In line with Chan and Chen (2007) and de Jong, Dutordoir, and 
Verwijmeren (2010), we adopt the following definition of convertible bond offering 
discounts (OD): 
 
icePrTheor
icePrIssueicePrTheorOD                                                (3) 
 
In Equation (3), TheorPrice refers to the theoretical price of the bond, and IssuePrice 
refers to actual price at which the bond is issued (obtained from SDC).  
To calculate the theoretical convertible bond price, we use the Tsiveriotis and Fernandes 
(1998) model. Tsiveriotis and Fernandes essentially use a binomial-tree approach to model 
the stock price process and decompose the total value of a convertible bond into an equity 
component and a straight debt component. Since the straight debt part is subject to default, it 
needs to be discounted at a risk-adjusted rate. The residual equity-like part is default-free and 
can be discounted at the risk-free rate. The Tsiveriotis and Fernandes model is widely-used in 
other academic studies that examine convertible bond underpricing (Ammann, Kind, and 
Wilde, 2003; Chan and Chen, 2007; Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld, 2009; de Jong, 
Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren, 2010). Zabolotnyuk, Jones, and Veld (2010) point out that the 
method is also popular among practitioners.  
We use the following input variables in the model (all measured as of the convertible 
bond issue date, unless otherwise mentioned): yield on U.S. government bonds of which the 
maturity most closely matches the maturity of the convertible bond (obtained from CRSP); 
Moody’s credit ratings or equivalent Standard and Poor’s ratings converted to a Moody’s 
rating both obtained from SDC. We assign a rating of BAA2 to unrated convertibles, as in 
Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2009) ; credit spreads of similarly-rated corporate straight 
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debt (obtained from Datastream); conversion ratios and call schedules (obtained from SDC); 
dividend yield for the fiscal year preceding the announcement date calculated as dividend 
per share (#26) divided by the stock price (#199) , price of the underlying stock averaged 
between trading days –12 and –2 (obtained from CRSP); and annualized stock return 
volatility calculated from daily stock returns over the window (–240, –40). We can calculate 
offering discounts from 1991 onwards, since credit spreads are not available on Datastream 
prior to this year. In total, there are 1,105 convertibles for which we have sufficient 
information to compute offering discounts. We find that these discounts vary substantially 
(maximum value of 47%, minimum value of –40%). The average offering discount is 16.7%.  
To analyze the impact of investor demand on convertible bond offering discounts, we 
regress the OD of each convertible on the six investor demand proxies, measured at the end 
of the quarter prior to the convertible bond issuance date. In equilibrium, the convertible debt 
price should be the result of both investor demand and corporate supply. During periods with 
a large supply, offering discounts should be larger, ceteris paribus. As a measure for the 
aggregate supply of convertible bonds, we include the aggregate convertible bond issuance 
volume over the quarter prior to the convertible bond issuance date (VolumeCD). In addition, 
we include the macroeconomic financing costs measures defined earlier (each measured at 
the end of the quarter prior to the convertible debt issuance date). We also control for the 
following firm-specific characteristics suggested by the literature: StockRunup Chan and 
Chen (2007) find that a higher pre-offering stock price runup is associated with lower 
underpricing ; StockVolat King (1986) and Kang and Lee (1996) argue that convertibles 
issued by riskier companies may be more underpriced ; LogAssets (acts as a inverse measure 
of asymmetric information, which may lead to higher offering discounts); DivYield acts as 
an inverse proxy for growth opportunities, as in Billingsley, Lamy, and Thompson (1986). 
Higher growth opportunities are expected to be associated with lower underpricing, since 
they increase the option value of a convertible . Finally, we control for the following security 
design characteristics that have been shown to affect convertible debt underpricing: Dilution 
number of shares issued upon conversion of the bond (obtained from SDC) divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding at the time of issue (obtained from CRSP). Convertibles 
inducing a higher level of share dilution are expected to be more underpriced (Billingsley, 
Lamy, and Thompson, 1986) ; Moneyness conversion value of the convertible (obtained 
from SDC) divided by its investment value. The investment value denotes the value of the 
convertible bond under the assumption that the conversion option does not exist. King 
(1986), Carayannopoulos (1996), and Ammann, Kind, and Wilde (2003) find a negative 
relation between underpricing and the degree of moneyness of the convertible ; Maturity as 
shown by Ammann, Kind, and Wilde (2003), longer-dated bonds tend to be more 
underpriced ; and Rating a scale ranging from 1 for bonds rated AAA by Moody’s to 15 for 
bonds rated B2. We assign a value of 15 to bonds rated below B2. Chan and Chen (2007) find 
that underpricing is higher for lower-rated bonds .  
The results of the underpricing analysis are shown in Table 2.5. t-statistics are based on 
standard errors adjusted for clustering of observations within each year. The coefficients on 
the investor demand proxies are all significantly negative, indicating that higher investor 
demand indeed leads to a smaller convertible bond offering discount. The economic 
magnitude of the impact varies across the proxies. OverAllot has the strongest influence. A 
one-standard deviation increase in this demand proxy over the quarter prior to the issue 
(which is equivalent to a 30 percentage point increase in the number of convertible issues 
made using the overallotment option, relative to total issues over a quarter) leads to 2.8% less 
underpricing. Given that the average convertible debt issue size between 1991 and 2007 was 
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$280 million, this demand shock represents an average gain of approximately $7.9 million for 
each issuer.  
With regard to the control variables, we find a positive coefficient for VolumeCD, which 
is significant in most of the regression specifications. This finding is in line with our 
expectation that convertible bond underpricing should be higher in periods with high 
convertible bond issuance. We also find a significant positive coefficient for Rate, and 
significant negative coefficients for TermSpread, MktRunup and MtkVolat. At the firm level, 
we find significantly higher initial underpricing for firms having more volatile returns 
(StockVolat), and a smaller size (LogAssets). The significantly negative coefficient for 
DivYield suggests that firms with many valuable growth opportunities (as proxied by low 
dividends) issue bonds that are more underpriced. As expected, underpricing is significantly 
positively influenced by Dilution, and significantly negatively influenced by Moneyness. 
Rating has a counterintuitive negative sign, suggesting that bonds with a higher credit rating 
(scale closer to one) are more underpriced. 
The negative relation between the investor demand proxies and convertible debt 
underpricing provides direct evidence that issuers take advantage of increased investor 
demand to raise financing at a lower cost. In addition, the observation of a lower underpricing 
level during high-demand windows suggests that aggregate issuance activity seems to be 
unable to immediately satisfy the increased demand for convertibles. 
 
 
2.4.3  Impact of investor demand on convertible debt design 
 
In a final step of our empirical analysis, we examine the impact of temporal fluctuations 
in investor tastes for relatively more equity-like convertibles on the design of convertible 
bond offerings. We measure fluctuations in these investor preferences by means of the 
RiskAversion and OptionDemand proxy variables defined earlier. We predict that, during 
periods with higher risk aversion, investors should prefer securities with a smaller equity 
component, causing convertibles to be more debt-like in nature. Conversely, during periods 
with heightened demand for option-like securities, investors should prefer convertibles to 
have a larger option component. We thus expect a negative impact of RiskAversion, and a 
positive impact of OptionDemand on the size of the option component (or equity component) 
included in convertible bond offerings.6  
We use two different measures for a convertible bond’s equity component. Our first 
measure, labeled EquityTF, is the equity component obtained from the Tsiveriotis and 
Fernandes (1998) convertible bond pricing model, divided by the total value of the 
convertible bond. The equity component represents the difference between the theoretical 
price of the convertible calculated according to the Tsiveriotis-Fernandes binomial-tree 
algorithm (using the input parameters described earlier) and the value of an otherwise similar 
non-convertible straight bond. The average (median) value of EquityTF for the 1,105 
convertibles for which we can calculate this component equals 52.8% (51.7%). Our second 
equity component measure is the convertible bond delta. Delta measures the sensitivity of the 
convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value. We calculate the convertible 
debt delta as follows: 
 
                                                          
6 As mentioned earlier, we use the terms equity and option component interchangeably, in line with previous 
papers.  
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where N(.) is the cumulative probability under a standard normal distribution, δ is the 
continuously-compounded dividend yield calculated as outlined earlier, S is the price of the 
underlying stock measured at trading day –5 prior to the issue date, X is the conversion price, 
r is the yield on a 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond measured on the convertible bond issue date 
(obtained from Datastream), σ is the annualized stock return volatility estimated from daily 
stock returns over trading days −240 to −40, and T is the maturity of the convertible. The 
average (median) delta is 79.5% (84.6%).  
Both measures present the advantage that they take into account different convertible debt 
design features. As such, they provide a more comprehensive measure of the convertible’s 
equity component size than single security design characteristics such as conversion premium 
or maturity. The Pearson correlation between both measures is 0.34 (significant at the 1% 
level).  
In Table 2.6 we present the results of regressions of the equity component measures on 
RiskAversion and OptionDemand, both lagged one quarter. We also control for the aggregate 
financing costs measures and firm-specific characteristics specified earlier. t-statistics are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering of observations within each year. In Column 
(1), we find that RiskAversion has a significant positive influence on EquityTF.. Thus, risk 
aversion does have an impact on convertible debt design, but in the opposite direction of the 
one predicted. One possible explanation is that, during periods with heightened risk aversion, 
investors prefer to include equity-like convertibles in their portfolios as an alternative to 
(relatively more risky) common stock. Firms may cater to this preference by structuring their 
convertibles to have a larger equity component. Column (2) shows that OptionDemand has 
no significant impact. As can be seen in Columns (3) and (4), findings remain similar (albeit 
at lower significance levels) when we use the convertible debt delta as an alternative equity 
component proxy. With respect to the influence of the control variables, we find substantial 
differences across our two equity component measures. For example, LogAssets (StockVolat) 
has a significant positive (negative) impact on EquityTF, while it has a significant negative 
(positive) impact on Delta. These results are in line with the notion that, while EquityTF and 
Delta are positively correlated, these measures capture different aspects of the convertible 
bond design (e.g., EquityTF takes call features into account, while Delta does not). In 
unreported analyses, we also examine the impact of the other four investor demand proxies 
(i.e., OverAllot, AbnRet, Mflows, and Hflows) on convertible debt design. A priori, we 
expect a less significant impact for these measures. The reason is that they capture general 
investor preferences for convertible debt (OverAllot and AbnRet) or the availability of 
investor capital for convertible debt investment (Mflows and Hflows), rather than investor 
preferences for specific payoff patterns (as do RiskAversion and OptionDemand). In line 
with this intuition, we do not find a significant impact for either of these proxies.  
 
 
2.5   Conclusion  
 
We analyze whether convertible debt issuance, pricing, and design decisions are 
influenced by demand forces from investors. We construct six proxies to capture 
intertemporal variations in investor demand for convertible bond financing.  
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We find that convertible debt issuance volumes are significantly positively influenced by 
investor preferences for convertible debt, as well as by the amount of capital available for 
investment in this asset class. While our proxies for investor demand for convertibles have a 
strong impact on aggregate convertible issuance volumes, they have a substantially lower 
power to explain seasoned equity or straight debt offerings. This finding supports the notion 
that convertible bonds satisfy a specific clientele, whose needs cannot be fulfilled by means 
of standard financing instruments. We also obtain evidence that convertible issuers 
opportunistically set higher prices on their offerings during periods of heightened investor 
demand, and that these issuers adjust the design of their offering in response to the level of 
risk aversion of investors. Our empirical analyses all control for macroeconomic financing 
costs as well as issuer-specific (“supply”) characteristics.  
On the whole, our results indicate that security-issuing companies are aware of changes in 
the investor demand for convertible securities, and cater to increases in this demand when 
deciding on the security type to be issued as well as on the price and structure of the offering.  
An interesting question that is left unanswered by our analysis is what drives the temporal 
fluctuations in investor preferences for convertible securities. We leave this question as a 
venue for future research. 
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Table 2.3: Robustness of the results to using alternative issuance measures 
This table shows the robustness of the results to the use of different issuance measures. Each of the estimated 
coefficients is obtained from a regression of the dependent variable (column) on a single investor demand proxy 
(row), as well as on aggregate financing costs measures and an AR(1) term. For parsimony, only the coefficients for 
the demand proxies are shown. VolumeCD is the quarterly dollar volume of convertible bond issues deflated by the 
dollar market capitalization of the U.S. equity market at the end of the prior quarter. RelNoCD is the quarterly 
number of convertible issues deflated by the total number of convertible, equity and debt issues. RelVolCD is the 
quarterly dollar volume of convertible issues deflated by the total dollar volume of convertible, equity and debt 
issues. IssuesEQ and IssuesSD are the quarterly numbers of equity and straight debt issues, respectively, deflated by 
the number of firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges at the end of the prior quarter. 
Independent variables are measured over the quarter prior to the convertible issuance date. RiskAversion is a 
habitat-based risk aversion proxy calculated as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). OptionDemand measures the 
difference between implied and realized volatilities as in Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009). OverAllot is 
the number of convertibles for which the over-allotment option is exercised relative to all convertible bond offerings 
in each quarter. AbnRet captures average abnormal stock returns measured over the window (–1, 1) relative to the 
convertible debt announcement date. Mflows measures flows into convertible mutual funds, obtained from the 
CRSP Survivorship-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database. Hflows measures quarterly flows into convertible arbitrage 
hedge funds, obtained from the TASS Live and Graveyard sub-databases. The starting period varies but all data 
range until end the end of 2007. All regressions are estimated using the Newey-West technique. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
VolumeCD RelNoCD RelVolCD IssuesEQ IssuesSD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investor Demand Proxies
RiskAversiont-1 158.63 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 *** -1.88 20.01
(2.18) (2.41) (2.86) (-0.17) (1.23)
OptionDemandt-1 2,884.54 ** 0.37 ** 0.46 ** 130.29 215.53
(2.56) (2.56) (2.22) (1.29) (1.28)
OverAllott-1 278.43 0.05 ** 0.06 ** 30.28 49.37 *
(1.53) (2.18) (2.18) (1.53) (1.68)
AbnRett-1 2,912.49 * 0.55 * 0.26 191.01 340.90
(1.94) (1.97) (0.75) (1.05) (1.34)
Mflowst-1 2,763.11 *** 0.39 *** 0.31 *** 136.30 * 277.70
(6.83) (2.91) (2.71) (1.97) (1.46)
Hflowst-1 1,500.46 * 0.12 0.33 ** 66.27 69.70
(2.00) (1.01) (2.37) (1.04) (0.52)
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Table 2.6: Impact of investor demand on convertible debt design 
This table presents the results of regressions of convertible bond design on risk aversion and option demand proxies, 
firm-specific characteristics, and aggregate financing costs measures. EquityTF is the equity component obtained 
from the Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) convertible bond pricing model, divided by the total value of the 
convertible bond. Delta is the sensitivity of the convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value. 
Aggregate financing costs measures are calculated over the quarter preceding the convertible bond issue date. 
RiskAversion is a habitat-based risk aversion proxy calculated as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). OptionDemand 
measures the difference between implied and realized volatilities as in Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009). 
Rate refers to the quarterly average real interest rate, measured as the difference between yields on 10-year Treasury 
Bonds and the inflation rate. TermSpread refers to the quarterly average term premium, calculated as the difference 
between yields on 10-year Treasury Bonds and 3-month Treasury Bills. MktRunup captures the quarterly return on 
the S&P 500 Index. MktVolat is the annualized market return volatility calculated from daily returns on the S&P 
500 index averaged over the quarter. Sentiment is the quarterly average level of the Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index. The following firm-specific characteristics are measured as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the issue, 
unless otherwise stated. # indicates a Compustat data item. StockRunup is the cumulative stock return over the 
window (–240, –40) relative to the announcement date. Slack is calculated as cash and short-term investments (#1) 
divided by total assets (# 6). FixedAssets is calculated as plant, property and equipment (#8) divided by total assets. 
Tax is taxes paid (#16) divided by total assets. MB refers to the market to book value and is calculated as the 
number of shares (#25) multiplied by the share price (#199), divided by common equity (#60). LogAssets is the 
natural logarithm of total assets (#6). Leverage is long-term debt (#9) divided by total assets. AssetGrowth is growth 
in assets over the year prior to the offering. StockVolat is the annualized standard deviation of the stock return, 
calculated using daily returns over the window (–240, –40) relative to the announcement date. The starting period 
varies but all data range until the end of 2007. t-statistics (calculated with standard errors robust to clustering of 
observations within each year) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
RiskAversiont-1 2.88 *** 0.02 *
(2.97) (1.70)
OptionDemandt-1 -2.46 0.03
(-0.16) (0.13)
Aggregate Financing Costs Measures
Ratet-1 -1.09 *** -1.15 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 ***
(-3.56) (-3.72) (-3.24) (-3.60)
TermSpreadt-1 0.97 *** 0.78 *** 0.00 0.00
(3.36) (2.68) (0.40) (-0.97)
MktRunupt-1 -15.44 *** -14.01 *** -0.14 ** -0.04
(-3.10) (-2.76) (-2.21) (-0.65)
MktVolatt-1 -33.94 *** -23.82 *** -0.29 *** -0.16
(-4.36) (-3.17) (-2.92) (-1.53)
Sentimentt-1 0.08 * 0.04 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(1.91) (0.99) (5.96) (2.97)
Firm-Specific Characteristics
StockRunup 2.89 *** 2.78 *** -0.01 0.00
(5.11) (4.94) (-0.99) (0.11)
Slack -1.65 -1.33 0.01 -0.02
(-1.12) (-0.91) (0.63) (-0.94)
FixedAssets -2.61 * -2.81 * -0.07 *** -0.09 ***
(-1.67) (-1.77) (-3.76) (-3.99)
Tax 15.07 16.54 * 0.38 *** 0.44 ***
(1.59) (1.73) (3.37) (3.46)
MB 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00
(1.22) (0.86) (0.38) (-0.77)
LogAssets 0.71 *** 0.83 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 ***
(3.03) (3.58) (-13.85) (-11.37)
Leverage 0.57 0.31 0.11 *** 0.09 ***
(0.33) (0.18) (4.54) (3.64)
AssetGrowth 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.87) (0.60) (1.00) (0.92)
StockVolat -4.10 *** -3.49 ** 0.29 *** 0.25 ***
(-2.63) (-2.23) (8.39) (6.96)
Intercept 30.92 *** 51.18 *** 0.60 *** 0.86 ***
(3.95) (13.24) (6.36) (15.94)
Adjusted R-squared 9.7 % 8.9 % 29.6 % 28.3 %
No. of Observations 956 956 1,898 1,494
Starting period 1991 1991 1980 1986
Dependent = EquityTF Dependent = Delta
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Changes in the convertible buyer base and 
new issue announcement returns7  
 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
Convertible bonds are hybrid securities that combine features of straight debt and equity. 
They resemble straight debt by paying a fixed coupon rate, and they resemble common equity 
by offering the possibility of conversion into stock as an alternative for receiving the nominal 
value in cash at the redemption date. Convertibles are a popular source of financing. Over the 
past 30 years, convertible debt issuance comprised approximately ten percent of total 
securities issuance by U.S. corporations.8 
Existing event studies on the announcement effects associated with convertible debt 
offerings generally focus on convertibles issued during the 1970s and 1980s. A common 
finding of these studies is that convertibles induce negative abnormal stock returns that are 
intermediate in size between the announcement effects associated with seasoned equity and 
straight debt offerings (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward, 1999). This pattern is consistent with the signaling model of Myers 
and Majluf (1984), which predicts that relatively more equity-like security offerings are more 
likely to be perceived as a signal of firm overvaluation. 
This chapter is inspired by the observation that convertible bond announcement effects 
have sharply declined over the past decade, whereas there is no corresponding decline in 
equity or straight debt announcement returns. While convertible offerings announced 
between 1984 and 1999 induce average abnormal stock returns of −1.69%, convertibles 
announced in the period 2000 to 2008 are associated with average abnormal stock price 
declines that are more than twice as large (−4.59%).  
                                                          
7 This Chapter is based on Duca, Dutordoir,Veld, and Verwijmeren (2010). It has benefited from comments by 
Stefano Bonini, Abe de Jong, Achim Himmelmann, Andreas Hoepner, Peter Roosenboom, Frederik 
Schlingemann, Heather Tarbert, Mathijs van Dijk, and participants at the Conference of the Scottish BAA in 
Glasgow (August 2010), the International Corporate Finance and Governance Symposium in Twente (October 
2010), and the Campus for Finance Conference in WHU Otto-Beisheim (January 2011). 
8 That is ten percent of the total amount of convertible debt, common equity, and straight debt issued by U.S. 
firms (excluding financials and utilities). Source: Securities Data Company New Issues database. 
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We hypothesize that the sharp decline in observed convertible bond announcement 
returns is attributable to a substantial change in the buy-side of the convertible bond market. 
Convertibles traditionally appealed to long-only investors looking for diversification benefits 
and indirect participation in equities (Lummer and Riepe, 1993). However, Choi, Getmansky, 
and Tookes (2009) show a dramatic increase in the importance of convertible arbitrage funds 
since the end of the 1990s. To exploit underpriced convertible issues, convertible bond 
arbitrageurs buy the convertibles and short the underlying common stock. If demand curves 
for stock are downward-sloping, the supply increase associated with this arbitrage-related 
short selling should result in a negative stock price effect. Of course, short-selling activities 
take place when convertible bond arbitrageurs are actually able to buy the offerings, i.e., on 
convertible bond issue dates rather than on announcement dates. However, for almost all 
recent convertible bond offerings issuance occurs either on the announcement date or one 
trading date after that. The very rapid issuance of recent convertibles can be explained by the 
fact that most of these issues are structured as Rule 144A offerings, which allows for a very 
fast (often overnight) placement (Huang and Ramirez, 2010). Therefore, our key prediction is 
that the observed highly negative “announcement” effect of recent convertible bond issues 
may partly reflect temporary price pressure associated with the activities of convertible bond 
arbitrageurs.  
To test this prediction, we collect a sample of 1,436 convertible bonds issued by U.S. 
corporations from the Securities Data Company’s New Issues database (henceforth SDC). In 
line with previous studies (Choi et al., 2009, De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren, 2010), 
we construct a measure for the amount of hedging-induced short selling associated with each 
convertible bond offering by regressing changes in monthly short interest around convertible 
bond issues on a number of potential firm-specific, issue-specific and time-varying 
determinants of arbitrageurs’ interest in a given offering. The predicted value of this 
regression reflects the portion of the change in monthly short interest that can be attributed to 
short selling by convertible bond arbitrageurs (as opposed to short selling by fundamental 
traders).  
In line with our hypothesis, we find that the difference in announcement-period returns 
between convertibles issued in the period 1984 to 1999 (labeled “Traditional Investor 
period”) and convertibles issued in the period 2000 to September 2008 (labeled “Arbitrage 
period”) is no longer significant after controlling for our constructed measure for arbitrage-
induced short selling. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications of arbitrage-
induced short selling, and remain intact when controlling for issuer-specific, security-
specific, and macroeconomic determinants of convertible bond announcement effects. 
The recent credit crisis placed serious constraints on the ability of convertible bond 
arbitrageurs to execute their hedging strategy. As a result, the convertible bond buyer base 
underwent a second important shift, from hedge funds back to long-only investors. In an 
article in the Financial Times of May 11, 2009, Masters (2009) writes: “Now hedge funds 
play a much smaller role in the investor base, representing less than half of the buyers of new 
issues (of convertible bonds) in many cases.” In line with this comment, Hutchinson and 
Gallagher (2010) show a strong decline of the number of unique convertible bond arbitrage 
funds in the TASS database after August 2008. From an arbitrage viewpoint, we therefore 
expect to observe less negative abnormal returns for convertibles issued during the financial 
crisis. However, our event-study results indicate that the average announcement effect for 
convertible bonds issues between the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 (which is 
often taken as a starting point of the crisis period) and December 2009 is almost twice as 
negative as in the Arbitrage period (−9.12%). Our evidence suggests that this very negative 
reaction can be attributed to the extremely high underpricing of crisis-period convertibles. 
While Arbitrage-period offerings are issued at an average discount of 15.7%, offering 
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discounts for Post-Lehman offerings are more than twice as large (34.2% on average). 
Issuing highly underpriced convertibles may have been the only option for cash- and credit-
constrained firms during the crisis.  
To further strengthen our case for the arbitrage explanation for the evolution in 
convertible bond announcement effects, we also analyze post-issuance abnormal stock 
returns. If the observed negative announcement effects of Arbitrage-period convertibles are 
indeed partly attributable to hedging-induced price pressure, then we should observe a 
positive stock price reversal quickly after the convertible bond issue date. The reason is that, 
after a short time, the market should have absorbed the effect of the supply shock. Consistent 
with this prediction, we find significant positive abnormal stock returns following Arbitrage-
period convertible bond issues, with the magnitude of the reversal significantly influenced by 
our constructed measure for the hedging demand associated with these offerings. Also in line 
with the arbitrage explanation, we find no evidence of such reversal for issues made during 
the Traditional Investor and Post-Lehman periods.  
Our analysis provides the following two main contributions to the literature. First, our 
study sheds a new light on long-accepted stylized facts on the relative magnitude of security 
offering announcement effects, by documenting that announcement-period returns associated 
with recent convertible offerings are far more negative than those for equity offerings. 
However, we also show that part of the highly negative “announcement” return associated 
with Arbitrage-period convertibles is actually caused by a short-lived stock price pressure 
induced by short-selling activities of convertible bond buyers. Our results imply that event 
studies using recent convertible bond offering announcements should correct for the 
influence of buy-side short selling associated with announced convertible bond issues. If not, 
they are likely to draw wrong (i.e., overly pessimistic) conclusions on the true magnitude of 
the transactions’ impact on firm value.9  
Second, our study contributes to a recent stream of corporate finance articles that 
explicitly take the influence of investor characteristics into account. As pointed out by Baker 
(2009), corporate finance studies have traditionally focused on the corporate supply side, 
thereby implicitly considering the investor side as a black box with perfectly elastic and 
competitive demand. However, a number of studies find that corporate finance actions can 
also be influenced through investor demand channels (e.g., Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; 
Leary, 2009; Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). Within this stream of literature, a limited number 
of papers document the impact of the actions of convertible bond arbitrageurs on convertible 
bond issuance volumes (Choi, Getmansky, Henderson, and Tookes, 2010; De Jong, Duca, 
and Dutordoir, 2010) and convertible bond design (Brown, Grundy, Lewis, and Verwijmeren, 
2010; De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren, 2010). Our study compliments these papers by 
examining the impact of buy-side shifts on stockholder wealth effects of convertible bond 
issues.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides the 
theoretical background for our study. Section 3.3 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 3.4 discusses the empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Similarly, Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) show that almost half of the negative “announcement return” 
observed around fixed-exchange-ratio mergers is attributable to short-lived price pressure caused by the hedging 
transactions of merger arbitrageurs. 
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3.2   Theoretical background  
 
In this section, we first briefly describe the two important shifts in the convertible bond 
investor base that occurred over the past decade. We then formulate our testable predictions 
on the impact of these shifts on the stockholder wealth effects of convertible bond offerings.  
 
 
3.2.1  Shifts in the convertible bond investor base 
 
Theoretical studies on convertible debt predict that convertibles are able to mitigate costs 
associated with attracting common equity and/or straight debt financing (Green, 1984; 
Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; Stein, 1992). Consistent with the hybrid debt-equity nature of 
convertible debt, event studies on the announcement effects associated with convertible debt 
offerings commonly find that these effects are negative and intermediate in size between the 
announcement effects associated with seasoned equity and straight debt offerings.10  
The majority of these studies focus on a period in which convertible bond investors (e.g., 
mutual funds specialized in convertible bond investments) buy the convertibles without 
shorting the underlying stock. Around the beginning of the 21st century, however, the 
convertible bond investor base shifted from traditional long-only buyers towards convertible 
bond arbitrageurs (mostly hedge funds, but also institutional investors). By the beginning of 
the 21st century, hedge funds were purchasing up to 80% of new convertible issues (Brown et 
al., 2010).  
The recent credit crisis, in turn, marked a substantial decline in the importance of 
convertible bond arbitrageurs as convertible bond investors. One of the reasons why arbitrage 
funds lost their grip on this market was the short sales ban affecting U.S. financial stocks 
between September 19, 2008 and October 8, 2008.11 Other factors disadvantaging convertible 
arbitrage include widespread hedge fund redemptions, extensive deleveraging, and higher 
funding and borrowing costs (Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index research report, May 
2009).  
The main goal of this chapter is to examine the impact of these two important shifts in the 
involvement of convertible arbitrage funds on the stock price effects of convertible bond 
offerings. We distinguish three periods, each with a different involvement of convertible 
bond arbitrageurs. It is difficult to exactly indicate when convertible bond arbitrageurs 
became dominant players in the convertible bond market, because hedge funds do not 
disclose much information on their investments. To obtain more insight into the evolution of 
convertible arbitrage funds over time, we search the Factiva database for news sources that 
mention “convertible arbitrage” or related terms over the period 1984 to 2009.12 Figure 3.1 
provides the results of this search. The graph shows a sharp rise in the number of hits from 
2000 onwards. This result is in line with Choi et al. (2009), who document a dramatic 
increase in the total assets under management of convertible bond hedge funds at the end of 
the 1990s.13 We therefore use January 2000 as a cutoff date for the start of the Arbitrage 
                                                          
10 See Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) for an overview of the literature. 
11 See Beber and Pagano (2010) and Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2010) for a detailed discussion of the short 
sales ban. 
12 Factiva provides access to thousands of archived newspaper and magazine articles, as well as to press releases 
appearing on newswires.  
13 A Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index research report dated May 2009 confirms that January 2000 is a 
reasonable cutoff date for the start of the Arbitrage period: “Up until the year 2000, the convertible bond market 
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period, in which the convertible bond investor base is dominated by convertible bond 
arbitrageurs, and label the previous window (from 1984 to December 1999) the Traditional 
Investor period.  
It is also not straightforward to determine an exact date for the start of the financial crisis. 
As argued by Beber and Pagano (2010), the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 
2008 is one of the most salient turning points in the course of events leading to the crisis. We 
therefore consider this date as the start of the third era, labeled “Post-Lehman” period.  
 
 
3.2.2  Testable predictions  
 
Unlike traditional long-only investors, convertible bond arbitrageurs generally short a 
portion of the common stock of the issuing firm to make their position invariant to small 
stock price movements. Their profits result from the fact that convertibles tend to be 
underpriced at issuance, and/or from their ability to exploit superior technology in managing 
convertible risk (Agarwal, Fung, Loon, and Naik, 2006).14  
If demand curves for stock are not perfectly elastic, the increase in the supply of shares 
resulting from arbitrage-related short selling should induce downward stock price pressure 
around the convertible bond issuance date. A number of studies effectively find evidence of 
negative abnormal stock returns around convertible bond issue dates (Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, 
Switzer, and Gosselin, 2005; Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld, 2009; De Jong, Dutordoir, and 
Verwijmeren, 2010).  
An important feature of recent convertible bond offerings is that they are placed very 
rapidly (often overnight), causing their announcement and issuance to be very close. The 
most important reason for this rapid placement is that most recent convertibles are structured 
as 144A offerings. Such offerings can be sold to selected institutional investors without 
having to incur time-consuming activities such as road shows and SEC filings.15 As a result 
of the overlap between issuance and announcement dates, the observed “announcement” 
effect of convertible bond issues may partly reflect price pressure associated with the shorting 
activities of convertible arbitrageurs. Given the different levels of involvement of this 
investor class over the three eras considered in our study, we thus obtain the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Arbitrage-period convertibles induce more negative announcement-period 
stock returns than Traditional Investor- and Post-Lehman-period convertibles. 
 
Stock market reactions to convertible bond announcements may be influenced by the 
characteristics of the issuer, the convertible bond design, as well as by macroeconomic 
conditions at the moment of issuance (Lewis et al., 1999, 2003; Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 
2007; Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2008; Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld, 2008). Thus, any 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was primarily driven by long-only buyers. Hedge funds entered the space in increasing numbers thereafter (…). 
The hedge fund influx represented a change in the buyer base.” 
14 Potential reasons for convertible debt underpricing include illiquidity, small issue size, and complexities 
associated with the valuation of hybrid securities (Lhabitant, 2002). 
15 One other reason why recent convertibles often have their issuance and announcement very closely together is 
that convertible arbitrage hedge funds tend to have a flexible, flat organization form, which enables them to 
decide very fast on whether they will include the convertible bond issue in their portfolio. In our empirical 
analysis, we include appropriate control variables for convertibles for which the announcement and issue dates 
coincide, as well as for 144A issues. 
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observed difference in the stockholder wealth effects of convertible bond offerings across the 
three periods may also be caused by temporal shifts in these determinants. We establish 
whether the differences in stockholder wealth effects across the three periods are effectively 
caused by temporal changes in buy-side characteristics by testing the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Differences in announcement-period returns between Arbitrage-period 
convertibles and Traditional Investor-/Post-Lehman-period convertibles disappear when 
controlling for arbitrage-related short selling associated with the convertible debt offering.  
 
The arbitrage explanation for differences in stock price reactions across the three periods 
also yields a testable prediction on the stock price behavior shortly after the convertible bond 
offering. More particularly, if (part of) the negative stock price effect associated with 
Arbitrage-period convertibles is indeed caused by an increase in the supply of stock 
associated with arbitrage-related short selling, then we expect to observe a stock price 
reversal shortly after the issuance of these offerings. The underlying rationale is that demand 
curves for stock tend to be inelastic only in the short run, so stock prices should revert to their 
fundamental values once the market has absorbed the shock (Harris and Gurel, 1986). By 
contrast, in the Traditional Investor and Post-Lehman periods, there should be no such stock 
price reversal. We thus obtain the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Convertible offerings made during the Arbitrage period are followed by a 
positive stock price reversal. No such reversal takes place in the Traditional Investor and 
Post-Lehman periods. 
 
 
3.3   Data and methodology 
 
In this section, we first describe how we obtain the data sets of convertible, seasoned 
equity, and straight bond offerings. We then discuss our measure for the arbitrage-related 
short selling associated with convertible bond offerings, as well as the different control 
variables included in the analysis.  
 
 
3.3.1  Convertible bond, equity, and straight bond samples 
 
We obtain data for U.S. convertible debt, equity, and straight debt issued between January 
1984 and December 2009 from the SDC Database. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900-
4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), and consolidate multiple tranches of 
convertibles and straight debt offerings issued by the same firm on the same date. In the 
convertible bond sample, we only include “plain vanilla” convertible bonds (no exchangeable 
bonds, mandatory convertible bonds, or convertible preferred stock). In the equity sample, we 
only include seasoned common stock offerings made by the firm itself (no IPOs, no offerings 
made by existing shareholders, no preferred stock issues, no unit issues). We eliminate asset- 
and mortgage-backed bonds, depository notes, and bonds issued with warrants from the 
straight debt sample. We obtain a data set of 1,436 convertible bond issues, 4,885 equity 
issues, and 8,734 straight bond issues. There are 727 convertible issues in the Traditional 
Investor period, 645 convertible issues in the Arbitrage period, and 64 convertible issues in 
the Post-Lehman period. 
 Changes in the convertible buyer base and new issue announcement returns   41 
 
                                                                       
We obtain company accounts variables from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual 
database, stock-price related data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
deal-specific information from SDC, and macroeconomic data from Datastream.  
 
 
3.3.2  Measure for arbitrage-related short selling 
 
To test the arbitrage explanation for differences in convertible bond announcement 
returns across the three periods, we construct a measure for the amount of arbitrage-related 
short selling associated with each convertible bond offering. In a first step, we download 
monthly short interest data from the Securities Monthly file of the CRSP-Compustat merged 
database. These data are available from March 2003 until June 2008. To match short interest 
data to convertible bond issues, we apply the algorithm used by Bechmann (2004) and Choi 
et al. (2009). If a bond is issued before the cutoff trade date of a given month (i.e., three 
trading days prior to the 15th of each month), we match the issue date with the short interest 
data filed for that month. Otherwise, we match the issue date with the short interest data for 
the following month. As short interest is reported bi-monthly since September 2007, we 
adjust the algorithm to a two-monthly frequency from that month onwards. We scale the 
change in monthly short interest ( SI) by the number of shares outstanding (SO) measured on 
trading day –20. We find an average (median) value of 0.019 (0.014) for the SI/SO ratio, 
which is similar to values recorded by Choi et al. (2009) and De Jong, Dutordoir, and 
Verwijmeren (2010).  
As argued by Choi et al. (2009), part of the observed increase in short interest around 
convertible bond offerings may be attributable to the short-selling actions of fundamental 
traders. In a second step, we therefore need to isolate the portion of the SI/SO measure that 
can effectively be attributed to the shorting actions of convertible bond arbitrageurs. We do 
this by regressing SI/SO on a number of potential determinants of convertible arbitrageurs’ 
interest in that particular convertible offering. We then take the predicted value for this 
regression as a measure for the change in short interest caused by arbitrage-related short 
selling (as opposed to fundamental short selling).16  
A priori, we expect a convertible bond arbitrageur to be more interested in issuers with 
more liquid shares (since high liquidity makes it easier for arbitrageurs to obtain their 
hedging positions), high institutional ownership (since institutional investors are more likely 
to lend out their shares than individual investors), volatile stock returns (since volatility 
positively affects the option value of the convertible, thus allowing a higher potential profit), 
and no dividend payouts (since dividends represent a cash outflow for short sellers). We 
therefore include the Amihud (2002) measure for illiquidity, the percentage of institutional 
ownership, the stock return volatility, and a dummy variable equal to one for convertible debt 
issuers that paid out a dividend in the previous fiscal year in the regression analysis. 
Appendix A contains detailed definitions for these variables. Next to issuer characteristics, 
we also expect arbitrageurs’ interest in a convertible bond issue to be affected by the 
characteristics of the offering itself. We predict a larger increase in arbitrage-related short 
interest around offerings for which arbitrageurs need to short-sell a larger number of shares to 
hedge their positions. We therefore include the ratio of Sarb to shares outstanding, with Sarb 
representing the expected number of shares shorted by arbitrageurs under the assumption that 
                                                          
16 Mitchell et al. (2004) apply a similar procedure to isolate the portion of changes in short interest attributable 
to the hedging behavior of merger arbitrageurs.  
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the arbitrageurs follow a delta-neutral hedging technique.17  Sarb depends on the convertible 
bond proceeds, the conversion ratio, and the equity component size of the offerings. 
Appendix B provides a more detailed description of this variable. We also expect arbitrageurs 
to be more interested in zero-coupon convertibles. The reason is that paying no coupons 
makes it easier to separate the option component of the convertible from its fixed-income 
component, which is a technique often applied by convertible arbitrage hedge funds.  
Panel A of Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for these potential issuer- and issue-
specific hedging demand determinants for the three periods.  
In the last column, we provide the results of t-tests for pairwise differences in the means 
across two periods. The letters a (b) indicate significant differences (at the 5% level) in the 
mean value between the Traditional Investor and the Arbitrage (Post-Lehman) period, and the 
letter c indicates a significant difference (at the 5% level) in the mean value between the 
Arbitrage and the Post-Lehman period. The Kruskal-Wallis p-value indicates the joint 
significance level of the difference in the variables across the three periods.  
We find evidence of significant differences in the potential hedging demand determinants 
across the three periods. Most remarkably, the percentage of institutional ownership of 
convertible debt issuers increases substantially between the Traditional Investor and the 
Arbitrage period (from 41.4% to 71.5%), and the stock return volatility is almost twice as 
large for Post-Lehman issuers than for other issuers. It is also striking that, while 
approximately 7% of the convertibles issued during the first two periods have a zero-coupon 
structure, we find no zero-coupon offerings in the Post-Lehman period.  
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the results of a regression analysis of SI/SO on the 
potential determinants of arbitrageurs’ hedging demand. The analysis includes convertibles 
issued between 2003 and 2008 for which all necessary explanatory variables are available. In 
all regressions reported throughout the chapter, we calculate t-statistics using White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Next to issuer- and issue-specific features, the reported regressions also include measures 
for temporal variations in the importance of convertible arbitrage activities. Such variations 
may occur due to fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions and/or in the capital available for 
investments in arbitrage funds. As a first proxy for temporal fluctuations in the importance of 
convertible bond arbitrageurs, we include the number of news sources in Factiva that mention 
“convertible arbitrage” or a related term over the three months prior to issuance (CAFactiva). 
One limitation of this measure is that it does not control for the actual content of the news 
source. Since both positive and negative developments regarding arbitrage funds may be 
newsworthy items, CAFactiva may be high both in periods in which arbitrageurs realize high 
profits (i.e., the Arbitrage period) and in periods with a high failure rate among convertible 
arbitrage funds (i.e., the Post-Lehman era). Figure 3.1 suggests that this may indeed be the 
case, as the number of convertible arbitrage-related announcements remains high throughout 
the Post-Lehman era. In Column (2) of Panel B, we therefore include lagged capital flows 
into convertible arbitrage funds (CAFlows) over the quarter prior to issuance as an alternative 
proxy for temporal fluctuations in the activities of hedge funds. Appendix A provides a 
detailed description of the calculation of this variable. The CAFlows variable may be a more 
accurate measure than CAFactiva, but presents the disadvantage that it can only be obtained 
from 1994 onwards.  
The R2s of the regression specifications in Columns (1) and (2) indicate that, together, the 
arbitrage demand proxies are able to explain approximately 20% of the variation in short 
                                                          
17 Arguably, arbitrageurs may take other Greeks (e.g., gamma, vega) into account when deciding on their 
hedging positions. Still, most of the convertible arbitrage strategies build on the delta-neutral hedging technique 
(Calamos, 2003). 
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interest increases around convertible bond offerings. This result is consistent with the notion 
that part of the increase in short interest reflects trading patterns by fundamental traders rather 
than arbitrageurs. The regression results suggest that the expected number of shares shorted 
(Sarb/SO) is the most important determinant of arbitrageurs’ hedging demand. The Amihud 
illiquidity measure also has a significant coefficient with the predicted negative sign, while 
the other variables have non-significant coefficients.  
In a final step, we use the coefficients of the regression in Column (1) of Table 3.1 to 
obtain an estimate of the arbitrage-related change in short interest for each convertible debt 
offering issued over the period 1984 to 2009. That is, for each observation for which we have 
all explanatory variables available, we multiply the value of the regression coefficients by the 
values of the correspondent explanatory variables. The resulting value represents the 
estimated change in short interest (relative to shares outstanding) caused by convertible 
arbitrageurs’ short selling associated with that particular convertible bond.18  
 
 
3.3.3  Control variables 
 
Next to our hedging demand measure, we also include a number of issuer-specific 
variables in our analysis of convertible bond announcement returns. Appendix A provides a 
detailed definition of each of the control variables. All issuer characteristics included in the 
regression analyses are measured at fiscal year-end preceding the convertible debt 
announcement date, unless otherwise indicated. 
Since convertibles encompass an equity component, we expect stockholder reactions to 
convertible debt announcements to be more negative for issuers with high equity-related 
financing costs. Similarly, due to the debt component embedded in convertible debt, we also 
expect convertible debt announcement returns to be more negative for issuers with high costs 
of attracting new debt financing.19 In line with Lewis et al. (1999, 2003), we use the amount 
of slack capital and the pre-announcement stock runup (measured as the continuously-
compounded non-market-adjusted daily stock return over trading days –60 to –2 relative to 
the announcement date) as proxies for the level of equity-related financing costs faced by the 
convertible debt issuers. When a firm with sufficient slack capital and/or a high stock runup 
issues equity, stockholders are more likely to infer that this firm is overvalued. We thus 
expect both the slack capital and the pre-announcement stock runup to have a negative impact 
on stockholder reactions to convertible debt announcements. To capture the level of debt-
related financing costs of the convertible debt issuers, we include the ratio of taxes paid to 
total assets and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. In the finance literature, it is 
generally assumed that firms with a higher leverage ratio and a lower tax ratio face higher 
costs of attracting new debt financing (see, e.g., Lewis et al., 1999, 2003). Next to these 
specific equity- and debt-related costs measures, we also include four control variables that 
act as proxies for both equity- and debt-related financing costs. The volatility of the firm’s 
                                                          
18 Findings remain similar when we use the coefficients in Column (2) for this purpose. The reason why we use 
Column (1) is that CAFactiva is available over the entire sample period, while CAFlows is only available from 
1994 onwards.  
19 This prediction might seem at odds with the convertible debt rationale of Stein (1992), which states that 
convertibles can be used as tools to mitigate equity-related adverse selection costs. However, even though 
convertibles entail smaller equity-related financing costs than equity offerings, their equity component still 
induces an incremental increase in the level of equity-related costs of the issuing firm. Thus, within a convertible 
debt sample, we expect stockholder reactions to be more negative for issuers with high equity-related financing 
costs. An analogous reasoning applies for the impact of debt-related financing costs on convertible debt 
announcement returns.  
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stock expressed relative to the volatility on the S&P 500 index measures the level of 
asymmetric information associated with the firm, as well as the firm’s riskiness. The market-
to-book ratio may act as a proxy for growth opportunities (and as such be negatively 
associated with financing costs), but may also measure the potential for underinvestment and 
asymmetric information. As such, its predicted impact is unclear. Lastly, we include the ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets and the natural logarithm of total assets. Firms with a high 
proportion of fixed assets and/or a large size tend to have lower levels of asymmetric 
information relating to their value and risk, resulting in smaller equity- and debt-related 
financing costs (MacKie-Mason, 1990).  
We also control for a number of issue-specific characteristics. We include the ratio of 
offering proceeds to total assets, since Krasker (1986) predicts that relatively larger equity(-
linked) security offerings should result in more negative announcement returns. We include 
the delta (calculated as outlined in Appendix B) to control for the equity component size of 
the convertible bond issue. Following Myers and Majluf (1984), we expect relatively more 
equity-like convertibles to induce more negative stockholder wealth effects. We also include 
a 144A dummy variable to disentangle the effect of the 144A private placement of 
convertibles from the effect of hedging-induced short selling, and an Issue=Announcement 
dummy variable equal to one for convertibles for which the issue date either coincides with 
the announcement date or falls on the trading day after the announcement date. Convertibles 
for which this is the case should be associated with more negative wealth effects in the 
window (−1, 1), since the announcement-period returns are more likely to capture hedging-
induced price pressure.20 We also control for convertible bond offering discounts (calculated 
as outlined in Appendix C). Offerings with higher discounts should be received less favorably 
by the market, since they imply a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to convertible 
bondholders.  
Finally, we control for a number of standard macroeconomic determinants suggested by 
the literature, i.e., interest rates, term spreads, market returns, and market return volatilities. 
In the regressions, all macroeconomic determinants are lagged one quarter. Following a 
similar reasoning as for the issuer-specific variables, we expect stock price reactions to 
convertible debt announcements to be negatively influenced by proxies for aggregate 
financing costs. We thus expect a negative impact of interest rates, term spreads, and market 
return volatilities, since these variables act as proxies for the level of debt-related financing 
costs in the economy as a whole (Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, 1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 
2003; Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2008). In turn, we expect a positive impact of market 
returns, since financing costs are assumed to be lower during market booms (Choe, Masulis, 
and Nanda, 1993).  
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for these control variables, and compares their 
average values across the three periods.  
The univariate test results indicate that Arbitrage-period issuers have a significantly larger 
slack and market-to-book ratio, and significantly smaller tax payments, relative stock return 
volatility, fixed assets, and total assets, than Traditional Investor-period issuers. With the 
exception of the finding on the stock return volatility, these results suggest that firms issuing 
convertibles during the Arbitrage period face higher external financing costs than pre-2000 
issuers. Post-Lehman issuers also differ from those in the other periods on several 
dimensions, but the results do not provide a clear picture on the relative magnitude of their 
                                                          
20 Huang and Ramirez (2010) find no differences in announcement effects between public and Rule 144A issue 
markets for firms issuing convertible bonds in the period 1991-2004. In contrast to this result, Carayannopoulos 
and Nayak (2010) find that issuers of convertible bonds under Rule 144A experience a negative stock price 
reaction on the announcement day, over and above any reaction associated with public issues of convertible 
bonds. 
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financing costs. On the one hand Post-Lehman issuers tend to have low tax levels and high 
debt levels, suggesting high debt-related financing costs, but on the other hand they tend to 
have low market-to-book ratios and a large firm size, which is consistent with low costs of 
attracting external financing.  
While issue proceeds and delta are not significantly different between the Traditional 
Investor period and the Arbitrage period, Post-Lehman offerings are significantly smaller in 
size, and significantly more debt-like in nature (smaller delta). In line with Huang and 
Ramirez (2010), we find that the percentage of convertibles issued under Rule 144A 
increases dramatically in the beginning of this century. While only 9% of the Traditional 
Investor-period issues are made under the Rule 144A regime, the percentage of Rule 144A 
issues increases to 85% in the Arbitrage period. In the Post-Lehman period this percentage 
drops back to approximately one-third of all offerings (34%). We also find a sharp increase in 
the percentage of offerings for which the announcement and issue date coincide, which is 
likely to be linked to institutional developments in the convertible debt market (increase in 
the importance of 144A offerings, and increase in hedge fund involvement). Finally, we 
observe substantial differences in convertible bond underpricing across the three periods. 
Traditional Investor-period offering discounts are significantly higher than those during the 
Arbitrage period. However, Arbitrage-period convertibles are still substantially underpriced 
(average offering discount of 15.7%), thus offering ample profit potential for convertible 
bond arbitrageurs. Post-Lehman offerings, in turn, are offered at discounts that are more than 
twice as large as the underpricing levels during the Arbitrage period (average offering 
discount of 34.2%). One possible explanation for this finding is that, during the crisis period, 
issuers that cannot obtain standard financing sources (e.g., due to serious restrictions on the 
possibility to obtain bank debt) use convertible bonds as a last-resort financing type. The 
exceptionally high underpricing levels may be necessary to convince risk-averse investors to 
include the convertibles in their portfolios.21,22 
We also find that most of the macroeconomic variables are significantly different across 
the three periods. Together, the descriptive results presented in Table 3.2 highlight the need 
to control for firm-specific, issue-specific, and macroeconomic financing costs measures 
when analyzing the source of the differences in abnormal stock returns between the three 
periods.  
 
 
3.4   Empirical results on stockholder wealth effects of 
convertible bond offerings 
 
In this section, we provide the results of our empirical tests on the validity of the arbitrage 
explanation for changes in the stockholder wealth effects of convertible bond announcements. 
We first provide event-study results on the magnitude of the announcement effects of 
convertible bond, equity, and straight bonds over the three time periods. We then analyse the 
                                                          
21 In line with this intuition, a report by Calamos and Calamos (2008) states that convertible debt undervaluation 
levels were “historically high” as per October 2008, creating an “incredible opportunity” for convertible bond 
arbitrageurs. Of course we do realize that this text is included in a sales report for the Calamos convertible debt 
investment funds, and that the statements should be interpreted in this light. The “undervaluation” levels are 
probably also high in this period to compensate for high liquidity risk. 
22 In line with this intuition, the article “Companies return to convertibles” (Masters, Financial Times, May 11, 
2009) mentions: “The big shift came after last autumn's collapse of Lehman Brothers when bank lending dried 
up. Under pressure to cut their debt, many companies began looking for new sources of financing. Straight bond 
issues for companies with less than stellar credit ratings and those in cyclical sectors proved problematic - 
many would have to pay double-digit coupons and risk being rated at less than investment grade.” 
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impact of arbitrage-related short selling on convertible bond announcement returns, while 
controlling for other announcement-return determinants. We conclude by examining stock 
price behavior following convertible bond offerings.  
 
 
3.4.1  Stockholder wealth effects of convertible, equity, and straight 
debt announcements 
 
We measure abnormal stock returns by applying standard event-study methodology as 
outlined in Brown and Warner (1985). We use the return over the CRSP equally-weighted 
market index as a proxy for the market return, and estimate the market model over the 
window (–240, –40) relative to the announcement date. In line with most existing event 
studies, we measure cumulative announcement returns (CARs) over the window (−1, 1) 
relative to the security offering announcement date. We assume that the public announcement 
of convertible debt offerings happens on the filing date obtained from SDC.23 However, this 
date is only available for publicly-placed convertible bond issues. For the remainder of the 
convertibles (754 in total), we manually look up the announcement date (identified as the 
date on which the offering is first mentioned) in Factiva. For equity offerings, we identify the 
announcement date as the filing date stated in SDC (available for virtually all of the 
offerings). For publicly-placed straight debt offerings, we also use the filing date. For straight 
debt issues for which the filing date is not available due to the fact that they are either 
structured as 144A offerings or privately placed (60.4% of the sample), we use the issue date 
obtained from SDC. Our findings remain similar when we exclude the straight debt issues for 
which we have no filing date available from the analysis. Table 3.3 provides the results of the 
event-study analysis for the three security types.  
During the Traditional Investor period, we observe security offering announcement 
effects that are similar in magnitude to those documented in prior studies (see Eckbo et al., 
2007). This is no surprise since most prior event studies on security offerings also focus on 
issues made prior to 2000. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that convertible bond 
announcement returns are significantly more negative during the Arbitrage Period than 
during the Traditional Investor Period (−4.59% compared with −1.69%), while equity and 
straight debt announcement returns remain fairly stable. However, inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 1, we find that Post-Lehman-period convertible bond announcement effects are 
significantly more negative than those in the previous two periods (–9.12%). Equity 
announcement returns are also slightly more negative over this period (–3.21%), but the 
magnitude of the change is much smaller than that for convertibles. Kruskal-Wallis p-values 
confirm that there are substantial differences in abnormal stock returns around convertible 
bond announcements across the three periods (p-value for differences in convertible bond 
wealth effects across the three periods is smaller than 0.001), while there are no such 
differences for equity and bond returns.  
Figure 3.2 visualizes the evolution in security offering announcement effects over our 
research period by plotting quarterly average shareholder wealth effects for each of the three 
security types. The observed patterns are similar as those discussed in the context of Table 
3.3: while equity and straight debt offering announcement effects remain fairly constant 
(except for a decrease in equity offering announcement effects during the Post-Lehman 
                                                          
23 We manually cross-checked the accuracy of the filing dates by verifying the actual announcement dates 
obtained from Factiva for 100 convertible bond issues. The results of this check indicate that SDC filing dates 
are accurate. However, some of the announcements are time-stamped after the closure of the stock market, 
which is why we also include day +1 in our analysis of convertible debt announcement returns.  
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period), convertible debt announcement returns exhibit a declining trend. Returns sharply 
drop as of the beginning of the Arbitrage period, and fall even further at the beginning of the 
Post-Lehman period.   
 
 
3.4.2  Determinants of stockholder wealth effects of convertible debt 
announcements 
 
In a next step of the empirical analysis, we test whether the evolutions in convertible debt 
announcement returns documented in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2 can effectively be attributed to 
changes in the convertible bond investor base (as predicted by Hypothesis 2). Table 3.4 
reports the results of regression specifications with the CAR over the window (−1, 1) relative 
to the convertible bond announcement date as dependent variable.  
Model (1) only includes a dummy variable equal to one for convertibles issued during the 
Arbitrage period (ArbPeriod), and a dummy variable equal to one for convertibles issued 
during the financial crisis (PostLehmanPeriod) on the right-hand side. Both variables have 
significantly negative regression coefficients. The differences between the periods are large 
in economic terms: the abnormal return in the Arbitrage Period is almost three percentage 
points lower than in the Traditional Investor period, and the abnormal return in the Post-
Lehman period is more than seven percentage points lower than in the Traditional Investor 
period.  
The significantly more negative CARs during the Arbitrage and Post-Lehman periods 
may be attributable to shifts in issuer, issue, and/or macroeconomic characteristics across the 
periods. For example, as shown in Table 3.2, Arbitrage-period issuers tend to have higher 
costs of attracting external financing, and may therefore receive more negative stockholder 
reactions to their convertible bond offering announcements. In Model (2), we therefore 
extend the regression with the control variables specified earlier. We find that the ArbPeriod 
and PostLehmanPeriod dummy variables still have significantly negative effects, but that the 
magnitude of their coefficients is only about half as large as in Model (1). This result 
suggests that the more negative announcement effects induced by recent convertible bond 
offerings are indeed partly attributable to changes in the control variables. Consistent with 
this intuition, we find that the inclusion of the control variables results in a substantial 
increase in the adjusted R2, from 7.40% to 10.12%.24 CARs are significantly positively 
influenced by the market-to-book ratio, which is in line with results reported by De Jong, 
Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2010). In line with our expectations, we also find that abnormal 
returns are significantly negatively influenced by the issuer’s relative volatility, the 
Issuance=Announcement dummy variable, the term spread, and the market return volatility.  
One of the control variables included in Model (2) is a dummy variable equal to one for 
Rule 144A offerings. Denis and Mihov (2003) show that relatively more risky firms are more 
likely to opt for a Rule 144A offering. The coefficient of the Rule 144A dummy may thus be 
affected by an endogeneity bias if we include this variable as such in the regression analysis. 
Heckman (1979) demonstrates that such bias can be avoided by not only including the 
particular dummy variable in the regression analysis, but also including the Inverse Mills 
ratio. The inclusion of the Inverse Mills ratio corrects for the potential correlation between 
unobservable factors affecting both the decision to structure a convertible as a 144A offering 
                                                          
24 We include industry dummies based on two-digit SIC codes as additional control variables in robustness tests, 
and find that our results remain similar. The industry dummies have low explanatory power. In fact, we find that 
the adjusted R2 slightly decreases when we include industry dummies. 
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and the stockholder reactions to convertible bond announcements, thus allowing us to obtain 
unbiased regression estimators in the abnormal return regression equation. As suggested by 
Heckman (1979), we first estimate a probit analysis with the 144A dummy variable as 
dependent variable, and with various control variables specified earlier on the right-hand side. 
The inverse Mills ratio (IMills) can be derived from this probit regression using the procedure 
outlined by Li and Prabhala (2007). 
Table 3.5 reports the results of the first-stage probit analysis. The dependent variable is 
equal to one for 144A offerings, and equal to zero otherwise.25 We find that Rule 144A issues 
are made by firms with a significantly larger slack capital and firm size and significantly 
smaller taxes paid and fixed assets than non-Rule 144A issues. Furthermore, they have larger 
offering proceeds and a larger delta. We also find a significant negative impact of the interest 
rate and a significant positive impact of term spreads. Overall, the probit results suggest that 
the choice to structure a convertible bond offering as a Rule 144A issue is non-random, 
although we do not find direct evidence linking this choice to the firm’s risk, as in Denis and 
Mihov (2003). Model (2) of Table 3.4 shows that convertible debt announcement effects are 
not significantly different for 144A convertibles (non-significant coefficient on the 144A 
dummy variable). This result corroborates results of Huang and Ramirez (2010), but goes 
against the results of Carayannopoulos and Nayak (2010). The coefficient on the Inverse 
Mills ratio is not significant either.  
Hypothesis 2 implies that the differences in convertible bond announcement returns 
across the three periods should not longer be significant after controlling for differences in 
arbitrage-related short selling. In Model (3), we test this prediction by including the variable 
DemandArbitrage, which captures the predicted hedging demand from convertible bond 
arbitrageurs. DemandArbitrage is equal to the predicted increase in short interest caused by 
arbitrage-related activities (calculated as outlined earlier) for convertibles issued during the 
Arbitrage period, and equal to zero for convertibles outlined in the other two periods. Model 
(3) thus relies on the assumption that there is no convertible arbitrage activity at all during the 
Traditional Investor and Post-Lehman periods. In line with Hypothesis 2, we find that the 
effect of the ArbPeriod dummy variable is no longer significantly negative after controlling 
for the price pressure caused by convertible bond arbitrage activity during the Arbitrage 
period. DemandArbitrage itself has a highly significant, negative effect on the CAR, which is 
consistent with the prediction that higher short selling is associated with stronger price 
pressure. However, inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, the impact of the PostLehmanPeriod 
dummy variable is still significantly negative in Model (3), suggesting that the highly 
negative CARs registered during the crisis period cannot (entirely) be ascribed to convertible 
arbitrage activities. 
In Model (4), we relax the assumption that there is no arbitrage-related short selling at all 
outside the Arbitrage period by including two additional hedging demand variables. 
DemandTradInvestor is equal to the expected hedging demand for convertibles issued during 
the Traditional Investor period, and equal to zero otherwise. DemandPostLehman is defined 
in an analogous way for Post-Lehman offerings. The findings for our main variables of 
interest, ArbPeriod and PostLehmanPeriod, remain unaltered under this alternative scenario. 
ArbPeriod has a non-significant regression coefficient, while the impact of 
PostLehmanPeriod is significantly negative. With regards to the hedging demand proxies, we 
again find a significant negative impact for DemandArbitrage. We also find a significantly 
negative coefficient for DemandTradInvestor. The latter result is consistent with the notion 
that even during the Traditional Investor period there was already some short-selling activity 
by convertible bond arbitrageurs, although the size of the coefficient is small relative to its 
                                                          
25 Almost all non-144A offerings are publicly placed (only 1.08% of the convertibles are privately placed 
without using Rule 144A). 
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size in the Arbitrage period. During the Post-Lehman period, by contrast, we do not find 
evidence of any price pressure caused by hedging activity (coefficient of 
DemandPostLehman is not significant). This finding is consistent with the severe restrictions 
on convertible arbitrage activities during that period.  
Overall, we can conclude that the regression results pertaining to the Arbitrage period are 
in line with Hypothesis 2 (i.e., the differences in CARs disappear when controlling for 
arbitrage-related short selling), while the regression results pertaining to the Post-Lehman 
period are not consistent with this hypothesis. One potential explanation for the highly 
negative announcement returns associated with crisis-period convertibles that we did not 
explore so far is their high initial underpricing reported in Table 3.3. In Model (5), we 
therefore augment Model (4) with the offering discount of the convertible bond offerings. 
Due to the limited availability of some of the input variables needed to calculate 
underpricing, we can only estimate this regression from 1991 onwards. We exclude the 
Rule144A and Issue=Announcement dummy variables because there are too few 
observations for which these dummy variables are zero over that time span.  
We find that the coefficient on the PostLehmanPeriod dummy variable is no longer 
statistically significant after controlling for issue-date convertible bond underpricing. Hence, 
the more negative announcement effects of Post-Lehman offerings (relative to Traditional 
Investor-period convertibles) seem to be attributable to the large underpricing of offerings in 
the Post-Lehman period.26 The coefficient on the OfferingDiscount variable is significantly 
negative, which is consistent with the issuance of underpriced securities representing a wealth 
transfer from current shareholders to the buyers of the convertible securities. It could be 
questioned why companies issue such highly underpriced convertibles. One possible 
explanation is that they simply had no other choice, due to the very large difficulties in 
obtaining classic financing types such as bank debt during the financial crisis.  
 
 
3.4.3  Stock returns following convertible bond offerings 
 
To examine Hypothesis 3, we calculate CARs over the extended windows (2, 5) and (2, 
10) following convertible bond issuance dates. The length of the windows is motivated by 
earlier studies showing that stock price reversals following arbitrage-related supply shocks 
tend to occur very fast (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Mitchell et al., 2004). Moreover, using longer 
windows would introduce too much noise in the abnormal return estimates (Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya, 2002). Table 3.6 reports the results of this analysis.  
Panel A provides univariate results on the stock returns following convertible offerings in 
the three periods. In line with our arbitrage explanation for the highly negative stock price 
effects observed for Arbitrage-period convertibles, we find significantly positive post-
issuance stock returns for offerings made during this period. The positive abnormal stock 
return of 0.54% over window (2, 10) represents approximately 12% of the absolute value of 
the announcement-period CAR (0.54/4.59). Thus, in line with previous studies (Dhillon and 
Johnson, 1991; Mazzeo and Moore, 1992; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; De Jong, Dutordoir, 
and Verwijmeren, 2010), our evidence suggests that there is only a partial reversal of the 
                                                          
26 The reduction in the significance of the effect of the PostLehmanPeriod dummy variable in Model (5) could 
also be attributable to the fact that we use a more narrow research period in this regression, due to the 
restrictions that the underpricing variable imposes on our sample period. We verify whether this is the case by 
re-running the regression in Model (4) for convertibles issued between 1991 and 2009. The untabulated results 
show that the Post-Lehman dummy variable is significantly negative even over this restricted window (t-statistic 
of –3.07), thus alleviating the concern that the change in its significance in Model (5) is mainly caused by a 
change in the research period.   
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negative impact of the supply shock. However, it is hard to isolate the true magnitude of the 
reversal of the price pressure effect due to the fact that the CAR (−1, 1) simultaneously 
captures the effect of the signaling content of the convertibles (which should be permanent) 
and the effect of price pressure resulting from arbitrage trading (which should be temporary, 
at least if demand curves for stock are only inelastic in the short run).  
Also in line with Hypothesis 3, we find no evidence of a positive stock price reversal in 
the Traditional Investor and Post-Lehman periods. Abnormal stock returns over the window 
(2, 10) are even significantly negative during both periods. The finding of negative post-
issuance returns is consistent with Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2001), who report long-run 
stock price underperformance following convertible debt issuance over longer investment 
horizons.  
In Panel B, we regress post-issuance stock price returns on our measures for arbitrage-
related increases in short interest.27 We also include the Amihud illiquidity measure, since 
price reversals should be stronger for more illiquid stocks (Bagwell, 1992). If the positive 
stock price reversal following Arbitrage-period convertibles is indeed related to the supply 
shock caused by arbitrage-induced short selling, we expect this reversal to be stronger for 
convertibles attracting a higher hedging demand. In line with this prediction, we find a 
significant positive impact of our constructed hedging demand measure for the Arbitrage 
period (DemandArbitrage) on stock price reactions over windows (2, 5) and (2, 10). Also 
consistent with our expectations, the coefficients on the corresponding hedging demand 
measures for the Traditional Investor and Post-Lehman periods are not significant. Overall, 
the findings on stock price behavior following convertible debt issues are thus consistent with 
Hypothesis 3.  
 
 
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
Over the past decades, the convertible bond market has experienced a substantial shift in 
its buyer base. In this chapter, we show that this shift has important implications for the 
stockholder wealth effects registered around convertible bond announcements. We 
distinguish three different periods. The first period (1984-1999) is characterized by traditional 
investors who take long positions in convertible bonds. In the second period (2000 to 
September 14, 2008) the majority of convertible buyers are convertible arbitrageurs that 
combine a long position in convertibles with short positions in the underlying stock. In the 
third period (September 15, 2008 to 2009), hedge funds partly lose their grip on the 
convertible bond market. We find strong differences in convertible bond announcement 
effects between these three periods. In the Traditional Investor period, the average abnormal 
return is −1.69%, which is below the average abnormal return associated with a common 
stock issue (−2.34%). This result corresponds to findings of previous event studies, and is 
widely interpreted as evidence for the signaling model of Myers and Majluf (1984). In the 
Arbitrage period, stockholder wealth effects of convertible bond announcements decrease to 
−4.59%, while straight debt and equity announcement returns remain fairly constant. Our 
results provide two non-mutually exclusive explanations for this sharp drop in announcement 
effects. First, part of the negative “announcement” effect is caused by price pressure 
associated with arbitrage-related short selling of convertible hedge funds. Second, we find 
that part of the more negative announcement effect registered during the Arbitrage period can 
                                                          
27 The number of observations in Panel B drops slightly compared to Panel A because data are not available for 
all explanatory variables. 
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be attributed to changes in firm-specific, security design, and macroeconomic characteristics 
over time. 
An interesting question is why firms have continued to issue convertible securities in the 
Arbitrage period after managers observed the negative price effects surrounding these issues. 
We attempt to answer this question by examining post-issue effects, and we show that the 
negative price effect upon issuance in the arbitrage period partly reverses after the convertible 
bond offering. An additional motivation for why firms continued to sell convertibles to hedge 
funds is that these funds can use their expertise in short-selling to distribute equity exposure 
to a large number of well-diversified investors, which makes hedge funds relatively low-cost 
distributors of equity exposure for the firm (Brown et al., 2010). 
During the financial crisis, we observe a further decrease in the abnormal returns around 
convertible bond announcements (−9.12%), while abnormal returns around equity 
announcements decrease to a much smaller extent (−3.21%) and abnormal returns around 
straight debt announcements remain virtually unchanged. The very negative convertible bond 
announcement returns are surprising given the smaller involvement of convertible arbitrage 
funds during this period. We find that the high underpricing of Post-Lehman convertibles 
plays a role in explaining the much more negative stockholder wealth effects associated with 
these securities. 
Our results suggest that event studies on recent convertible bond announcements need to 
take the price pressure caused by convertible arbitrage strategies into account if they want to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the signaling content of convertibles. Our findings also highlight 
the need to control for convertible bond underpricing when analyzing stock price reactions to 
convertible bond announcements.  
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Panel B: Regression analysis of ∆SI/SO on potential determinants of arbitrage-related short selling 
Variable Parameter estimate  
(t-value) 
(1) (2) 
Amihud −0.01** 
(−2.08) 
−0.02* 
(−1.86) 
InstitOwnership 0.01 
(1.06) 
0.00 
(0.39) 
Volatility −0.01 
(−1.60) 
0.00 
(0.24) 
DividendPaying 0.00 
(1.11) 
0.00 
(0.82) 
Sarb/SO 0.15*** 
(8.08) 
0.14*** 
(7.35) 
ZeroCoupon 0.00 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.16) 
CAFactiva −0.00 
(−1.47) 
 
CAFlows  0.02 
(0.36) 
Intercept 0.01 
(0.99) 
0.01 
(0.99) 
   
Adj. R2 
R2 
N 
Period 
18.72% 
20.01% 
440 
2003-2008 
18.92% 
20.64% 
330 
2003-2008 
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Table 3.3: Univariate analysis of convertible debt, equity, and straight debt announcement effects 
This table shows average and median cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) measured over the window 
(−1, 1) relative to the announcement date for samples of convertible debt, equity, and straight debt offerings. 
CARs are calculated using standard event-study methodology. CARsCD are the CARs of convertible debt 
issuers. CARsEQ are the CARs of seasoned equity issuers. CARsSD are the CARs of straight debt issuers. The 
Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in 
convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the 
period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-
Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The Kruskal-Wallis test is used to test for differences between the CARs across all three sub-periods. 
The Patell Z-test is used to test the hypothesis that the individual CARs are equal to zero. *, **, *** indicate 
significance of the Patell Z-test statistic at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 
Variable Traditional Investor 
Period 
 
Arbitrage period 
 
Post-Lehman period 
 
Kruskal- 
Wallis 
p-value 
Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev 
CARsCD(−1, 1) −1.69%*** 5.07% −4.59%*** 7.20% −9.12%*** 9.41% 0.00 
N 727  645  64   
        
CARsEQ(−1, 1) −2.34%*** 6.13% −2.67%*** 7.68% −3.21%*** 11.67% 0.27 
N 3,579  1,143  163   
        
CARsSD(−1, 1) −0.09%* 3.67% −0.04% 3.99% −0.40%** 5.94% 0.06 
N 5,662  2,692  380   
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Table 3.4: Regression analysis of determinants of convertible debt announcement returns 
This table presents the results of a regression analysis of announcement-period cumulative abnormal stock 
returns (CARs) of convertible offerings on a number of potential determinants. The dependent variable in the 
regression is the cumulative abnormal stock return measured over the window (−1, 1) relative to the 
announcement date, and is calculated using standard event-study methodology. ArbPeriod is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one for announcements made in the Arbitrage period. PostLehmanPeriod is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for announcements made in the Post-Lehman period. InverseMills is the 
Inverse Mills ratio calculated from the probit regression in Table 3.5. DemandTradInvestor is equal to the 
estimated arbitrage-related increase in short interest relative to shares outstanding (calculated using the 
regression in Column (1) of Table 3.1) for issues made in the Traditional Investor period, and equal to zero for 
issues made during other periods. DemandArbitrage and DemandPostLehman are defined in an analogous way 
for issues made during the Arbitrage period and the Post-Lehman period, respectively. All other explanatory 
variables are defined as outlined in Appendix A and C. t-statistics, calculated using White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations.  
 
Variable Parameter estimate 
(t-value) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Period indicators      
ArbPeriod −2.83*** 
(−8.30) 
−1.70** 
(−2.40) 
1.51 
(1.53) 
1.45 
(1.44) 
1.09 
(0.88) 
PostLehmanPeriod −7.16*** 
(−6.25) 
−4.03*** 
(−2.75) 
−3.54*** 
(−2.37) 
−3.33** 
(−2.08) 
−4.05 
(−1.49) 
Firm characteristics       
StockRunup  −0.15 
(−0.14) 
−0.62 
(−0.60) 
−0.56 
(−0.52) 
−0.51 
(−0.37) 
Slack  −1.31 
(−0.86) 
−2.43 
(−1.60) 
−2.44 
(−1.57) 
−1.87 
(−1.17) 
Tax  2.05 
(0.26) 
3.24 
(0.41) 
1.23 
(0.15) 
−1.67 
(−0.18) 
LTDebt  −1.46 
(−1.09) 
−0.03 
(−0.02) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
RelVolatility  −0.37** 
(−2.02) 
−0.46** 
(−2.43) 
−0.55*** 
(−2.77) 
−0.08 
(−0.28) 
MarkettoBook  0.07* 
(1.79) 
0.02 
(0.60) 
0.02 
(0.47) 
−0.01 
(−0.23) 
FixedAssets  0.01 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
−0.12 
(−0.09) 
−0.66 
(−0.58) 
LogAssets  0.32 
(0.70) 
−0.09 
(−0.20) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
0.45* 
(1.87) 
Issue characteristics      
Proceeds  0.19 
(0.21) 
0.34 
(0.39) 
0.88 
(0.95) 
1.72* 
(1.66) 
Delta  −0.01 
(0.00) 
−0.70 
(−0.39) 
−0.11 
(−0.06) 
−1.28 
(−0.74) 
144A  0.34 
(0.58) 
0.34 
(0.57) 
0.47 
(0.77) 
 
InverseMills  −0.10 
(−0.08) 
−0.92 
(−0.74) 
−0.59 
(−0.46) 
 
Issue=Announcement  −0.91** 
(−2.14) 
−0.91** 
(−2.14) 
−0.91** 
(−2.14) 
−0.91** 
(−2.14) 
OfferingDiscount     −4.45* 
(−1.82) 
  Changes in the convertible buyer base and new issue announcement returns     57 
 
                                                                       
Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Macroeconomic 
characteristics 
     
InterestRatet-1  0.39 
(1.15) 
0.56 
(1.62) 
0.54 
(1.52) 
0.72** 
(2.22) 
TermSpread t-1  −0.43*** 
(−2.67) 
−0.45*** 
(−2.74) 
−0.44*** 
(−2.62) 
−0.36* 
(−1.91) 
MarketRunup t-1  −0.30 
(−0.10) 
0.61 
(0.20) 
0.30 
(0.09) 
3.93 
(0.92) 
MarketVolatility t-1  −11.98*** 
(−2.95) 
−13.37*** 
(−3.20) 
−15.04*** 
(−3.49) 
−11.57** 
(−2.02) 
Arbitrage-related 
shorting activity 
     
DemandTradInvestor    −8.38*** 
(−3.96) 
−38.88 
(−1.42) 
DemandArbitrage   −164.73*** 
(−4.64) 
−168.07*** 
(−4.67) 
−166.67*** 
(−4.18) 
DemandPostLehman    −7.45 
(−0.47) 
43.43 
(0.23) 
Intercept −1.69*** 
(−9.11) 
−1.16 
(−0.25) 
2.79 
(0.60) 
1.45 
(0.30) 
−2.80 
(−0.97) 
      
Adj. R2 
N 
Period 
7.40% 
1,476 
1984-2009 
10.12% 
1,476 
1984-2009 
11.94% 
1,476 
1984-2009 
12.41% 
1,476 
1984-2009 
10.20% 
788 
1991-2009 
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Table 3.5: Regression analysis of the determinants of 144A issues 
This table presents the results of a probit regression with as dependent variable a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for a 144A issue and zero for all other (mostly publicly-placed) convertible bond offerings. All 
explanatory variables are defined as outlined in Appendix A. t-statistics, calculated using Huber-White robust 
standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. N 
denotes the number of observations.  
 
Variable Parameter estimate 
(t-value) 
Firm characteristics   
StockRunup 0.15 
(0.96) 
Slack 1.24*** 
(4.91) 
Tax −5.09*** 
(−4.33) 
LTDebt −0.83 
(−3.26) 
RelVolatility 0.27 
(1.57) 
MarkettoBook 0.01 
(0.84) 
FixedAssets −1.19*** 
(−6.34) 
LogAssets 0.49*** 
(13.91) 
Issue characteristics  
Proceeds 0.57*** 
(4.10) 
Delta 1.66*** 
(6.44) 
Macroeconomic characteristics  
InterestRatet-1 −0.30*** 
(−13.48) 
TermSpread t-1 0.10*** 
(3.10) 
MarketRunup t-1 0.07 
(0.12) 
MarketVolatility t-1 −0.40 
(−0.57) 
Intercept −3.77*** 
(−10.09) 
  
Adj. R2 
N 
Period 
38.29% 
1,476 
1984-2009 
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Table 3.6: Analysis of stock returns following convertible debt issues 
This table analyses average cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) following convertible bond issuance, 
computed using standard event-study methodology. The windows are measured relative to the convertible bond 
issuance date. The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period 
before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 
and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt 
issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. In Panel A, the Kruskal-Wallis test examines differences between the CARs over 
the three sub-periods. The Patell Z-test examines the hypothesis that the individual CARs are equal to zero. 
Panel B presents the results of a regression analysis of the CARs following convertible bond issuance on a 
number of potential determinants. DemandTradInvestor is equal to the estimated arbitrage-related increase in 
short interest relative to shares outstanding (calculated using the regression in Column (1) of Table 3.1) for 
issues made in the Traditional Investor period, and equal to zero for issues made during other periods. 
DemandArbitrage and DemandPostLehman are defined in an analogous way for issues made during the 
Arbitrage period and the Post-Lehman period, respectively. Explanatory variables are defined as outlined in 
Appendix A. t-statistics, estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis of abnormal stock returns following convertible bond issuance 
Variable Traditional Investor 
Period 
 
Arbitrage period 
 
Post-Lehman period 
 
Kruskal- 
Wallis 
p-value 
Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev 
CARs(2,5) −0.02% 5.26% 0.50%*** 6.11% −1.85% 11.52% 0.00 
CARs(2,10) −0.46%** 8.25% 0.54%*** 8.79% −3.39%* 11.49% 0.00 
N 727  645  64   
 
Panel B: Regression analysis of abnormal stock returns following convertible bond issuance 
Variable Parameter estimate  
(t-value) 
CARs(2,5) (1) CARs(2,10) (2) 
DemandTradInvestor 2.19 
(0.22) 
5.44 
(0.30) 
DemandArbitrage 46.67*** 
(2.75) 
58.97*** 
(0.39) 
DemandPostLehman −33.68 
(−0.97) 
−34.47 
(−0.52) 
Amihud 0.04 
(1.15) 
0.28 
(0.54) 
Intercept −0.24 
(−0.71) 
−0.56 
(−1.17) 
   
Adj. R2 
N 
Period 
0.58% 
1,422 
1984-2009 
0.33% 
1,422 
1984-2009 
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3.8.2  Appendix B: calculation of number of shares expected to be 
shorted by arbitrageurs (Sarb) 
 
Sarb represents the number of shares expected to be shorted by arbitrageurs, under the 
assumption that arbitrageurs follow a delta-neutral hedging strategy.  In line with De Jong, 
Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2010), we calculate Sarb as follows: 
 
priceconversion
deltavaluefaceissuedesconvertiblofnumberSarb                             (5) 
 
We calculate the number of convertibles issued by dividing the offering proceeds by the face 
value of the convertible (both obtained from SDC). Delta represents the sensitivity of the 
convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value. In line with Burlacu (2000), 
Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007), and Loncarski et al. (2009), we calculate the convertible 
debt delta as follows: 
,
T
T)
2
r()
X
Sln(
Ne)d(NeDelta
2
T
1
T                             (6) 
 
with δ the continuously-compounded dividend yield (obtained from Compustat Fundamentals 
Annual by dividing #26 by #199), N(.) the cumulative probability under a standard normal 
distribution, S the stock price on trading day −5 (obtained from CRSP), X the conversion 
price (obtained from SDC), r the yield on a ten-year U.S. Treasury Bond measured on the 
issue date (obtained from CRSP), σ the annualized stock return volatility (measured as 
outlined in Appendix A), and T the stated maturity of the convertible bond measured on its 
issuance date (obtained from SDC).28  
 
 
3.8.3  Appendix C: calculation of convertible debt offering discounts 
 
In line with Chan and Chen (2007) and De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2010), we 
define the convertible debt offering discount as the difference between the bond’s theoretical 
price and the bond’s issue price, divided by the bond’s theoretical price. We obtain the issue 
price from SDC. To calculate the theoretical convertible bond price, we use the Tsiveriotis 
and Fernandes (1998) model, which is widely-used in other studies on convertible bond 
underpricing (Ammann, Kind, and Wilde, 2003; Chan and Chen, 2007; Loncarski et al., 
2009; De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren, 2010). As pointed out by Zabolotnyuk et al. 
(2010), the method is also popular among practitioners.  
Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) use a binomial-tree approach to model the stock price 
process and decompose the total value of a convertible bond into an equity component and a 
                                                          
28 As argued in Zabolotnyuk, Jones, and Veld (2010), a potential disadvantage of the delta is that it does not 
capture convertibility and callability characteristics. As such, the delta provides an incomplete measure for the 
equity component size of convertibles. However, the purpose of the delta measure included in the Sarb variable is 
to replicate the inputs that are actually used by arbitrageurs in their delta-neutral hedging strategy. Calamos 
(2003) argues that arbitrageurs base their hedging on a delta measure analogous to the one defined in Equation 
(6), so we conclude that it is appropriate to use this measure as an input in Sarb.  
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straight debt component. We use the following input variables in the model (all measured as 
of the convertible bond issue date, unless otherwise mentioned): yield on U.S. government 
bonds of which the maturity most closely matches the maturity of the convertible bond 
(obtained from CRSP); Moody’s credit ratings or equivalent Standard and Poor’s ratings 
converted to a Moody’s rating (obtained from SDC);29 credit spreads of similarly-rated 
corporate straight debt (obtained from Datastream);30 conversion ratios and call schedules; 
dividend yield for the fiscal year preceding the announcement date, price of the underlying 
stock averaged between trading days –12 and –2; and annualized stock return volatility 
calculated from daily stock returns over the window (–240, –40).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 We assign a rating of Baa2 to unrated convertibles, as in Loncarski et al. (2009). 
30 Datastream discontinues the provision of credit spreads as of the end of 2008, so we construct our own credit 
spread estimates for convertibles issued in 2009. In 2009, 95% of our sample offerings are unrated (and thus 
classified as Baa2-rated offerings), while the remainder of the offerings are speculative grade. To calculate Baa2 
credit spreads, we subtract the 20-year Treasury Bond rate (obtained from CRSP) from the yield on Baa-rated 
bonds (obtained from Bloomberg). To measure the credit spread for the (very few) speculative grade issues, we 
download the Barclays yield series on high-yield U.S. corporate bonds from Datastream and subtract the 20-year 
Treasury Bond rate from this yield. We tried using other benchmark maturities (7-, 10-, and 30-year Treasury 
Bond yields), but the 20-year yield results in spreads with the highest correlation and the smallest difference 
with the credit spreads reported by Moody’s.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Seasoned equity offerings and the cost of 
market timing31 
 
 
 
 
4.1   Introduction  
 
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are on average followed by negative long-run abnormal 
returns (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). A popular 
explanation for this underperformance is that issuers are able to time the market and raise 
equity when the cost of capital is abnormally low. Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) view managers as being better informed than investors and are able to issue 
equity opportunistically when they anticipate that their share price is likely to decline. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) provide survey evidence in support of this view. Market timing 
can also be viewed in a rational framework, with firms choosing to issue equity in more 
favorable economic periods when asymmetric information is lower (e.g., Choe, Masulis, and 
Nanda, 1993; Lucas and McDonald, 1990). Another possible explanation for post-issue 
underperformance, suggested by Ritter (2003), is that both investors and managers are 
overoptimistic about the prospects of issuing firms.  
While market timing of equity offerings is extensively documented in the literature, its 
effects on future equity offerings by repeat issuers are less known. Given that market timing 
represents a price risk for purchasers of the equity offering, I expect offerings perceived as 
more likely to be timed, to be issued at a greater discount to the pre-issue market price. 
Research has shown that seasoned equity offerings are underpriced on average, partly to 
compensate investors for the uncertainty regarding the value of the issuer. For instance, 
Corwin (2003) finds that seasoned offers were underpriced by an average of 2.2 percent 
between 1980 and 1998, while Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) find an average discount of 3.2 
percent over the 1990’s.32  
                                                          
31 This Chapter is based on Duca (2010). It has benefited from comments by Abe de Jong, Marie Dutordoir, 
Frederik Schlingemann, Chris Veld, and seminar participants at Rotterdam School of Management. 
32 Corwin (2003) finds that underpricing represents 21.7% of total direct and indirect issue costs and results in 
$1.95 million in lost proceeds, while Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, (2007) consider underpricing as the most 
important indirect issuance cost of SEOs. 
68  Chapter 4 
 
 
 
In this chapter I examine the effects of past market timing on underpricing of subsequent 
equity offerings in the United States over the period 1980-2007. I capture possible market 
timing behavior based on the abnormal returns following a previous issue, and find that 
underpricing of equity offerings is greater if firms are more likely to have timed the market 
previously. The additional discount by past market timers can be seen as compensation for 
the perceived risk that these issuers will time the market again. I also find that the effect of 
past market timing is most pronounced for issuers that did not experience a change in their 
CEO in the period between issues. This finding is consistent with recent evidence by Baker 
and Xuan (2009) that the identity of the CEO matters in assessing past firm performance. I 
also find that underpricing is less sensitive to positive returns that follow a previous issue, 
than it is to negative returns. In line with prospect theory, this asymmetric effect could imply 
that investors are more concerned about potential losses than with gains. An alternative 
interpretation of these results is that investors view a share price decline following a previous 
issue as market timing, but do not view a price increase as the ability of managers to 
successfully time profitable investment opportunities.  
In robustness tests, I control for the possible influences of short selling constraints on my 
results. If SEOs made by short-sale constrained issuers (i.e., stocks that are difficult to short) 
are also underpriced more, then the market timing effect on underpricing may be spurious. I 
use several measures to capture the demand and supply influences on short-sale constraints, 
such as short interest outstanding, institutional ownership, and the Amihud (2002) measure of 
illiquidity. I also examine the influences of an exogenous event, the introduction of SEC Rule 
10b-21 in August 1988, which prohibited short-selling around the issue of an SEO. I find that 
the market timing effect on underpricing remains significant after controlling for the 
influences of short-sale constraints. I also perform robustness tests that use the price reaction 
at the SEO announcement date to capture shareholder wealth effects, instead of using 
underpricing as the variable of interest. I find consistent results with respect to the cost of 
past market timing on shareholder wealth effects. 
A corollary of the relationship between market timing and underpricing of subsequent 
equity offerings, is that the choice between debt and equity financing will also be influenced 
by past market timing. I find that firms that had timed their previous equity offering are more 
likely to switch to debt for subsequent financing. This suggests that past market timers 
anticipate the higher discounting and switch to debt in order to avoid additional dilution of 
share value.33 The higher cost of equity implies that firms’ financial constraints increase if 
they had timed the market with previous issues, especially if they are unable to subsequently 
switch to debt.  
Whereas SEOs are underpriced by more if returns following previous SEOs are more 
negative, they are not underpriced by more if returns following previous IPOs are more 
negative. This suggests that investors view IPOs as being less indicative of the market timing 
motives of follow-on equity issuers. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) find motives for 
IPOs other than market timing, while there may also be fewer opportunities to time IPOs 
because these take longer to set up (Geddes, 2003), and it is harder to establish what 
valuations investors are willing to pay for shares that are not trading yet (Chemmanur, He, 
and Hu, 2009; Geddes, 2003; Ritter, 2003). In addition, a company IPO is withdrawn due to 
overpricing will often not get another opportunity to go public (Dunbar, 1988).     
The results in this chapter provide several contributions to the literature. First, they 
suggest that investors take the past behavior of firms into account when evaluating their 
                                                          
33 Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) note that underpricing in itself represents a wealth transfer to purchasers of 
the new securities, unless these are purchased entirely by current shareholders. This wealth transfer represents 
an indirect cost of raising equity, which decreases the marginal contribution of investment opportunities to 
overall shareholder wealth. 
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motives for market timing of subsequent equity offerings. This finding complements a 
growing literature that examines how investors form beliefs in financial market (see 
Hirschleifer and Teoh, 2003, for a review). Second, I show that there is a cost associated with 
timing equity issues, in the form of higher underpricing of subsequent issues. While the 
literature has hitherto recognized the motivations for market timing in equity offerings, the 
cost of such behavior has to the best of my knowledge, not been documented yet. I also show 
that managers who had timed previous equity issues, partly anticipate the higher underpricing 
of follow-on issues, and tend to switch to debt financing in order to avoid the cost of dilution 
or abandonment of profitable investment opportunities. This finding extends the literature on 
capital structure by shedding light on how past actions by firms affects the choice between 
equity and debt financing. A corollary is that firms’ financial constraints increase if they time 
the market with previous issues, especially if they are unable to switch to debt. Finally, while 
my results provide evidence in line with the timing of seasoned equity offerings, I find no 
evidence that supports the market timing hypothesis in IPOs. On the other hand, my findings 
also support the view that IPOs and SEOs are different events, and investors do not consider 
the market timing of IPOs as providing a good indication of market timing intentions in 
subsequent equity offerings.  
While studies on multiple issues of equity are relatively rare, two recent papers are most 
related to my study. D’Mello, Tawatnuntachai, and Taman (2003) look at repeat equity 
issuers and document that abnormal returns become less negative as more issues are made, 
with this being partly explained by a reduction in information asymmetry. I therefore control 
for the level of information asymmetry to ensure that the post-issue returns are not simply 
capturing general information asymmetry instead of market timing motives. Hovakiminan 
and Hutton (2010) find that the probability of seasoned equity issuers returning to the market 
to raise equity is positively linked to the one-year post issuance returns of the firm’s previous 
equity issue. They attribute this to feedback from the market to the firm about the value of 
investment opportunities. My contribution differs in that I show a link between the returns 
following an SEO, which I consider as capturing market timing behavior, and underpricing of 
subsequent SEOs. Admittedly, it is difficult to distinguish whether returns following an issue 
reflect market timing by the issuer, as opposed to feedback from the market about the 
investment opportunities of the firm. In support of the market timing view, I find that 
underpricing is more sensitive to negative past returns than it is to positive past returns, a 
prediction in line with prospect theory. The second part of my analysis also provides support 
to the market timing hypothesis: I find that the returns following previous SEOs affect the 
choice between subsequent equity and debt financing. To some extent, conditioning on a 
seasoned offering being followed by either debt or equity controls for investment 
opportunities since funds will be raised in either case.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides literature 
related to underpricing, while Section 4.3 develops the testable predictions. I describe the 
data in Section 4.4 and present the results in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
4.2   Background on underpricing of equity offerings  
 
Underpricing in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) represents lost proceeds to the issuer 
and is considered the most important indirect cost of raising equity (Eckbo, Masulis, and 
Norli, 2003). It is generally measured as the difference between the closing price on the offer 
day, or one day prior to the offer day, and the price that the new shares are sold for. Whereas 
the possible rationales for underpricing have been well documented in the IPO literature (e.g., 
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Ljungqvist, 2007) there is relatively less literature examining underpricing in SEOs. 
However, most of the explanations underlying underpricing for IPOs are applicable to the 
SEO literature. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report mean underpricing of 0.44% for a sample of 
firms over the 1963-1981 period. Corwin (2003) and Mola and Loughran (2004) examine 
underpricing in SEOs over the 1980s and 1990s and document an average discount of 2.2% 
and 3% respectively. In more recent years the discount has risen and Altinkiliç and Hansen 
(2003) find an average discount of 3.2% over the 1990’s. 
There is a large empirical and theoretic literature suggesting explanations for 
underpricing, more prominently for IPOs. Most of these papers rely on asymmetric 
information models in which either the issuer, underwriter, or investor, has more information 
than the other parties. The main prediction of these models is that underpricing compensates 
the less informed party. In the framework of Rock (1985) some investors are less informed 
than others, giving rise to the winner’s curse problem as the less informed investors end up 
subscribing to the worse issues. A prediction of this model is that underpricing increases with 
the uncertainty of the issuer’s value. Parsons and Raviv (1985) examine the perspective of the 
investor who has the choice of either purchasing a share with certainty in the secondary 
market or to subscribe to an issue. Investors with high reservation prices who are uncertain 
about subscription demand and the allocation of shares, drive up secondary market prices, 
consequently increasing underpricing. In the models of Chemmanur (1993), and Benveniste 
and Spindt (1989), underwriters use underpricing to induce investors into revealing their 
private information about their reservation price for an offering. Hanley (1993) finds 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis, while Bradley and Jordan (2002) find that 
underpricing is also related to the revelation of public information. Chemmanur (1993), Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989), propose theoretical 
frameworks in which firms signal their quality through higher underpricing, which ensures 
that future equity offerings by these firms are better received by investors. There is limited 
evidence to support this hypothesis, however, as shown in Mola and Loughran (2004), 
Garfinkel (1993), and Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993). 
A strand of papers focuses specifically on seasoned offering, and emphasizes the 
importance of placement costs on underpricing. Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) show that 
underwriters attract capital suppliers by last minute adjustments to the offering price, based 
on the demand reflected in their order book. Corwin (2003) provides evidence that price 
pressure impacts underpricing and that this is greater for issuers with relatively more inelastic 
demand curves. This setting assumes that demand curves for stocks are not perfectly elastic, 
with demand for an offering increasing as the issue price falls.34 Mola and Loughran (2004) 
and Corwin (2003) also find evidence that underwriter pricing practices, such as offer-price 
rounding, impact underpricing. A final strand of literature emphasizes the role of short-sellers 
and manipulative trading around seasoned offerings, although the evidence is mixed. Henry 
and Koski (2009) find that manipulative trading increases underpricing, whereas 
Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2009), provide evidence that institutional trading reflects an 
information production role rather than manipulative trading. Further studies (e.g., Singal and 
Xu, 2005; Kim and Shin, 2004; Safieddine and Wilhelm, 1996) examine the consequences of 
the adoption of SEC Rule 10b-21 in 1988, but find contrasting results with respect to its 
effect on underpricing.35  
                                                          
34 Apart from Chapter 3 of this thesis, papers that find evidence of downward sloping demand curves include 
Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004), and Shleifer (1986). 
35 Rule 10b-21, adopted in August 1988, prohibited the use of shares purchased at the offering to cover short 
sales positions established between the initial filing and offer date. In April 1997, this rule was replaced by Rule 
105 of Regulation M, which prohibited traders from covering short sales made within five days of the offering 
with shares obtained in the offering. 
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4.3   Testable predictions  
 
4.3.1  Post issue abnormal returns and current SEO underpricing 
 
Both seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and to a lesser degree, initial public offerings 
(IPOs), are on average followed by negative long-run abnormal returns (e.g., Ritter, 2003; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995).36 An extensive strand of 
literature suggests that the post-issue underperformance is evidence of  issuers timing the 
market to raise equity when the cost of capital is abnormally low. One version of the market 
timing theory assumes that managers are better informed than investors and time equity 
issues to coincide with periods when their equity is overvalued (see, e.g., Huang and Ritter, 
2009; Baker and Wurgler, 2000; Stein, 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Graham and 
Harvey (2001) provide survey evidence in support of this view. Firms may also time their 
issues to coincide with windows of opportunity during which asymmetric information is 
lower and investors have a more favorable view of issuers (see, e.g., Lowry, 2003; Bayless 
and Chaplisky, 1996; Choe, Masulis and Nanda, 1993). In the asymmetric information 
models of Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1992), and Lucas and McDonald (1990), firms 
postpone an issue until they release positive private information, which raises their stock 
price. Another possible explanation for post-issue underperformance, suggested by Ritter 
(2003), is that both investors and managers are overoptimistic about the prospects of issuing 
firms. In summary, the literature on market timing documents that SEOs and IPOs on average 
have a negative impact on the wealth of new investors, while issuers show signs of timing 
their offerings to coincide with higher stock prices.37 
In the presence of information asymmetries, investors are limited in their ability to predict 
the market timing motives of issuers. However, investors can infer the intentions that issuers 
had by observing the consequence of their actions, as captured in the post-issuance returns. A 
corollary is that investors view companies with more negative abnormal returns following 
IPOs or SEOs as more likely to time their future equity offerings. If this hypothesis holds I 
expect the level of underpricing in SEOs to be inversely related to the abnormal returns 
following previous equity issues. The risk of market timing constitutes another source of 
price uncertainty, complementing previous literature that relates underpricing to the 
uncertainty of the issuer and the demand as revealed in the underwriter’s order book.  
The risk of issuers timing their offering is the main price concern of potential subscribers. 
An equity issue is a mainly unpredictable event, and investors are assumed to update their 
expectations of the post-issue return distribution in a Bayesian manner, using information 
about returns following a similar event in the past (i.e. the previous equity issue).38 Therefore, 
the magnitude of the effect that market timing risk has on underpricing depends on investors’ 
perception about how representative the previous offering is of the current one, in terms of 
                                                          
36 Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) review recent literature on equity offerings and document that 3-year buy-
and-hold abnormal returns post-offering regularly exceed 10% for SEOs but are somewhat more muted for 
IPOs. 
37 Issuing overvalued equity to new investors results in a wealth transfer to current shareholders. As such, an 
overvalued issue has a positive effect on the wealth of current shareholders, unless the issuer overinvests the 
additional proceeds in negative net present value investments. 
38 Hirschleifer (2001) identifies the role of Bayesian updating in asset pricing, while literature reviewed by 
Hirschleifer and Teoh (2003) documents how investors are influenced by observing the actions of other agents, 
although there is inconclusive evidence on whether such behavior is fully rational. Mishra, Racine, and Schmidt 
(2011) find evidence that investors judge the credibility of a firm’s share repurchase announcement based on its 
repurchase history. 
72  Chapter 4 
 
 
 
indicating market timing motives. It is not clear whether market timing is seen as a general 
trait of a company, as opposed to it being attributable to a specific CEO, assuming that 
decisions about security issues are authorized by the CEO. If the identity of the CEO is more 
important, the signal from past issues is less informative if the CEO changes between issues. 
I test this hypothesis by identifying firms that experience a change in their CEO in between 
issues. In support of the CEO view about corporate decisions, Baker and Xuan (2009) find 
that investors are more likely to supply capital to CEOs who perform well, holding constant 
the firm performance.  
If market timing incentives are similar for both SEOs and IPOs, then the returns 
following either event should be equally informative for investors in updating their beliefs 
regarding market timing of subsequent SEOs. Both SEOs and IPOs raise additional capital, 
so that issuance can be motivated by needs to finance profitable investment opportunities or, 
in contrast, opportunities to raise capital when valuations are abnormally high. On the other 
hand, the IPO literature suggests that investors might view IPOs as being less indicative of 
the market timing motives of follow-on equity issuers. Apart from raising proceeds, a 
company might have other benefits from going public for the first time. In addition, there 
may be fewer opportunities to time the market because of the time and costs of setting up the 
IPO, difficulty in valuation, and the risk of a failed offering. For instance, Pagano, Panetta, 
and Zingales (1998) find evidence of market timing of IPOs in the Italian market, but also 
find other benefits, such as cheaper access to bank credit. The authors also document an 
increased turnover in control following the IPO, which could lead to a change in market 
timing incentives. Geddes (2003) notes that the offering process for an IPO is more complex 
and lengthy than that of a secondary offering. IPOs require that documentation is set up for 
the first time, and involve more extensive marketing effort than subsequent SEOs.  
Pricing of IPOs is also complex and usually depends on comparable firm multiples 
(Geddes, 2003; Ritter, 2003), whereas the price of listed securities provides a good indicator 
of what investors are willing to pay for seasoned offerings. As noted by Chemmanur, He, and 
Hu (2009), institutional investors’ private information can also be partly inferred through 
trading volumes prior to an SEO offering, but this mechanism is not available in the case of 
IPOs. The importance of avoiding a failed IPO is emphasized in Dunbar (1998), who finds 
that only around 9% of companies with failed offerings are able to ever go public. A failed 
offering can be avoided if the issuer has a good indication of the demand curve for the 
company’s shares. The uncertainty regarding the valuation of an IPO increases the risk of a 
failed offering, and to some extent explains why firms leave a substantial amount of money 
on the table by heavily discounting of the IPO.  
 
 
4.3.2  Post-issue abnormal returns and capital structure 
 
In the presence of contracting costs, the choice between equity and debt financing is one 
that minimizes the cost of capital. For instance, the pecking order theory emphasizes the 
issuance costs arising from the varying degrees of information asymmetry associated with 
different financing instruments. To mitigate these costs, firms should use internally generated 
funds, and raise external funds only if these are insufficient. Their first choice of external 
funding should be straight debt, while equity should only be used as a last resort. In the 
tradeoff theory, firms compare the costs and the benefits of debt. The costs of debt include 
costs related to bankruptcy and agency costs resulting from the different interests of 
bondholders and shareholders. The benefits of debt include the deductibility of interest 
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expenses and the reduction of agency conflicts. This theory predicts that firms should issue 
equity when their leverage is above the desired target, and otherwise issue debt.  
Underpricing represents an additional cost of issuing equity, since new securities are 
issued at below the market price. In the presence of profitable investment opportunities that 
can’t be delayed, higher expected underpricing will cause a shift from equity to debt 
financing. Debt becomes a viable alternative if its issuance costs (for instance costs arising 
from the risk of asset substitution and bankruptcy) are lower than the investment’s net present 
value. In severe cases of expected underpricing, or if investment opportunities are only 
marginally positive, the firm may abandon investment plans altogether if debt financing is not 
a viable substitute. Thus, past market timing may constitute a financing constraint prohibiting 
future fund-raising and investments. A manager can use the abnormal returns following past 
SEOs in the same way as investors to form expectations of underpricing of a subsequent 
equity offering. This behavior is consistent with the model of Noe, Rebello, and Wang 
(2003), where both managers and investors endogenously form expectations of prices based 
on past behavior, with debt emerging as the security of choice when the risk of issue failure 
increases. Hence, I hypothesize that firms are more likely to switch to debt if their abnormal 
returns following a previous SEO are more negative.  
In addition, the risk of market mispricing is lower for a debt instrument than for common 
stock. Whereas the share price performance following past SEOs is likely to influence the 
perception that future SEO investors might have about the firm riskiness, this effect should be 
less important to investors in new debt issues. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, (2007) note that 
debt securities have a predictable contractual payment stream, while they are also protected 
by bankruptcy law. Debt purchasers are normally more sophisticated than equity investors 
and tend to scrutinize issuers more.39 The commitment to pay interest also signals firm 
quality. Noe, Rebello, and Wang, (2003) provide a model in which underpricing is related to 
the difficulty of pricing a security, with debt emerging as the instrument that minimizes 
underpricing. In their model, rational agents learn from past experience how to price 
securities, providing further support to my hypothesis that firms switch to debt if past SEOs 
are followed by negative abnormal returns. 
While some firms tend to switch to debt if they anticipate that an SEO will require larger 
underpricing, there are instances when an equity issue is still the preferable option. The most 
obvious case is if the share price is much higher than the issuer’s underlying value, so that 
underpricing is not large enough to make debt an attractive alternative. In this case, the 
current shareholders will benefit from raising capital at a cost of equity below the true cost, 
while purchasers of the new issue will suffer a loss in wealth.40 Relaxing the assumption that 
investments must have positive net present value, equity may be preferred to debt if managers 
have personal objectives and overinvest the proceeds from the issue (see, e.g., Stulz, 1990; 
Jensen 1986). In the presence of personal objectives, managers would prefer equity to debt 
since it is less restrictive and does not impose bankruptcy costs that would limit the use of the 
proceeds. Finally, if a firm has a multi-issue strategy, underpricing may be accepted as an 
immediate cost that is used to signal the quality of the issuer, which ensures that future equity 
offerings are better received by investors (e.g., Chemmanur, 1993; Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989).  
 
 
                                                          
39 Debt issues have a minimal subscription amount that precludes smaller investors, while the illiquidity of the 
secondary market and restricted availability of price data also makes them unattractive to less sophisticated 
investors.  
40 If the new issue is purchased completely by existing shareholders, there will be no wealth transfer, so that 
underpricing becomes irrelevant (Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2007). 
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4.4   Data and summary statistics 
 
In section 4.4.1 I describe the sample of equity issues, and the construction of the 
variables directly related to the market timing hypothesis, underpricing and the returns 
following past SEOs and IPOs. In Section 4.4.2 I describe the other determinants of 
underpricing that I use as control variables in the underpricing regressions. In Section 4.4.3 I 
describe the variables that influence capital structure decisions, which I use as controls when 
I model the choice to issue equity.  
 
 
4.4.1  Equity issues, underpricing and post-issue returns 
 
I obtain data for U.S. Initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings issued 
between January 1st 1975 and December 31st 2007 from the Securities Data Company New 
Issues Database (henceforth SDC). I exclude units, secondary offerings, and those made by 
firms having a market capitalization under $10 million as well as utilities (SIC codes 4900-
4949) and financials (SIC codes 6000-6999). I condition on a SEO being preceded by another 
SEO or an IPO. I allow for five years to elapse after 1975, before I start my sample of follow-
on issues, with the first observation occurring in 1980.41 I also require that firms have data 
available in both CRSP and Compustat. My final sample consists of 2,420 SEOs, 1,402 of 
which follow an SEO and 1,018 following an IPO. Figure 4.1 shows the annual distribution 
of the number of follow-on issues.  
I measure the dependent variable, underpricing, as in Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), 
taking the logarithm of the ratio of the closing share price on the day prior to the offer, to the 
offer price. The offer price is obtained from SDC, while the closing price is obtained from 
CRSP. I plot the average underpricing per year in Figure 4.2. As previously documented by 
Mola and Loughran (2004), and Corwin (2003), underpricing exhibits an upward trend, and 
has averaged around 3% in recent years. The figure also shows that underpricing for equity 
issues that follow IPOs has become consistently above the underpricing of equity issues that 
follow previous SEOs. This might be because after 1990, newly listed firms became more 
likely to cease trading in the first 10 years after being listed, as documented by Fama and 
French (2004). 
I capture the performance following previous SEOs or IPOs as the buy-and-hold six 
month or one-year abnormal returns relative to a benchmark of non-issuers matched on size, 
measured by the market value five days after an issue is made. I construct the benchmark 
portfolio based on the market value of all non issuers that have data available in CRSP, 
excluding financials and utilities. The benchmark return for each issuer making a SEO is the 
return on the equally weighted portfolio that is closest to that of the issuer. Ritter (2003) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) also use size benchmarks to calculate abnormal returns. 
Figure 4.3 shows a timeline for the event study employed in my approach. Since I need 
one year returns following a previous SEO or IPO, I impose the condition that at least one 
calendar year has passed between subsequent events, and also ensure that there is no overlap 
with the stock runup prior to the filing date.42 Underpricing is calculated at the issue date, 
which occurs on average (median) 42 (30) calendar days after the filing date. 
                                                          
41 I allow for five years to pass so that I avoid a bias arising from having (by construction) less follow-on issues 
in the early years of my sample,  as well as a bias due to less time being allowed to pass between an IPO or SEO 
and subsequent equity issues. 
42 I also limit my sample to firms that re-issue within 10 years, although the results are robust to their inclusion. 
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4.4.2  Determinants of underpricing 
 
I control for the following variables that have been used in other studies as determinants of 
underpricing: 
Filing CARs: This captures the wealth effect of an SEO announcement, measured 
similarly to Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), as the raw cumulative stock return over trading 
days -1 to +1 relative to the announcement date less the CRSP equally weighted market index 
return over the same period. 
Abn. stock runup: The raw cumulative stock return over trading days -62 to -2 prior to the 
announcement date less the CRSP equally weighted market index return over the same 
period. As shown by Lucas and McDonald (1990), a pre-announcement stock runup can 
reflect lower equity-related adverse selection costs.  
Residual volatility: Idiosyncratic risk, computed similarly to Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) 
as the annualized standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily excess stock 
returns on excess returns of the value-weighted CRSP market portfolio, estimated over 
trading days -62 to -2 before the announcement date.  
Systematic volatility: Systematic risk, computed as the annualized standard deviation of 
the predicted value from a regression of daily excess stock returns on excess returns of the 
value-weighted CRSP market portfolio, estimated over trading days -62 to -2 before the 
announcement date.  
Ln(MV): As in Corwin (2003) I proxy for firm size by the natural logarithm of the market 
value measured 5 days before the announcement of the issue. Firm size is generally 
interpreted as capturing asset diversification and the quality of publicly available information 
about the firm. 
Tobin’s Q: This has been shown to proxy for growth opportunities (see, for e.g., Graham, 
2000; Polk and Sapienza, 2009), or overvaluation (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003). Tobin’s 
Q is calculated as the market value of equity (Compustat # 25 x # 199) + total assets (# 6) – 
book value of equity (# 60)/total assets. 
Relative proceeds: The relative offering size is calculated as the number of shares issued 
dived by the number of shares outstanding. Offering size is interpreted as capturing an 
adverse selection effect, or the liquidity effect of price pressure associated with new shares 
being issued (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003), which require underpricing as a 
‘sweetener’ to lure prospective investors.  
Age: Firm age. DeAngelo et al. (2010) finds that firms in the earlier stage of their 
lifecycle are more likely to issue equity. Age is measured as the difference, in years, between 
the issue date and the date that the firm first appears in the CRSP database.  
Years previous: The number of years that have elapsed since the previous issue. 
Ln(price): The natural logarithm of the market price measured 5 days before issue is used 
to control for uncertainty about firm value as in Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), with an inverse 
relationship hypothesized. In addition, Corwin (2003) finds that low-priced securities tend to 
be more underpriced than offers of high-priced securities, due to a common practice of 
rounding the offer price to even dollars. 
Underwriter Prestige: As in Loughran and Ritter (2004), I take prestigious underwriters 
as those having a ranking of 8 or higher on the Carter and Manaster (1990) 9-point scale. 
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SDC provides data on the underwriter of each SEO, which I match with the underwriter 
prestige rankings available from Jay Ritter’s site.43  
NYSE: I include a dummy variable equal to one for issuers on the New York Stock 
Exchange following Corwin (2003), who finds lower underpricing for these issues, which are 
characterized by less uncertainty.  
Previous debt issue: I include a dummy variable equal to one for issuers that make a debt 
issue in between the current SEO and a previous equity offering. 
Change CEO: A dummy variable equal to one if there was a change in the CEO since the 
previous issue was made, identified using Standard and Poor’s Executive Compensation 
(ExecuComp) Database. 
 
Panel A in Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for equity offerings, conditional on a 
firm having previously made an SEO. The sample consists of 1,402 follow-on equity 
offerings made by 732 firms that had a previous SEO. Around 95% of firms make no more 
than 4 further issues after their first SEO. Panel B presents statistics for 1,018 firms that issue 
equity following their IPO. The average underpricing for SEOs that follow a previous SEO is 
smaller than the underpricing for SEOs following an IPO. Overall, underpricing is similar to 
that documented by Corwin (2003), but slightly less than in Mola and Loughran (2004) and 
Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), who examine a more recent period. The 6-month abnormal 
returns that follow a previous SEO are on average 2.6%, whereas the 12-month returns are 
2.2%. Meanwhile, the 6-month abnormal returns following an IPO are -2.1%, and the 12-
month returns are 21.7%.44 The sharp increase in post-IPO returns after six months have 
elapsed might be due to the expiration of the lockup period that commonly occurs after 6 
months. Information released at the lock up date can have a large effect on share prices. 
Hence, the returns in the year after issue are considered more informative about market 
timing than those in the first 6 months after issue. Compared to firms issuing seasoned equity 
for the first time, Table 4.1 indicates that firms with a prior SEO have less firm-specific risk 
and growth opportunities, are larger and older, and raise less proceeds. These firms are also 
more likely to be listed on the NYSE and to adopt a prestigious underwriter to manage their 
issue. Thus, firms with a previous SEO are less prone to asymmetric information problems 
than those issuing equity after their IPO.   
   
  
4.4.3  Determinants of capital structure 
 
I include a number of standard firm-specific variables that capture costs associated with 
straight debt and equity financing (see, e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Lewis, Rogalski, and 
Seward 1999). Firm characteristics are retrieved from Compustat and measured as at the end 
of the fiscal year prior to the offering, unless mentioned otherwise. The symbol “#” denotes a 
Compustat data item: 
                                                          
43 Data for underwriter prestige between 1980 and 2007 are available on Jay Ritters’s site at: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
44 In the larger sample of 8,181 SEOs that are not conditioned on a previous SEO being made, the abnormal 
returns are -0.4% in the first 6 months, and -4.6% in the first 12 months after issue. The abnormal returns 
following 5,543 unconditioned IPOs are -0.1% in the first six months, and -3.1% in the first 12 months after the 
IPO. By comparison, Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that seasoned equity issuers underperform size-matched 
firms by 0.05% in the first 6 months after issue, and 6.3% in the first 12 months. They also find that IPO firms 
outperform the matched sample by 0.05% in the first 6 months, but underperform by 4.5% in the year after 
going public. Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) find that seasoned equity issuers underperform their book-to-
market and size matched benchmark by 5.2% in the year after issue. 
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Abn. stock runup: The raw cumulative stock return over trading days -62 to -2 prior to the 
announcement date less the CRSP equally weighted market index return over the same 
period. As shown by Lucas and McDonald (1990), a pre-announcement stock runup can 
reflect lower equity-related adverse selection costs.  
Stock volatility: Total risk, computed as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over trading days -62 to -2 before the announcement date.  
Slack: Cash and short-term investments (# 1) divided by total assets (# 6). Financial slack 
acts as a measure for adverse selection costs, as firms with higher slack could engage in 
wasteful use of resources. 
Fixed assets: Calculated as plant, property and equipment (# 8) divided by total assets (# 
6). Firms with more tangible assets are assumed to have lower financial distress costs. Asset 
tangibility could also be negatively associated with information asymmetry.  
Ln(sales): Calculated as the natural logarithm of total sales (# 12). Larger firms are 
assumed to face smaller information asymmetries regarding their value and risk. 
Taxes: This variable captures the tax liabilities benefit associated with issuing debt and is 
computed as income tax (# 16) divided by total assets. 
Tobin’s Q: This has been shown to proxy for growth opportunities (see, for e.g., Graham, 
2000; Polk and Sapienza, 2009). Firms with higher growth opportunities face higher debt 
costs associated with risk shifting (Green, 1984) and underinvestment (Myers, 1977), making 
them more likely to issue equity instead of debt. Alternatively the Q-ratio might indicate 
overvaluation (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003). Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value 
of equity (# 25 x # 199) + total assets (# 6) – book value of equity (# 60)/total assets. 
R&D expense: The expenditure on research and development (# 46) divided by total 
assets. Missing observations are assigned a value of 0. This variable proxies for growth 
opportunities. 
Leverage-Target: the deviation of the market leverage from the target leverage.45 I 
estimate a firm’s target leverage using similar determinants of leverage as in previous 
research (see, for e.g., Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Frank 
and Goyal, 2009). The firm’s target leverage for firm i in year t is calculated as the fitted 
values from Equation (7), while the deviation from the target leverage is the actual leverage 
for firm i in year t minus the target leverage (t-statistics, clustered by firm and year, are in 
brackets): 
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Equation (7) is estimated using 129,422 firm-years over the period 1975-2007, and the 
adjusted R-squared is 30.9%. I retrieve firm characteristics from the Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual database, and omit financials (SIC codes 6000–6999), utilities (SIC 
codes 4900–4949), and firms with a market capitalization less than $10 million. market 
leverage is calculated as [book value of debt (# 9 + # 34)] divided by market value of assets 
[market value of equity (# 25 x # 199) + total assets (# 6) – book value of equity (# 60)]; 
                                                          
45 I include the deviation from the target leverage as a determinant of the choice of financing instrument, but I 
also include other determinants for two reasons. First, as noted by Hovakimian et al. (2001), and Leary and 
Roberts (2005), target leverage is estimated with error, reducing its explanatory power. In addition, firms may 
adjust slowly to target leverage (see, e.g., Leary and Roberts, 2005) so that other factors may be more significant 
in explaining the choice between debt and equity at a particular instance in time.  
(7) 
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Fixed assets plant, property and equipment (# 8) divided by total assets ; LnSales [the 
natural logarithm of sales (# 12)]; Taxes income tax (# 16) divided by total assets ; Tobin’s 
Q [market value of equity (# 25 x # 199) + total assets (# 6) – book value of equity (# 
60)]/[total assets]; R&D is the expenditure on research and development (# 46) divided by 
total assets]46; Capex [capital expenditure (# 128) divided by total assets]; Cash flow 
[earnings before extraordinary items (# 18) + depreciation (item 14)]/[total assets]; Industry 
refers to 70 dummies based on the 2 digit SIC code, and Year are annual dummies.  
The estimated regression coefficients are mostly in line with those found in previous 
research.  In line with the tradeoff theory of capital structure, larger firms and those with 
more collateral, as measured by fixed assets, have higher target leverage, while the negative 
coefficient on Taxes is unexpected. Firms with a higher Tobin’s Q ratio have a smaller target 
leverage, although this relationship can simply be mechanical (Huang and Ritter 2009; Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). R&D and Capital expenditure are both negatively related to target 
leverage, supporting the tradeoff hypothesis that firms with more growth opportunities face 
higher costs associated with debt financing due to bankruptcy, risk-shifting, or 
underinvestment. Cash flow is negatively related to target debt, counter to the prediction that 
these firms would benefit from the tax savings and lower costs of free cash flow associated 
with debt.  
KZ index: the Kaplan and Zingales index captures financial constraints (Graham 2000; 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003), and firms with higher constraints face higher costs of 
issuing debt, which are to some extent mitigated by the disciplinary benefit that debt brings to 
firms with excess cash. I expect the probability of issuing equity should be increasing in the 
value of KZ index since more financially constrained firms are forced to issue equity. 
Following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), I exclude the Tobin’s Q-ratio from the index, as 
a high Q-ratio might indicate overvaluation and thus contaminate the index as a measure of 
financial constraints. Hence, the KZ index is calculated as: 
 
leverageBook 3.139         
Cash 1.315-Dividends39.368- flowCash 002 1.- Index  KZ         
 
 
Where: Cash flow [earnings before extraordinary items (# 18) + depreciation (item 14) 
divided by lagged total assets]; Dividends [cash dividends (# 21 + # 19) divided by lagged 
total assets]; cash [cash balances (# 1) divided by lagged total assets]; Book leverage [book 
value of debt (# 9 + # 34)] divided by book value of assets [book value of debt (# 9 + # 34) +  
stockholders’ equity (# 216)]. 
I capture economy-wide costs of issuing debt or equity through the following Aggregate 
Financing Costs Measures, which are obtained from Datastream:  
Interest rates: The real interest rate serves as a proxy for bankruptcy risk, as in 
Krishnaswami and Yaman (2008). This variable is calculated as the difference between yields 
on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds and the inflation rate, defined as the continuously-
compounded annual change in the U.S. consumer price index.  
Default premium: The default premium also captures bankruptcy risk (Korajczyk and 
Levy, 2003) and is defined as the difference between yields on Baa rated corporate Bonds 
and Aaa bonds. Both the real interest rate and the default premium are averaged over the 3 
months prior to the issue date.  
                                                          
46 Missing values of R&D are replaced by 0. 
(8) 
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Market runup: Calculated as the return on the S&P 500 index over the quarter preceding 
the issue date, the stock market runup controls for general market conditions.  
Confidence Index: I control for investor sentiment following several studies that highlight 
its importance in security issuance decisions (e.g., Lowry, 2003; Helwege and Liang, 2004). 
As a sentiment proxy I take the average level of the University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index over the three months prior to issuance. 
 
 
4.5  Results  
 
In Section 4.5.1 I examine the effects of past market timing on the underpricing of equity 
issues. I perform an analysis for equity issues occurring after previous SEOs and a separate 
analysis for firms issuing equity after their IPO, and contrast the results. Section 4.5.2 
presents a similar analysis, but I focus on the shareholder wealth effects at the SEO 
announcement date, instead of on underpricing. In Section 4.5.3 I model the influences of 
market timing on the capital structure, while in Section 4.5.4 I test my results for robustness 
to measures of short-sale constraints.   
 
 
4.5.1  The impact of market timing on underpricing of subsequent 
SEOs 
 
My main hypothesis proposes a relationship between returns following a past SEO or IPO 
and underpricing of a subsequent equity offering. Hence, my sample conditions on a firm 
returning to the market to raise further equity, but it is possible that the choice to do so is not 
random. For instance, a firm’s choice on whether to issue further equity can depend on 
insider information about expected underpricing that is not observable to the market. An 
example of such a situation is one where a prospective issuer has lined up a convincing road 
show to market the equity issue after it is announced. Information released to selective 
investors during the road show might not even be impounded into prices until the issue is 
offered for sale, when the issue price is determined. Such a case would imply a correlation 
between the unobservable characteristics determining the decision to issue, and the 
unobservable influences in the underpricing regression, resulting in a selection bias. I address 
this concern by applying the Heckman (1979) 2-step procedure, where in the first step I 
estimate a probit regression to determine the decision to issue equity, from which I obtain the 
Inverse Mills’ ratio. This captures unobservable characteristics influencing the decision to 
issue. I include the Inverse Mills’ ratio in the second stage regression, where I regress 
underpricing on the market timing proxy and control variables. Some of the variables 
included in the first stage influence the decision to issue equity but not underpricing, helping 
the identification of the underpricing equation. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the first step of the Heckman procedure for equity issues 
that follow previous SEOs (Columns 1 and 2) and those following IPOs (Columns 2 and 3). 
The first step is performed using a panel regression consisting of all firms having at least one 
previous SEO, but not conditioning on them issuing again. The dependent variable takes a 
value of one if a firm issues equity again in a given firm-year, and a value of zero for every 
firm-year in which it does not. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The first two 
columns in Table 4.2 indicate that the probability of issuing equity following a previous SEO 
is positively related to both the 6-month and 12-month returns following the previous SEO. 
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Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) find similar results. The other explanatory variables are 
generally in line with the predictions of capital structure theory. For instance, the probability 
of an equity issue is also positively related to the stock run-up, Tobin’s Q, and R&D 
expenditure, variables that have been used to capture growth opportunities. Firms are also 
more likely to issue equity if their leverage is above their target leverage. The results in 
Columns (3) and (4) refer to the sample of firms having done an IPO, but without 
conditioning on them issuing equity again. Both the 6-month and 12-month returns following 
the IPO have a positive influence on the likelihood of the firm issuing equity again, while 
most of the other determinants have a similar effect as in the SEO sample. IPO underpricing 
has an insignificant impact on the likelihood of issuing equity, in contrast to the predictions 
of models in which underpricing is used to signal better quality firms (e.g., Chemmanur, 
1993; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). 
Having shown that the probability of issuing further equity is positively influenced by the 
returns following a previous SEO or IPO, I next examine repeat issuers to test the hypothesis 
that past market timing impacts underpricing of subsequent equity issues. Table 4.3 presents 
the results of the second stage Heckman procedure, using the sample of firms that had a 
previous SEO. The dependent variable is underpricing, while I control for several 
determinants of underpricing previously documented in the literature (e.g., Altinkiliç and 
Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003), as well as the Inverse Mills’ ratio calculated from Table 4.2.47 
In addition, I control for the upward trend in underpricing documented in Figure 4.2 by 
including year dummies. The results in Column (1) suggest that past market timing has an 
impact on underpricing of subsequent equity issues. The significant negative coefficient for 
the six-month returns implies that underpricing is larger in the returns following a previous 
issue were more negative. In economic terms, if the returns are one standard deviation lower, 
underpricing increases by 0.29 percentage points. This represents 13% of the average 
underpricing across all SEOs. Column (2), indicates that the impact of the one-year returns on 
underpricing is similar, with one standard deviation lower returns resulting in higher 
underpricing of 0.22 percentage points (10% of the average). In the remaining analysis I 
report results for the one-year returns only, rather than the six-month variable.48 I use the 
longer horizon for consistency with the results on issues following an IPO, for which the 
twelve-month period is more informative because it incorporates the expiration of the lock-up 
period. On the other hand, the longer horizon may be noisy due to developments not 
associated with market timing that occur after an issue.  
With regards to the other variables in the regression, the runup in stock prices prior to the 
announcement has a negative impact on underpricing. This is consistent with the runup 
capturing growth opportunities and positive sentiment about a company. In contrast volatility, 
particularly that attributable to firm-specific returns, increases underpricing, in line with the 
hypothesis that underpricing is higher when an issuer is exposed to more asymmetric 
information. The positive coefficient for firm age could be due to issuers late in their 
lifecycle, who raise funds due to cash shortfalls instead of investment opportunities, as 
documented in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010). A potential explanation for the 
negative coefficient on Years previous, is that firms signal their quality by waiting longer to 
issue as in the models of Lucas and MacDonald (1990), and Welch (1996).49 Underpricing is 
also lower for firms that are listed on the NYSE, in line with the findings or Corwin (2003), 
                                                          
47 The specification in Column (1) of Table 4.3 uses the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (1) of Table 4.2, 
while the remaining specifications in Table 4.3 use the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (2) of Table 4.2. This 
is in accordance with whether 6-month, or 12-month returns are the variable of interest in Table 4.3. 
48 The results are similar if the six-month returns are used. 
49 In unreported analysis I find no differential effect when I interact Years previous with 12 Mth. post-previous 
rets. 
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and consistent with Mola and Loughran (2004) and Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), who use a 
dummy for Nasdaq issuers. The negative coefficient for ln(price), and positive coefficient for 
Tick<1/4 are both evidence of offer price rounding, consistent with the findings of  Mola and 
Loughran (2004), and Corwin (2003). 
In Column (3) I devise a further test of the hypothesis that past market timing impacts 
subsequent SEO underpricing. This hypothesis proposes that investors use the returns 
following previous issues to adjust their beliefs about the intentions of the issuer, and 
consequently the expected returns post-issuance. If this is the case, prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) would suggest that investor ‘value’ would be more sensitive 
to a drop in their wealth rather than an increase, assuming investors are loss-averse.50 In order 
to test this proposition, I include an interaction term to allow for a differential effect of 
returns following a previous SEO on underpricing. The specification in Column (3) includes 
the interaction term, which has a positive and significant coefficient. Adding up the 
coefficient of 12 Mth. post-previous rets. and the interaction term gives a total effect (0.06) 
on underpricing for the returns following a previous issue, when conditioning on these being 
positive. In contrast the coefficient for negative returns almost doubles, increasing the impact 
of past market timing on underpricing. 
In Column (4) I interact the 12-month returns with a dummy variable that captures 
whether the issuer changed its CEO since the past issue was made.51 If the identity of the 
CEO is more important, the signal from past issues is less informative if the CEO changes 
between issues. The interaction term has an estimated coefficient that is positive and 
significant, lending support to this hypothesis, since the influence of past returns has a 
smaller impact if a company changed its CEO. The coefficient of past returns remains 
negative for those companies that did not change their CEO. The coefficient for the dummy 
Change CEO (not interacted) is negative and significant, indicating that a change in CEO, by 
itself, reduces underpricing of future equity issues by 0.44 percentage points. This evidence 
suggests that a change in CEO signals a possible improvement in prospects for a company, 
and is consistent with the findings of Baker and Xuan (2009). 
The final column of Table 4.3 includes two additional control variables, the abnormal 
returns for the window (-1, 1) around the filing date of the SEO, as well as the level of 
underpricing of the previous issue. The sample size is smaller since I omit observations for 
which the filing date is unavailable. The filing date return captures investor perceptions about 
the reasons for a firm issuing stock, including concerns about share price overvaluation, as in 
the Myers and Majluf (1984) framework. The estimated coefficient for Filing CARs is 
insignificant, indicating that information from the announcement date does not influence the 
final price that the shares are issued at. The coefficient of Previous underpricing is positive, 
so that past underpricing has some influence on underpricing of subsequent SEOs. This could 
reflect firm-specific effects, such as information asymmetry, that are not captured by the 
other control variables in the model. Even after including these two variables, the coefficient 
for the 12-month returns following past SEOs continues to have a negative and significant 
impact on underpricing. 
Next I examine the hypothesis that past market timing impacts underpricing of SEOs that 
follow IPOs. Table 4.4 presents the results of the second stage Heckman procedure, using the 
                                                          
50 In prospect theory the value function substitutes for a utility function, and value is derived from gains and 
losses around a reference point, rather than from levels (of wealth, in my case).  
51 Changes in the CEO are identified using Standard and Poor’s Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) 
Database. 
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sample of firms that had a previous IPO.52 The dependent variable is underpricing, and I 
control for year effects in all specifications. Across all specifications, I find that returns 
following an IPO have no significant impact on underpricing of subsequent SEOs. These 
results are in contrast with those for multiple SEOs, documented in Table 4.3, and suggest 
that the post-IPO returns are not indicative of market timing motives in subsequent SEOs.  
Turning to the other variables in Table 4.4, residual volatility has a marginally significant 
positive impact on underpricing, underlining the role of asymmetric information in 
underpricing. Tobin’s Q is significantly positive across all specifications, suggests that this 
variable captures growth opportunities that are hard to value, or overvaluation, both of which 
increase price uncertainty and lead to higher underpricing. The negative coefficient for 
ln(price), is consistent with the practice of offer price rounding, while firms listed on the 
NYSE have larger underpricing, which is contrary to expectations. Column (5) indicates that 
the level of underpricing at the IPO does not influence subsequent SEO underpricing, which 
is inconsistent with the signaling models discussed earlier, and in line with the results in 
Table 4.2.  
  
 
4.5.2  The impact of market timing on the announcement effects of 
SEOs 
 
In the previous section, I use underpricing at the offering date to measure the cost of past 
market timing on subsequent equity issues, thus placing direct focus on the purchasers of the 
new issue. There are several reasons why underpricing is the appropriate measure to capture 
these costs. For instance, in the model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) the demand for the 
new issue is partly reflected in the price discount, which compensates investors for revealing 
their private information. Hanley (1993) finds evidence for IPOs in line with the implications 
of this model, while Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) show that underwriters adjust underpricing 
to incorporate private information of investors as reflected in their order book. 
While my primary focus is on underpricing at the offer date, theory suggests that the 
effects of past market timing should also to some extent be reflected in the announcement 
date returns, which capture shareholder wealth effects. In the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
framework, adverse selection costs imply that companies have an incentive to issue shares 
when the market price is higher than the underlying value of the company.53 An SEO 
announcement may signal overvaluation and is on average accompanied by a negative share 
price reaction. This signal should be stronger if the firm had timed its past equity issues to 
coincide with overvaluation.  
However, the announcement day return also incorporates other information unrelated to 
market timing, such as signals about unanticipated financing requirements or investment 
opportunities (see, e.g., Cooney and Kalay, 1993; Miller and Rock, 1985). This softer 
information embodies unobservable beliefs of investors, and is harder to control for. On the 
other hand, this information would be mostly incorporated into the share price by the time the 
issue is made. In addition, the announcement day reaction may be contaminated by 
                                                          
52 The specification in Column (1) of Table 4.4 uses the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (3) of Table 4.2, 
while the remaining specifications in Table 4.4 use the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (4) of Table 4.2. This 
is in accordance with whether 6-month, or 12-month returns are the variable of interest in Table 4.4. 
53 Eckbo et al. (2007) note that unless all the new shares are sold to insiders, issuing undervalued equity dilutes 
the holding of current shareholders and results in a wealth transfer to purchasers of the new shares. Thus, issuers 
tend to wait till the market price is above the underlying value of the firm before issuing equity. Conversely, 
issuing overvalued equity to new investors results in a wealth transfer to current shareholders. 
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uninformed or passive investors. Existing shareholders also have an incentive to keep the 
share price high, at least until after the issue is sold, so as to extract wealth from purchasers of 
the new shares. On the other hand, investors buying new shares have the option not to 
purchase the issue unless their updated beliefs about the expected return distribution, as well 
as the riskiness of these shares, is incorporated into the discount.  
Whereas there may be some uninformed investors holding a company’s stock, the 
purchasers of the new shares have a greater incentive to search for information, so that they 
should be more informed than the average existing shareholder. Market timing should also be 
more of a concern for the purchasers of the new equity than for current shareholders, since 
current shareholders benefit if additional stock is issued when valuations are high, thus 
raising more funds, before the share price drops to its true value. 
I examine the effects of past market timing on announcement of equity issues in Table 
4.5. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the window (-
1, 1), surrounding the announcement of an equity issue. The first two columns present 
estimates for the sub-sample of equity issues that are preceded by SEOs, whereas the other 
two columns pertain to the sub-sample of issues that follow an IPO. The explanatory 
variables are similar to those used in previous studies on equity issues (e.g. D’Mello, 
Tawatnuntachai, and Yaman, 2003; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996). I exclude year dummies 
in all regressions, since a 2 test does not reject the restriction that all the year dummy 
variable coefficients are jointly equal to zero (p-value of 0.33). The Inverse Mills’ ratio used 
in each regression is calculated using the probit model in the corresponding Column of Table 
4.2.  
The results in the first two columns of Table 4.5 indicate that the announcement returns 
are positively influenced by the returns following previous SEOs. This is evidence that 
market timing motives, captured by the returns following previous issues, are also 
incorporated in the beliefs of investors at the announcement of an issue. With regards to the 
firm characteristics, announcement returns are lower for riskier firms, but higher for those 
with a larger stock runup and Tobin’s Q, suggesting that these signal growth opportunities. 
Announcement returns are positively related to size, as proxied by ln(sales), fixed assets of 
the issuer, and the dummy for having issued debt in the past. Issuers that have less tax 
benefits of issuing debt are also better received by the market. The Inverse Mills’ ratio is 
positive and significant in Columns (1) and (2), indicating that there is ‘soft’ information that 
is not captured by observable variables in the selection model of Table 4.2, but which 
influences the decision to issue equity and also affects the stock price reaction positively. In 
contrast, almost all of the variables in Columns (3) and (4) are not significant in explaining 
the stock price reaction to equity announcements that follow IPOs. The insignificance of the 
firm characteristics could be because the stock price already incorporates information related 
to these characteristics, and the announcement of a stock issue does not alter the effect that 
these variables have on the stock price. The low R2 is common in studies that examine the 
announcement effects of SEOs, and shows that the determinants of the market reaction are 
not well understood.  
  
 
4.5.3  The impact of market timing on capital structure 
 
The results in the previous section show that underpricing is larger for those firms with 
lower returns in the year following a previous issue. In this section I test whether firms take 
this into account when they decide whether to issue equity or debt. Underpricing represents 
an additional cost of issuing equity, since new securities are issued at below the market price. 
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Hence I expect firms to prefer debt over equity financing if they expect larger underpricing, 
all else equal. I test this hypothesis by using a probit model to capture the marginal influence 
of returns following a previous issue, on the decision to issue equity or debt. I perform this 
analysis separately for SEOs and IPOs, and I condition that a firm returns to the market to 
issue either debt or equity. The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm switches to 
debt, and zero if it issues equity. 
 I control for other determinants of capital structure, similar to those used in Table 4.2.54 
Panel A of Table 4.6 shows descriptive statistics for firms that switch to debt and those that 
stick with another equity issue, having previously made an SEO. Out of a total of 1,732 
equity issues, only 593 are followed by a debt issue, compared with 1,139 that are followed 
by an SEO.55 Both the average 6-month and 12-month returns following a previous SEO are 
lower for those firms that switch to debt. These firms have a smaller stock price runup, are 
less risky, and have smaller growth opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s Q and R&D 
expense), making debt issues less prone to risk shifting costs (e.g., Green, 1984). The lower 
slack and larger fixed assets mitigate costs related to overinvestment and bankruptcy. Firms 
that switch to debt are also larger (sales) and older, and would consequently find it easier to 
switch to debt since they are more established with market participants. In fact, their leverage 
is above the target, suggesting that the debt issue is not done to immediately re-balance their 
capital structure. The coefficients estimated by the probit regression in Panel B are largely in 
line with the univariate analysis. The coefficients for both 6-Mth. Post-previous Rets. and 12-
Mth. Post-previous Rets. are negative, so that a firm is more likely to switch to debt if its 
previous SEO was followed by lower returns. In economic terms, when the 6-month (12-
month) returns are one standard deviation lower, the probability of switching to debt rises by 
2.21% (2.26%). These results support the hypothesis that firms take into account expected 
equity issue costs that arise from past market timing, thus influencing their capital structure. 
A corollary is that past market timing may constitute a financing constraint prohibiting future 
fund-raising and investments. The evidence presented here adds to that in Huang and Ritter 
(2009), and Baker and Wurgler (2002), who document that market timing has long-lasting 
influences on capital structure. 
I perform a similar analysis for equity issues that follow IPOs, as shown in Table 4.7. Out 
of a total of 1,033 IPOs, only 94 are followed by a debt issue. Panel A shows that the average 
6-month and 12-month returns following the IPO are lower for those firms that switch to 
debt, but not significant in the regression analysis in Panel B. For the firm characteristics, 
both the univariate analysis in Panel A and the regression estimates in Panel B indicate that 
firms switching to debt have lower debt-related costs than those sticking with equity, in line 
with the findings in Table 4.6. IPO underpricing is larger for firms that issue equity after their 
IPO, supporting the predictions of signaling models in which underpricing is used to signal 
firm quality (e.g., Chemmanur, 1993; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 
1989; Welch, 1989). 
In Table 4.8 I test whether the impact of past market timing on underpricing is robust for 
the sub-samples of firms that stick with equity. In columns (1) and (2) I examine the same 
sample of firms that stick with equity as in Panel A of Table 4.6. The results indicate that the 
impact of 6-Mth. Post-previous Rets. and 12-Mth. Post-previous Rets. on underpricing 
remains significantly negative for SEOs following previous SEOs. The Inverse Mills’ ratio 
used in columns (1) and (2) are those estimated using the probit model in the corresponding 
                                                          
54 For the model I use in this section I know the precise issue date of equity or debt, which differs from that in 
Table 4.2, where firm-years are used in a panel setting. Thus, I can use more precise proxies for the stock runup 
and volatility, in line with the underpricing regressions in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
55 Firms switching to debt may subsequently raise equity, which is why the total number of equity issues in 
Panel A of Table 4.1 is larger than 1,732. 
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columns in Panel B of Table 4.6.56 In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.8 I examine the sample 
of firms that follow an IPO with an equity offering, taken from Table 4.7. In this case, the 
returns following IPOs have an insignificant impact on underpricing.   
 
 
4.5.4  Underpricing and short-sale constraints 
 
Singal and Xu (2005) find that the negative returns following an SEO are largely due to  
short-sale constrained stocks (i.e., stocks that are difficult to short). If SEOs made by short-
sale constrained issuers are also underpriced more, then the market timing effect that I 
document in the previous sections, may in fact be spurious. One reason why short-sale 
constrained stocks can have larger underpricing is that the pre-offer price does not reflect the 
market’s valuation because investors cannot short the stocks and impound this information 
into prices (especially in the period between the announcement and issue dates). On the other 
hand, shares that are hard to short-sell offer less opportunities for manipulative traders to 
influence the offer price, so that underpricing is less. In this section I introduce proxies to 
capture stocks that are short-sale constrained, and re-run the underpricing regressions to test 
if the effects of market timing remain robust. 
The first proxy for short-sale constraints is short interest, scaled by the total number of 
shares outstanding (both measured over the quarter prior to the SEO announcement date). 
This captures the demand for sales for shorting purposes. Short interest data are obtained 
from the Securities Monthly file of the CRSP-Compustat merged database, and are available 
from 2003 onwards. The mean (median) number of shares that are shorted, relative to shares 
outstanding, is 5.60% (3.74%) in my sample. However,  Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) 
emphasize the importance of also controlling for the supply of shares that can potentially be 
borrowed for shorting purposes. I capture supply effects by using the number of shares held 
by 13F institutions (obtained from Thomson Reuters), divided by the number of shares 
outstanding (both measured over the quarter prior to the SEO announcement date). 
Institutional investors are a measure of supply since they are more likely to lend out their 
shares than individual investors. The mean (median) number of shares held by institutions, 
relative to shares outstanding, is 51.23% (50.60%). 
My third proxy for constraints is the liquidity of the shares. High liquidity makes it easier 
for short-sellers to obtain shares, and open short positions can be covered without creating a 
large adverse price impact. I use the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, calculated as the 
ratio of the absolute value of daily stock returns divided by trading volumes averaged over 
the window (−62, −2) relative to the SEO announcement date. As in Corwin (2003), I also 
control for the change in the stock price immediately prior to the issue by taking the abnormal 
returns over days (-6, -2) relative to the issue date. Changes in the stock price can be due to 
short-sellers and manipulative trading, or the result of information production. Henry and 
Koski (2009) find that manipulative trading increases underpricing, whereas Chemmanur, 
He, and Hu (2009), provide evidence that institutional trading reflects an information 
production role rather than manipulative trading.  
As a final robustness test, I introduce a dummy variable to capture the period after SEC 
Rule 10b-21 was introduced in August 1988.57 Since this rule limits short-selling, the period 
                                                          
56 To estimate the correct Inverse Mills’ ratio I change the dependent variable in the probit regression to one if a 
firm sticks with equity. 
57 Rule 10b-21 prohibited the use of shares purchased at the offering to cover short sales positions established 
between the initial filing and offer date. In April 1997, this rule was replaced by Rule 105 of Regulation M, 
which prohibited traders from covering short sales made within five days of the offering with shares obtained in 
the offering. 
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after its introduction should be one where the effects of short-sale constraints on underpricing 
can be separated from the effects of past market timing. Hence, if my results are not spurious, 
they should remain significant in the period after Rule 10b-21 was introduced. This 
robustness test is especially appealing since it represents an exogenous event that directly 
captures a change in short sale constraints common to all issuers. Several studies (e.g., Singal 
and Xu, 2005; Kim and Shin, 2004; Safieddine and Wilhelm, 1996) examine the 
consequences of the adoption of Rule 10b-21 in 1988, but find contrasting results with 
respect to its effect on underpricing. 
I present the results of the underpricing regression including the controls for short-sale 
constraints, in Table 4.9.58 In column (1) I introduce Instit. ownership and Short interest,, 
which enter the regression with the hypothesized sign, but are insignificant. The coefficient 
for the returns following a previous SEO remains significantly negative, indicating that short-
selling effects have a separate influence from the market timing effects. In column (2) Instit. 
ownership becomes significant, when I omit  Short interest, which allows the regression to be 
estimated from 1980 instead of 2003. In Column (3) Amihud has a positive coefficient, 
indicating that more illiquid companies underprice their issues to a larger degree. When the 
5-day abnormal returns prior to an issue are positive (Positive 5-day CARs), the estimated 
coefficient implies a positive influence on underpricing. This supports models in which 
private information revelation prior to an offer is rewarded with larger underpricing (e.g., 
Hanley, 1993; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). The dummy variable for Rule 10b-21 shows a 
positive coefficient when interacted with 12 Mth. post-previous rets. in Column (4). While 
the effects of past market timing on underpricing are weaker after this rule was introduced, 
the influence of 12 Mth. post-previous rets. remains negative (adding up the coefficients 
results in a net effect of -0.38). In addition a 2 test rejects the restriction that the sum of the 
two coefficients is equal to zero (p-value of 0.00). In Column (5) I introduce all the controls 
that are available after 2003, with the only change being that the coefficient for Negative 5-
day CARs, becomes positive. A potential reason is that short-sellers manipulate prices prior to 
an issue to obtain shares at lower prices, even though this practice is prohibited. 
 
 
4.5   Conclusions 
 
Market timing is commonly cited as a determinant of equity issues, although the cost of 
timing equity offerings on future issues is not well known. In this chapter I show that 
offerings are issued at a greater discount to the pre-issue market price if an issuer had 
exhibited market timing behavior with previous offerings. I capture market timing behavior 
by the abnormal returns in the year following a previous issue, and find that underpricing of 
equity offerings is greater if abnormal returns were more negative. The additional discount by 
past market timers can be seen as compensation for the perceived risk that these issuers will 
time the market again.  
The effect of past market timing is most pronounced for issuers that did not experience a 
change in their CEO in the period between issues, suggesting that the identity of the CEO 
matters in assessing past firm performance. I also find that underpricing is less sensitive to 
positive returns that follow a previous issue, than it is to negative returns. This asymmetric 
effect could imply that investors are more concerned about potential losses compared with 
gains, in line with prospect theory. Whereas SEOs are underpriced by more if returns 
                                                          
58 In unreported results I split my sample based on the median value of several firm characteristics that D’Avolio 
(2002) finds to be related to short-sale constraints, such as size, market-to-book ratio, and cash flow. The effect 
of 12 Mth. post-previous rets. remains significant in all sub-samples. 
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following previous SEOs are more negative, they are not underpriced by more if returns 
following previous IPOs are more negative. This suggests that investors view IPOs as being 
less indicative of the market timing motives of follow-on equity issuers. 
Past market timing also has an influence on capital structure decisions. I find that firms that 
had timed their previous equity offering are more likely to switch to debt for subsequent 
financing. This suggests that past market timers anticipate the higher discounting and switch 
to debt in order to avoid additional dilution of share value. A corollary of this finding is that 
firms’ financial constraints increase if they time the market with previous issues, especially if 
they are unable to subsequently switch to debt. Thus, my results have implications for the 
objective function that managers should maximize when considering an equity issue. In 
particular, the cost of raising capital in the future should be considered in tandem with the 
cost of a present issue. 
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4.6   Tables 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for follow-on seasoned equity offerings 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for equity issues that follow SEOs, while Panel B  provides descriptive 
statistics for equity issues that follow IPOs. SEO underpricing is the logarithm of the ratio of the closing share 
price on the day prior to the offer, to the offer price. 6 Mth. post-previous rets. (12 Mth. post-previous rets.) 
refers to the buy-and-hold returns over the 6-month (12-month) period after a previous SEO. 6 Mth. post-IPO 
rets. (12 Mth. post-IPO rets.) refers to the buy-and-hold returns over the 6-month (12-month) period after a 
previous IPO. Filing CARs is measured as the raw cumulative stock return over trading days -1 to +1 relative to 
the announcement date less the CRSP equally weighted market index return over the same period. Abn. stock 
runup is the raw cumulative stock return over trading days -62 to -2 prior to the announcement date less the 
CRSP equally weighted market index return over the same period. Residual volatility is computed as the 
annualized standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily excess stock returns on excess returns on 
the value-weighted CRSP market portfolio, estimated over trading days -62 to -2 before the announcement date. 
Systematic volatility is computed as the annualized standard deviation of the predicted value from a regression 
of daily excess stock returns on excess returns of the value-weighted CRSP market portfolio, estimated over 
trading days -62 to -2 before the announcement date. MV is the market value from CRSP measured 5 days 
before the announcement of the issue. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of equity (Compustat # 25 x # 
199) + total assets (# 6) – book value of equity (# 60)/total assets. Relative proceeds is calculated as the number 
of shares issued dived by the number of shares outstanding. Age is measured as the difference, in years, between 
the issue date and the date that the firm first appears in the CRSP database. Years previous: is the number of 
years that have elapsed since the previous issue. Price is the market price measured 5 days before issue. 
Underwriter Prestige is a dummy equal to one for prestigious underwriters, defined as those having a ranking of 
8 or higher on the Carter and Manaster (1990) 9-point scale. NYSE is a dummy variable for issuers on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Previous debt issue is a dummy variable for issuers that make a debt issue in between the 
current SEO and a previous equity offering. Change CEO is a dummy  variable equal to one if there was a 
change in the CEO since the previous issue was made, identified using Standard and Poor’s Executive 
Compensation (ExecuComp) Database. A t-test ( 2 test for the binomial dummy variables) is used to test for the 
equality of means across sub-samples. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Panel B:
Difference
(N=1,018) in means
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.
SEO underpricing 0.022 0.012 0.033 0.028 0.018 0.040 -0.01***
6 Mth. post-previous rets. 0.026 0.026 0.328
12 Mth. post-previous rets. 0.022 0.024 0.476
6 Mth. post-IPO rets. -0.021 -0.020 0.364
12 Mth. post-IPO rets. 0.217 0.203 0.553
Filing CARs -0.020 -0.020 0.061 -0.026 -0.028 0.073 0.01**  
Abn. stock runup 0.117 0.085 0.245 0.141 0.106 0.288 -0.02**  
Residual volatility 0.457 0.405 0.225 0.543 0.497 0.237 -0.09***
Systematic volatility 0.147 0.128 0.104 0.142 0.120 0.107 0.01       
MV 1161.2 353.6 3189.9 406.4 138.4 1418.9 754.82***
Tobin's Q 2.115 1.575 1.819 3.390 2.281 4.800 -1.27***
Relative proceeds 0.291 0.198 0.431 0.395 0.296 0.378 -0.11***
Age 15.102 10.290 14.361 3.490 2.138 3.425 11.61***
Years previous issue 3.465 2.754 2.205 3.129 2.370 2.059 0.34***
Price 27.496 23.690 18.998 21.495 18.960 15.730 6.01***
Tick<1/4 (%) 63.600 57.589 6.01**  
Underwriter prestige (%) 58.059 40.357 17.71***
NYSE (%) 43.509 13.304 30.21***
Previous debt issue (%) 18.878 7.812 11.07***
Change CEO (%) 9.914 4.017 5.89***
(N=1,476)
SEOs following an SEO SEOs following an IPO
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Table 4.2: Returns following previous equity issues and the probability of a follow-on SEO 
This Table presents the results of a panel probit regression that estimates the probability of issuing equity for 
firms that have a prior equity offering or IPO, over the period 1975-2007. The dependent variable is one if a 
firm makes an issue in a firm-year and zero otherwise. 6 Mth. post-previous rets. (12 Mth. post-previous rets.) 
refers to the buy-and-hold returns over the 6-month (12-month) period after a previous SEO. 6 Mth. post-IPO 
rets. (12 Mth. post-IPO rets.) refers to the buy-and-hold returns over the 6-month (12-month) period after a 
previous IPO. All other variables are calculated over the year preceding the issue date. Abn. stock runup is the 
raw cumulative monthly stock return less the CRSP equally weighted market index return. Stock volatility is 
computed as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Slack is cash and short-term 
investments (# 1) divided by total assets (# 6). Fixed assets is calculated as plant, property and equipment (# 8) 
divided by total assets (# 6). Ln(sales) is the natural logarithm of total sales (# 12). Taxes is computed as income 
tax (# 16) divided by total assets. Tobin’s Q  is calculated as the market value of equity (# 25 x # 199) + total 
assets (# 6) – book value of equity (# 60)/total assets. R&D expense is the expenditure on research and 
development (# 46) divided by total assets. Leverage-Target refers to the deviation of the market leverage from 
the target leverage, as calculated in Section 4.4.3. KZ index is the Kaplan and Zingales index of financial 
constraints, as calculated in Section 4.4.3. Age is the firm age in years, calculated using the firm first instance 
when the firm appears in the CRSP database. Years previous is the number of years that have elapsed since the 
previous issue. Interest rates refers to the quarterly average real interest rate, measured as the difference 
between yields on 10-year Treasury Bonds and the inflation rate. Default premium is defined as the difference 
between yields on Baa rated corporate Bonds and Aaa bonds. Market runup captures the return on the S&P 500 
Index. Confidence index is the quarterly average level of the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. Z-statistics, 
calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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IPOs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Returns following previous issue
6 Mth. post-previous rets. 0.29 ***
(7.92)
12 Mth. post-previous rets. 0.27 ***
(9.67)
6 Mth. post-IPO rets. 0.23 ***
(5.56)
12 Mth. post-IPO rets. 0.23 ***
(7.22)
Issuer characteristics
Abn. stock runup 0.67 *** 0.65 *** 0.85 *** 0.85 ***
(23.64) (22.95) (22.53) (21.53)
Stock Volatility -0.59 *** -0.58 *** -0.77 *** -0.75 ***
(-9.90) (-9.69) (-12.12) (-11.49)
Slack 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10
(0.69) (0.90) (1.00) (1.03)
Fixed assets 0.40 *** 0.41 *** 0.45 *** 0.48 ***
(5.63) (5.83) (5.16) (5.31)
Ln(Sales) 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 ***
(6.80) (6.20) (6.43) (6.32)
Taxes -0.80 ** -0.96 ** 0.12 0.05
(-2.08) (-2.49) (0.25) (0.11)
Tobin's Q 0.01 * 0.01 0.03 *** 0.03 ***
(1.93) (1.16) (3.88) (3.87)
R&D expense 1.36 *** 1.37 *** 0.77 *** 0.73 ***
(12.05) (12.08) (5.75) (5.21)
Leverage-Target 0.70 *** 0.72 *** 1.07 *** 1.13 ***
(4.94) (5.03) (4.85) (5.09)
KZ index 0.02 ** 0.02 ** -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(2.41) (2.38) (-3.18) (-2.91)
Age 0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 ***
(-3.66) (-3.48) (-7.30) (-7.36)
Years previous issue -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 ***
(-18.11) (-17.91) (-5.44) (-5.16)
Previous underpricing -0.39 -0.36
(-1.03) (-0.96)
IPO underpricing -0.08 -0.07
(-1.49) (-1.28)
Aggregate Financing Costs Measures
Interest rates 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.03
(0.23) (0.24) (0.59) (0.33)
Default premium 0.51 ** 0.54 ** -0.84 ** -0.79 *
(2.10) (2.21) (-2.10) (-1.94)
Market runup -5.99 *** -6.11 *** -0.20 -0.43
(-3.83) (-3.89) (-0.15) (-0.33)
Confidence Index -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 ** -0.04 **
(-1.25) (-1.25) (-2.27) (-2.24)
Intercept 5.35 5.44 3.59 ** 3.54 *
(1.01) (1.02) (1.98) (1.92)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 14.98 % 15.36 % 20.72 % 21.58 %
No. of observations 23,834 23,834 13,302 13,302
Seasoned offerings
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Table 4.3: Returns following SEOs and underpricing of subsequent equity issues 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is underpricing, using the 
sample of firms having made a previous SEO. The variables are explained in Table 4.1, with the exception 
of the following: DPositive rets. is a dummy equal to one if the 12 Mth. post-previous rets are positive. The 
specification in Column (1) uses the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (1) of Table 4.2, while the remaining 
specifications in use the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (2) of Table 4.2. This is in accordance with 
whether 6-month, or 12-month returns are the variable of interest in Table 4.3. t-statistics, calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Returns following previous SEO
6 Mth. post-previous rets. -0.87 ***
(-6.33)
12 Mth. post-previous rets. -0.46 *** -0.88 *** -0.52 *** -0.46 ***
(-7.38) (-3.81) (-7.04) (-7.81)
12 Mth. post-previous rets*DPositive rets. 0.75 **
(2.23)
12 Mth. post-previous rets*DChange CEO. 0.80 *
(1.88)
Issuer characteristics
Change CEO -0.44 *
(-1.79)
Abn. stock runup -1.28 *** -1.24 *** -1.24 *** -1.26 *** -1.35 ***
(-10.88) (-14.56) (-13.61) (-12.85) (-4.39)
Residual volatility 3.66 *** 3.63 *** 3.52 *** 3.63 *** 2.93 ***
(10.83) (10.85) (8.95) (11.13) (5.01)
Systematic volatility 1.66 *** 1.66 *** 1.53 *** 1.74 *** 1.12
(2.93) (3.09) (2.95) (3.08) (1.25)
Ln(MV) -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.09
(-1.61) (-1.57) (-1.59) (-1.62) (-1.23)
Tobin's Q 0.10 * 0.10 0.10 0.10 * 0.12 ***
(1.66) (1.62) (1.54) (1.69) (3.11)
Relative proceeds 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 **
(0.00) (-0.06) (-0.11) (-0.09) (2.30)
Age 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** -0.01
(9.06) (8.37) (8.23) (8.98) (-0.39)
Years previous -0.02 * -0.02 * -0.02 * -0.01 0.09
(-1.72) (-1.92) (-1.95) (-0.80) (0.43)
Ln(Price) -0.76 *** -0.75 *** -0.75 *** -0.72 *** -1.08 ***
(-3.95) (-3.76) (-3.82) (-3.71) (-9.02)
Tick<1/4 0.11 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.25 *
(3.56) (3.59) (3.43) (3.43) (1.95)
Underwriter prestige 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.33) (0.26) (0.23) (0.26) (0.21)
NYSE -0.28 ** -0.28 ** -0.27 ** -0.28 ** -0.27
(-2.31) (-2.17) (-2.10) (-2.14) (-1.29)
Previous debt issue -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.06
(-0.62) (-0.59) (-0.53) (-0.33) (0.24)
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.18
(0.37) (0.31) (0.42) (0.35) (1.39)
Filing CARs -0.36
(-0.70)
Previous underpricing 0.08 ***
(5.40)
Intercept 0.94 ** 0.87 ** 0.83 * 0.75 ** 1.93 ***
(2.52) (2.24) (1.89) (2.14) (3.63)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 24.98 % 24.68 % 24.82 % 24.79 % 24.97 %
No. of observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 871
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Table 4.4: Returns following IPOs and underpricing of subsequent equity issues 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is underpricing, using the 
sample of firms having made a previous IPO. The variables are explained in Table 4.1, with the exception of 
the following: DPositive rets. is a dummy equal to one if the 12 Mth. post-previous rets are positive. The 
specification in Column (1) uses the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (3) of Table 4.2, while the remaining 
specifications in use the Inverse Mills’ ratio from Column (4) of Table 4.2. This is in accordance with 
whether 6-month, or 12-month returns are the variable of interest in Table 4.4. t-statistics, calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Returns following previous SEO
6 Mth. post-IPO rets. -0.05
(-0.15)
12 Mth. post-IPO rets. 0.28 0.84 0.31 0.42
(1.22) (1.42) (1.28) (1.58)
12 Mth. post-IPO rets*DPositive rets. -0.80
(-1.09)
12 Mth. post-IPO rets*DChange CEO. -0.68
(-0.86)
Issuer characteristics
Change CEO 0.50
(0.74)
Abn. stock runup 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.18
(1.28) (1.23) (1.20) (1.23) (0.27)
Residual volatility 1.53 * 1.19 1.26 1.19 1.92 *
(1.84) (1.34) (1.42) (1.35) (1.85)
Systematic volatility -0.24 -0.30 -0.33 -0.30 -1.78
(-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.21) (-1.06)
Ln(MV) -0.11 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21 -0.49 **
(-0.62) (-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.12) (-2.12)
Tobin's Q 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.15 ***
(3.13) (2.83) (2.86) (2.82) (2.72)
Relative proceeds 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.54 -0.06
(1.52) (1.42) (1.41) (1.41) (-1.33)
Age 0.06 * 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 ***
(1.89) (1.55) (1.55) (1.56) (2.76)
Years previous -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(-0.30) (0.17) (0.17) (0.08) (0.00)
Ln(Price) -2.02 *** -1.97 *** -1.98 *** -1.98 *** -1.54 ***
(-6.82) (-6.57) (-6.55) (-6.58) (-3.95)
Tick<1/4 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.15
(-1.22) (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.24) (-0.55)
Underwriter prestige -0.32 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.25
(-1.34) (-0.89) (-0.90) (-0.87) (-0.85)
NYSE 0.77 ** 0.77 * 0.77 * 0.77 * 0.90 *
(1.97) (1.91) (1.90) (1.88) (1.81)
Previous debt issue -0.49 -0.53 -0.53 -0.52 -0.39
(-1.35) (-1.38) (-1.39) (-1.37) (-0.85)
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 -0.10
(0.42) (0.58) (0.54) (0.57) (-0.38)
Filing CARs 0.07
(0.03)
IPO underpricing -0.00
(-0.38)
Intercept 4.87 *** 5.03 *** 5.15 *** 5.11 *** 5.93 ***
(4.13) (4.14) (4.17) (4.14) (4.27)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 25.04 % 24.61 % 24.62 % 24.5 % 18.89 %
No. of observations 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 782
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Table 4.5: SEO announcement effects and returns following previous issues 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is Filing CARs, which 
captures the abnormal stock returns over the window (-1, 1) relative to the filing date. The firms in this 
sample have made a previous SEO (Columns 1 and 2) or IPO (Columns 3 and 4). The variables are explained 
in Table 4.1. The Inverse Mills’ ratio used in each regression is calculated using the probit model in the 
corresponding Column of Table 4.2. t-statistics, calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are 
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPOs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Returns following previous issue
6 Mth. post-previous rets. 0.49 *
(1.78)
12 Mth. post-previous rets. 0.52 **
(2.15)
6 Mth. post-IPO rets. 0.99
(0.98)
12 Mth. post-IPO rets. 0.17
(0.22)
Issuer characteristics
Abn. stock runup 2.35 *** 2.28 *** 1.85 1.73
(3.35) (3.59) (0.88) (0.80)
Residual volatility -3.01 ** -2.95 ** 0.39 -0.63
(-2.22) (-2.16) (0.14) (-0.27)
Systematic volatility 2.19 2.11 -5.25 -5.03
(1.56) (1.38) (-1.32) (-1.31)
Slack -0.01 0.02 0.46 0.25
(-0.01) (0.03) (0.22) (0.12)
Fixed assets 1.62 *** 1.62 *** 0.28 -0.33
(2.66) (2.60) (0.19) (-0.21)
ln(Sales) 0.25 ** 0.24 ** 0.53 * 0.50 *
(2.53) (2.29) (1.91) -1.76
Taxes -9.22 * -9.44 ** -10.55 -13.19
(-1.93) (-1.97) (-1.39) (-1.77) *
Tobin's Q 0.43 *** 0.42 *** 0.07 0.05
(7.36) (6.97) (1.27) (0.93)
R&D expense -0.27 -0.15 3.45 3.67
(-0.28) (-0.16) (0.97) (1.02)
Leverage-Target -0.88 -0.83 2.01 -0.13
(-0.97) (-0.89) (0.83) (-0.05)
KZ index -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.02
(-0.38) (-0.37) (0.10) (0.17)
Age 0.02 *** 0.02 *** -0.03 0.00
(2.99) (3.07) (-0.33) (-0.06)
Years previous issue -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.09
(-0.99) (-0.70) (-0.22) (0.50)
Previous debt issue 0.81 ** 0.81 ** 0.99 0.85
(2.14) (2.09) (0.94) (0.78)
Previous underpricing 0.02 0.02
(0.22) (0.23)
IPO underpricing 0.00 0.00
(0.21) (-0.23)
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.52 *** 0.55 *** -0.34 -0.59
(4.73) (4.53) (-0.61) (-0.98)
Intercept -5.32 *** -5.46 *** -5.03 ** -4.10 ***
(-5.40) (-5.36) (-2.05) (-1.73)
Year dummies No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 3.11 % 3.00 % 0.09 % 0.04 %
No. of observations 871 871 782 782
Seasoned offerings
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Table 4.6: Impact of returns following previous SEO on capital structure 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for a sample of firms with a prior SEO that subsequently issue further equity 
or switch to debt. Panel B shows a probit regression that estimates the probability of switching to debt for firms that 
have a prior equity offering, over the period 1975-2007. The dependent variable is one if a firm switches to debt and 
zero if it issues equity. The independent variables are explained in Table 4.2, with the exception of the following: 
Abn. stock runup is the raw cumulative stock return over trading days -62 to -2 prior to the announcement date less 
the CRSP equally weighted market index return over the same period. Stock volatility is computed as the annualized 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over trading days -62 to -2 before the announcement date. Z-statistics, 
calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Median  Std. Dev.  Mean Median  Std. Dev. (1) (2)
Returns following previous SEO
6 Mth. Post-previous Rets. -0.01 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.04 0.34 -0.05*** -0.31 **
(-2.21)
12 Mth. Post-previous Rets. -0.04 -0.02 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.50 -0.09*** -0.21 **
(-2.14)
Issuer characteristics
Abn. stock runup 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.25 -0.11*** -1.29 *** -1.28 ***
(-5.65) (-5.61)
Stock Volatility 0.39 0.34 0.20 0.51 0.45 0.24 -0.12*** 0.37 0.35
(1.37) (1.31)
Slack 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.22 -0.12*** -1.06 ** -1.05 **
(-2.16) (-2.14)
Fixed assets 0.44 0.42 0.24 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.10*** 1.11 *** 1.12 ***
(6.12) (6.19)
Sales 3106.6 1287.8 4536.5 643.7 191.5 1662.2 2462.9*** 0.37 *** 0.37 ***
(10.12) (10.14)
Taxes 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 1.10 1.23
(0.70) (0.78)
Tobin's Q 1.51 1.32 0.82 2.31 1.73 1.97 -0.79*** -0.14 ** -0.14 *
(-1.98) (-1.95)
R&D expense 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.14 -0.06*** -3.82 *** -3.72 ***
(-2.93) (-2.86)
Leverage-Target 0.01 -0.02 0.14 -0.01 -0.03 0.13  0.02**  1.85 *** 1.84 ***
(4.64) (4.61)
KZ index 0.58 0.69 2.73 0.41 0.48 2.11 0.18*** -0.16 *** -0.16 ***
(-4.05) (-4.00)
Age 23.18 16.12 19.65 11.63 8.15 11.42 11.54*** 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
(2.98) (2.97)
Years previous issue 3.34 2.74 2.06 3.16 2.50 2.03 0.18*    0.02 0.02
(1.22) (0.99)
Previous underpricing 1.52 0.76 2.82 2.03 0.87 3.94 -0.51*** -0.34 -0.30
(-0.26) (-0.23)
Aggregate Financing Costs Measures
Interest rates 3.68 3.68 2.14 3.79 3.58 2.12 -0.11 -0.17 * -0.17 *
(-1.90) (-1.89)
Default premium 1.00 0.88 0.42 1.03 0.90 0.45 -0.03 0.74 * 0.71 *
(1.82) (1.75)
Market runup 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06  0.00 -0.67 -0.60
(-0.93) (-0.84)
Confidence Index 91.69 92.33 10.98 90.03 91.77 10.96 1.66*** 0.01 0.01
(0.45) (0.46)
Intercept -3.98 *** -3.97 ***
(-3.10) (-3.09)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 35.45 % 35.57 %
No. of observations 593 1,139 1,732 1,732
Panel B: Probit regressions
in means
Switch to debt Stick with equity Difference
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
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Table 4.7: Impact of returns following previous IPO on capital structure 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for a sample of firms with a prior IPO that subsequently issue further equity 
or switch to debt. Panel B shows a probit regression that estimates the probability of switching to debt for firms that 
have a prior IPO, over the period 1975-2007. The dependent variable is one if a firm switches to debt and zero if it 
issues equity. The independent variables are explained in Table 4.2, with the exception of the following: Abn. stock 
runup is the raw cumulative stock return over trading days -62 to -2 prior to the announcement date less the CRSP 
equally weighted market index return over the same period. Stock volatility is computed as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over trading days -62 to -2 before the announcement date. Z-statistics, calculated 
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Median  Std. Dev.  Mean Median  Std. Dev. (1) (2)
Returns following previous IPO
6 Mth. Post-IPO Rets. -0.09 -0.09 0.27 -0.02 -0.02 0.37 -0.06**  -0.11
(-0.48)
12 Mth. Post-IPO Rets. 0.09 0.10 0.41 0.21 0.20 0.53 -0.13**  -0.11
(-0.76)
Issuer characteristics
Abn. stock runup 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.29 -0.11*** -1.08 *** -1.01 ***
(-3.23) (-2.81)
Stock Volatility 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.57 0.53 0.25 -0.15*** -0.25 -0.37
(-0.53) (-0.74)
Slack 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.27 0.15 0.28 -0.22*** -1.95 *** -1.77 **
(-2.60) (-2.40)
Fixed assets 0.43 0.40 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.18*** 0.97 *** 1.06 ***
(2.88) (3.07)
Sales 708.5 278.4 1434.5 194.2 60.03 500.10 514.3*** 0.31 *** 0.31 ***
(4.01) (3.81)
Taxes 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -2.88 -2.67
(-1.23) (-1.16)
Tobin's Q 1.77 1.45 1.15 3.33 2.32 3.88 -1.57*** -0.08 -0.03
(-1.01) (-0.46)
R&D expense 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.19 -0.09*** 0.52 0.47
(0.47) (0.48)
Leverage-Target 0.05 0.04 0.16 -0.02 -0.04 0.12 0.07**  1.59 *** 2.06 ***
(2.60) (3.34)
KZ index 0.52 1.08 3.24 0.05 0.11 1.82 0.47**  -0.05 ** -0.05 *
(-2.09) (-1.72)
Age 4.55 2.93 4.83 3.82 2.56 3.38 0.73 -0.08 ** -0.08 **
(-1.98) (-2.06)
Years previous issue 3.34 2.53 2.14 3.10 2.36 2.03 0.24 0.08 * 0.09 **
(1.90) (2.11)
IPO underpricing 4.75 2.10 9.18 14.02 5.56 31.80 -9.27*** -1.40 ** -1.41 **
(-2.10) (-2.01)
Aggregate Financing Costs Measures
Interest rates 3.62 3.69 1.44 3.56 3.49 1.76 0.06 -0.35 *** -0.37 ***
(-2.81) (-2.82)
Default premium 0.82 0.72 0.28 0.95 0.88 0.38 -0.14*** -1.62 ** -1.43 *
(-2.21) (-1.90)
Market runup 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.97 -1.61
(-0.62) (-0.98)
Confidence Index 97.00 95.18 8.25 90.82 91.63 10.26 6.19*** 0.05 ** 0.05 **
(2.21) (2.22)
Intercept -4.69 ** -5.16 **
(-2.14) (-2.21)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 38.52 % 38.23 %
No. of observations 94 939 1,033 1,033
Panel B: Probit regressions
in means
Switch to debt Stick with equity Difference
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
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Table 4.8: Underpricing and returns following previous issue, after controlling for switchers 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is underpricing, using the 
sample of firms having made a previous SEO and stick with equity (Columns 1 and 2), and those with a 
previous IPO that stick with equity (Columns 3 and 4). The independent variables are explained in Table 4.1. 
The Inverse Mills’ ratio used in columns (1) and (2) are those estimated using the probit model in the 
corresponding columns in Panel B of Table 4.6, and the Inverse Mills’ ratio used in columns (3) and (4) are 
those estimated using the probit model in the corresponding columns in Panel B of Table 4.7. To estimate the 
correct Inverse Mills’ ratio I change the dependent variable in the probit regression to one if a firm sticks with 
equity, and zero if it switches to debt. t-statistics, calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are 
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
IPOs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Returns following previous Issue
6 Mth. post-previous rets. -0.75 **
(-2.48)
12 Mth. post-previous rets. -0.43 **
(-2.00)
6 Mth. Post-IPO Rets. -0.06
(-0.15)
12 Mth. Post-IPO Rets. 0.39
(1.47)
Issuer characteristics
Abn. stock runup -0.72 -0.68 0.75 0.81
(-1.03) (-0.97) (1.08) (1.16)
Residual volatility 3.07 *** 3.04 *** 2.13 ** 1.69
(2.69) (2.66) (2.18) (1.61)
Systematic volatility 1.64 1.68 -0.08 -0.16
(1.48) (1.53) (-0.06) (-0.11)
Ln(MV) -0.07 -0.09 -0.22 -0.27
(-0.49) (-0.59) (-1.10) (-1.29)
Tobin's Q 0.06 0.06 0.13 *** 0.12 ***
(0.61) (0.66) (4.10) (3.91)
Relative proceeds 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.10
(0.24) (0.17) (0.25) (0.22)
Age 0.03 *** 0.03 *** -0.05 -0.06
(2.85) (2.80) (-1.27) (-1.59)
Years previous issue -0.02 -0.02 0.10 * 0.13 **
(-0.55) (-0.68) (1.69) (2.17)
Ln(Price) -0.94 *** -0.92 *** -1.76 *** -1.79 ***
(-3.70) (-3.62) (-4.64) (-4.59)
Tick<1/4 0.08 0.07 -0.20 -0.21
(0.42) (0.36) (-0.79) (-0.80)
Underwriter prestige -0.01 -0.02 -0.38 -0.28
(-0.08) (-0.11) (-1.39) (-1.00)
NYSE -0.19 -0.19 0.65 0.62
(-0.82) (-0.82) (1.41) (1.30)
Inverse Mills' ratio -0.07 -0.01 0.80 0.61
(-0.16) (-0.02) (0.95) (0.63)
Intercept 1.64 * 1.57 4.38 *** 4.72 ***
(1.72) (1.64) (3.23) (3.35)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 26.34 % 26.09 % 22.98 % 22.5 %
No. of observations 1,139 1,139 939 939
Seasoned offerings
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Table 4.9: Underpricing and short-sale constraints 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is underpricing, using the 
sample of firms having made a previous SEO. The variables are explained in Table 4.1, with the exception of 
the following: Short interest refers to the number of shares shorted, scaled by the total number of shares 
outstanding (both measured over the quarter prior to the SEO announcement date).. Short interest data are 
obtained from the Securities Monthly file of the CRSP-Compustat merged database. Instit. ownership is the 
number of shares held by 13F institutions (obtained from Thomson Reuters), divided by the number of shares 
outstanding (both measured over the quarter prior to the SEO announcement date).  Amihud is the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure, calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of daily stock returns divided by trading 
volumes averaged over the window (−62, −2) relative to the SEO announcement date. Negative 5-day CARs is 
the abnormal returns over days (-6, -2) relative to the issue date, if these are negative, and 0 otherwise. Positive 
5-day CARs is the abnormal returns over days (-6, -2) relative to the issue date, if these are positive, and 0 
otherwise.  Rule 10B is a dummy variable to capture the period after SEC Rule 10b-21 was introduced in August 
1988. The Inverse Mills’ ratio is obtained from Column (2) of Table 4.2. t-statistics, calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Returns following previous SEO
12 Mth. post-previous rets. -0.45 *** -0.39 *** -0.44 *** -1.04 *** -0.41 **
(-2.68) (-6.68) (-6.58) (-5.15) (-2.18)
Short selling controls
Short interest 8.06 8.84
(1.48) (1.46)
Instit. ownership -0.65 -1.34 ** -0.45
(-1.36) (-1.97) (-0.99)
Amihud 3.70 *** 848.11 ***
(2.73) (23.54)
Negative 5-day CARs -1.32 13.33 ***
(-1.19) (3.64)
Positive 5-day CARs 3.65 *** 0.15
(2.62) (0.04)
12 Mth. post-previous rets*Rule10B 0.66 ***
(2.55)
Rule 10B 1.04
(1.18)
Issuer characteristics
Abn. stock runup 0.22 -1.27 *** -1.29 *** -1.24 *** -0.20
(0.38) (-6.30) (-10.36) (-15.23) (-0.35)
Residual volatility 0.57 3.14 *** 3.54 *** 3.62 *** 0.74
(0.45) (24.97) (12.17) (11.15) (0.40)
Systematic volatility 2.92 * 2.04 *** 1.62 ** 1.67 *** 4.11 **
(1.72) (5.00) (2.26) (3.21) (2.53)
Ln(MV) -0.25 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.18
(-1.49) (-1.27) (-1.52) (-1.62) (-0.99)
Tobin's Q -0.09 ** 0.09 0.09 0.11 * -0.09 ***
(-2.25) (1.51) (1.48) (1.74) (-2.70)
Relative proceeds -1.95 * -0.12 -0.04 0.00 -1.71 *
(-1.90) (-0.41) (-0.35) (0.00) (-1.87)
Age -0.01 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** -0.01
(-0.94) (5.17) (7.43) (8.34) (-0.93)
Years previous 0.04 ** -0.02 -0.02 * -0.02 * 0.03 ***
(2.18) (-1.51) (-1.68) (-1.78) (2.61)
Ln(Price) -0.85 *** -0.62 *** -0.74 *** -0.75 *** -1.02 ***
(-2.63) (-2.65) (-3.46) (-3.73) (-2.75)
Tick<1/4 -0.33 0.16 ** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** -0.04
(-0.76) (2.37) (3.62) (3.77) (-0.18)
Underwriter prestige -0.11 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08
(-0.22) (0.23) (0.15) (0.27) (0.17)
NYSE 0.01 -0.16 ** -0.21 ** -0.29 ** 0.07
(0.07) (-2.17) (-2.36) (-2.24) (0.47)
Previous debt issue -1.10 *** -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -1.02 ***
(-3.58) (-0.46) (-0.70) (-0.53) (-4.66)
Inverse Mills' ratio -0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06
(-0.21) (-0.62) (0.24) (0.28) (0.75)
Intercept 7.49 *** 1.89 *** 0.84 ** 0.90 ** 6.90 ***
(4.78) (3.92) (2.07) (2.40) (4.61)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No
Adjusted R-squared 12.79 % 22.63 % 24.63 % 24.72 % 20.71 %
No. of observations 319 1,230 1,333 1,476 319
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Figure 4.3: Timeline for the event study of follow-on issues 
This figure shows the sequence of events for a typical firm in my sample. 6 Mth. post-previous rets. (12 Mth. 
post-previous rets.) refers to the buy-and-hold returns over the 6-month (12-month) period after a previous SEO 
or IPO. Abn. stock runup is the raw cumulative stock return over trading days -62 to -2 prior to the 
announcement date less the CRSP equally weighted market index return over the same period. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Summary and concluding comments 
 
The studies in this thesis contribute to a growing stream of papers showing that capital 
structure decisions are not only influenced by corporate determinants, but also by fluctuations 
in investor tastes and capital available for investment. This is a relatively new way of looking 
at corporate decisions, but is also given the deserved importance in the literature (for a 
comprehensive survey see Baker, 2009). This view contrasts with the traditional approach in 
the literature that largely considered corporate decisions to be distinct from the decision 
process of investors. Chapters 2 and 3 use convertible debt issuance to analyze the impact of 
intertemporal variation in investor demand on corporate decisions, and the market reaction to 
these decisions. Chapter 2 shows that convertible debt issuance, pricing, and design decisions 
are influenced by demand forces from investors. Chapter 3 finds that a shift in the convertible 
bond investor base from long-only investors towards convertible arbitrage funds resulted in 
an increasingly negative stock price reaction, induced by short-selling pressure. Thus, the 
first two studies in this thesis provide more evidence of corporate opportunism, using data on 
issuers of convertible debt. The fourth chapter uses data from repeat issuers of equity, and 
provides evidence in line with the hypothesis that investors take opportunism into account 
when firms issue new equity. In addition, the chapter shows that firms’ choice of capital 
structure is influenced by their past behavior. 
 
 
5.1   Summary of the main findings 
 
Chapter 2 examines whether firms cater to intertemporal fluctuations in investor demand 
for convertible debt by issuing more convertibles and/or opportunistically adjusting the 
design and pricing of their offering. We construct six proxies to capture intertemporal 
variations in investor demand for convertible bond financing. We find that these investor 
demand proxies are able to explain approximately one-third of the time-series variation in 
quarterly U.S. convertible debt volumes over the period 1975 to 2007. We also document that 
convertible issuers act opportunistically by adjusting the design of their offerings towards 
changes in investor tastes. In particular, issuers tend to include a larger equity component in 
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their offering during periods with high risk aversion, thus catering to investors who would 
otherwise hold equities. Finally, we document that convertibles are significantly less 
underpriced in periods with high investor demand, even when controlling for corporate 
demand characteristics. 
In Chapter 3 we show that a recent shift in the buyers of convertible bonds has important 
implications for the stockholder wealth effects around convertible bond announcements. The 
first period we analyze (1984-1999) is characterized by traditional investors who take long 
positions in convertible bonds. In the second period (2000 to September 14, 2008) the 
majority of convertible buyers are convertible arbitrageurs that combine a long position in 
convertibles with short positions in the underlying stock. We find that stockholder wealth 
effects around announcements in the second period are more than twice as negative as in the 
first period. Our results provide two explanations for this sharp drop in announcement effects. 
First, part of the negative announcement effect in the second period is caused by price 
pressure associated with arbitrage-related short selling of convertible hedge funds. Second, 
we find that part of the more negative announcement effect can be attributed to changes in 
firm-specific, security design, and macroeconomic characteristics over time. In the third 
period (September 15, 2008 to 2009), hedge funds partly loosen their grip on the convertible 
bond market, but announcement returns continue to become more negative in the wake of the 
post-Lehman crisis. 
Chapter 4 starts with the observations that market timing is commonly cited as a 
determinant of equity issues, although the cost of timing equity offerings on future issues are 
not well known. In this study I show that seasoned  equity offerings (SEOs) are issued at a 
greater discount to the pre-issue market price if an issuer had exhibited market timing 
behavior with previous offerings. The additional discount by past market timers can be seen 
as compensation for the perceived risk that these issuers will time the market again. The 
effect of past market timing is most pronounced for issuers that did not experience a change 
in their CEO in the period between issues, suggesting that the identity of the CEO matters in 
assessing past firm performance. Whereas SEOs are underpriced by more if returns following 
previous SEOs are more negative, they are not underpriced by more if returns following 
previous IPOs are more negative. This suggests that investors view IPOs as being less 
indicative of the market timing motives of follow-on equity issuers. Past market timing also 
has an influence on capital structure decisions. The results in Chapter 4 show that firms that 
had timed their previous equity offering are more likely to switch to debt for subsequent 
financing. This suggests that past market timers anticipate the higher discounting and switch 
to debt in order to avoid additional dilution of share value.  
 
 
5.2   Implications of the findings 
 
Chapter 2 provides evidence that corporate finance actions can be influenced through 
investor demand channels, rather than being solely driven by firm-specific determinants. The 
results in the Chapter show that firms cater to increased preference for convertible debt by 
issuing these securities in the primary market, while also adjusting the security design 
parameters, and the pricing of their offering. In particular, we obtain evidence that 
convertible issuers opportunistically set higher prices on their offerings during periods of 
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heightened investor demand, and that these issuers adjust the design of their offering in 
response to the level of risk aversion of investors. This study adds to a growing stream of 
studies showing that capital structure decisions are not only influenced by corporate and 
macroeconomic determinants, but also by fluctuations in investor tastes and capital available 
for investment. It also contributes to the literature on the motivations for convertible debt 
offerings, which has thus far mainly focused on issuer-specific determinants. In addition, the 
findings support the notion that convertible bonds satisfy a specific clientele, whose needs 
cannot be fulfilled by means of standard financing instruments.  
Chapter 3 also contributes to a recent stream of corporate finance studies that explicitly 
take the influence of investor characteristics into account. This study sheds provides a new 
perspective on long-accepted stylized facts regarding the relative magnitude of security 
offering announcement effects. We document that announcement-period returns associated 
with recent convertible offerings are far more negative than those for equity offerings, partly 
as a result of stock price pressure induced by short-selling activities of convertible 
arbitrageurs. This evidence, together with a short-term recovery in the share price after a 
convertible issue, suggests that the demand curve for the issuer’s shares is not perfectly 
elastic. One of the practical implications of our results is that event studies on recent 
convertible bond announcements need to take the price pressure caused by convertible 
arbitrage strategies into account if they want to obtain unbiased estimates of the signaling 
content of convertibles. Our findings also highlight the need to control for convertible bond 
underpricing when analyzing stock price reactions to convertible bond announcements.  
The study in Chapter 4 provides new insights into the interactions between firms and 
investors when new equity is issued. First, they suggest that investors take the past behavior 
of firms into account when evaluating their motives for market timing of subsequent equity 
offerings. This finding complements a growing literature that examines how investors form 
beliefs in financial markets. Second, the results show that there is a cost associated with 
timing equity issues, in the form of higher underpricing of subsequent issues. While past 
literature has acknowledged the motivations for market timing in equity offerings, the cost of 
such behavior has not yet been documented. Another finding is that firms that had timed 
previous equity issues anticipate the higher underpricing to some extent and tend to switch to 
debt financing to avoid the cost of dilution, or abandonment of profitable investment 
opportunities. This particular finding extends the literature on capital structure by shedding 
light on how past actions by firms affects the choice between equity and debt financing. A 
corollary is that firms’ financial constraints increase if they time the market with previous 
issues, especially if they are unable to switch to debt. Finally, while the results of this Chapter 
provide evidence in line with the timing of seasoned equity offerings, there is no evidence 
that supports the market timing hypothesis in IPOs. Thus, these findings support the view that 
IPOs and SEOs are different events, and investors do not consider the market timing of IPOs 
as providing a good indication of market timing intentions in subsequent equity offerings.  
 
 
5.3   Suggestions for future research 
 
This dissertation provides empirical evidence about how corporate decisions are affected 
by demand forces from investors. The existing literature in this field is relatively young, and 
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there are several opportunities for further advancement. The findings from this dissertation 
provide opportunities for this advancement.  
Evidence from Chapter 2 supports the view that convertible bonds can be considered as a 
separate asset class, distinct from equities and bonds. An interesting question that is left 
unanswered is what drives the temporal fluctuations in investor preferences for convertible 
securities. In addition, the finding that issuers price on better terms when demand is higher, 
raises questions about why the supply of convertible bonds does not adjust to the point that 
such profitable opportunities disappear. Further research can address the possibility that not 
all firms are allowed to tap into this higher demand. 
Chapter 3 documents new evidence that issuers of convertible debt during the crisis suffer 
a negative stock price reaction that is much larger than in earlier years. While the results of 
this chapter suggest that this very negative reaction can be partly attributed to the extremely 
high underpricing of convertibles after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a challenge remains 
for future research to find other explanations underlying the reaction of investors. One 
suggestion is that firms raising finance during the crisis were more likely to be cash- and 
credit-constrained. 
The results in Chapter 4 have implications for firms that raise finance through seasoned 
equity offerings over multiple periods. Given that I document a cost to timing these issues, 
future research could incorporate this cost in the objective function that managers maximize 
when considering an equity issue. In particular, the cost of raising capital in the future should 
be considered in tandem with the cost of a present issue. Another logical step for further 
research would be to understand how investors form beliefs when assessing the intentions of 
managers that are considering an equity issue. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)  
 
De studies in dit proefschrift dragen bij aan een groeiende stroom van onderzoeken, die 
laten zien, dat kapitaalstructuur beslissingen niet alleen beïnvloed worden door 
ondernemingskenmerken, maar ook door veranderingen in voorkeur van investeerders en de 
beschikbaarheid van kapitaal. Dit is weliswaar een relatief nieuwe manier van kijken naar 
ondernemingsbeslissingen, toch krijgt deze benadering de nodige aandacht in de literatuur 
(voor een uitgebreid overzicht zie Baker, 2009). Deze benadering staat in contrast met de 
traditionele benadering uit de literatuur, waarbij ondernemingsbeslissingen onafhankelijk 
worden geacht van het besluitvormingsproces van investeerders. De eerste twee studies in dit 
proefschrift geven meer bewijs van ondernemingsopportunisme met behulp van data van 
uitgevers van converteerbare obligaties. De laatste studie maakt gebruik van data van 
ondernemingen die herhaaldelijk aandelen uitgeven, de zogenaamde ‘seasoned-equity 
offerings’ (SEO). De bevindingen zijn in overeenstemming met de hypothese, dat 
investeerders rekening houden met opportunisme van de kant van ondernemingen die nieuwe 
aandelen uitgeven. 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken we of bedrijven die waardepapieren uitgeven tegemoet 
komen aan tijdelijke schommelingen in de vraag van investeerders naar converteerbare 
obligaties. We veronderstellen dat de vraag van investeerders naar converteerbare obligaties 
kan veranderen in de tijd, als gevolg van veranderende voorkeuren en wijzigingen in 
beschikbare middelen voor investeringen in converteerbare obligaties. We vinden met behulp 
van een tijdreeks analyse, dat de determinanten van de vraag ongeveer een derde van de 
variantie van de kwartaalvolumes van Amerikaanse converteerbare obligaties over de periode 
1975 tot 2007 kunnen verklaren. Onze bevindingen zijn robuust ook na controle voor 
veranderingen in de financieringsbehoefte van bedrijven naar financiering middels 
converteerbare obligaties. Hetgeen in overeenstemming is met de traditionele motieven 
vanuit de literatuur. We laten tevens zien, dat uitgevers van converteerbare obligaties zich 
opportunistisch gedragen, door het aanbod aan te passen aan de veranderde behoefte van de 
investeerders. In het bijzonder, zijn uitgevende instellingen geneigd om gedurende 
risicomijdende perioden een grotere component eigen vermogen toe te voegen in hun aanbod, 
op deze wijze cateren ze de investeerders, die anders zouden investeren in aandelen. Wij 
vinden ook dat emittenten hun aanbod voordeliger prijzen volgend op stijgingen van de 
investeerders-vraag naar converteerbare obligaties. 
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In hoofdstuk 3 vinden we een neerwaartse beweging in de aandelenrendementen als 
reactie op uitgiften van converteerbare obligaties, en we verbinden dit met een structurele 
verandering in het type kopers van converteerbare obligaties. Emissieaankondigingen van 
converteerbare obligaties leidden in de periode 1984 tot 1999 tot een gemiddeld abnormaal 
rendement van -1,69%, echter het negatieve aankondigingseffect over de periode 2000 tot 
2008 was meer dan twee keer zo sterk (-4,59%). We veronderstellen dat deze verandering is 
te wijten aan een verschuiving van het type belegger, i.e. van  beleggers die zelf 
converteerbare obligaties kopen, naar beleggers die investeren in arbitrage fondsen. Deze 
arbitrage fondsen kopen converteerbare obligaties en verkopen de onderliggende aandelen, 
waardoor een neerwaartse prijsdruk ontstaat. In overeenstemming met deze hypothese, 
vinden we dat de verschillen in de aankondiging rendementen tussen de traditionele 
investeerder-periode (1984-1999) en de arbitrage-periode (2000-september 2008) verdwijnen 
na een correctie voor de ‘arbitrage-short selling’. De rendementen na een aandelenemissie 
zijn ook in overeenstemming met met de arbitrage uitleg. De gemiddelde effecten van 
aankondigingen van converteerbare obligatie-emissies tijdens de recente financiële crisis zijn 
nog negatiever (-9,12%). Dit resultaat kan worden toegeschreven aan de ernstige 
onderwaardering van emissies gedurende de crisis-periode, hetgeen opweegt tegen het effect 
van de verminderde invloed van de arbitrage funds. 
De resultaten in hoofdstuk 4 suggereren, dat wederkerende aandelenemissies (SEOs) 
worden uitgegeven met een grotere korting op de pre-emissie marktprijs, indien de emittent 
bij eerdere emmisies market timing gedrag heeft laten zien. Een robuste bevinding in de 
literatuur is dat SEO's worden gevolgd door negatieve lange termijn abnormale rendementen, 
hetgeen gezien kan worden als een bewijs van market timing. In dit onderzoek laat ik de 
kosten van market timing zien, gebaseerd op het idee dat beleggers bedrijven met de meest 
negatieve abnormale rendementen in het jaar na een SEO zullen zien, als degene die zeer 
waarschijnlijk de emissie hebben getimed. Deze bedrijven compenseren beleggers door een 
grote korting aan te bieden in een volgende SEO. Ik laat tevens zien dat emittenten een 
hogere onderwaardering anticiperen en daarom is de kans groter dat ze vreemd vermogen 
zullen uitgeven indien de rendementen bij een voorgaande SEO negatiever waren. Een 
gevolg van deze bevinding is dat de financiële beperkingen van emittenten toenemen indien 
zij bij eerdere emissies de market getimed hebben. Ik vind ook, dat het effect op 
onderwaardering naar aanleiding van market timing in het verleden sterker was, wanneer de 
CEO tussen de emissies dezelfde persoon is gebleven. Ik vind geen bewijs, dat 
onderwaardering gerelateerd is aan het rendement na een IPO, hetgeen suggereert dat 
beleggers beursintroducties minder als een indicatie beschouwen, dat deze bij toekomstige 
emissies de market zullen proberen te timen. 
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The studies in this thesis contribute to a growing stream of papers showing that capital
structure decisions are not only influenced by corporate determinants, but also by fluctua -
tions in investor tastes and capital available for investment. This is a relatively new way of
looking at corporate decisions, but is also given the deserved importance in the literature.
This view contrasts with the traditional approach in the literature that largely considered
corporate decisions to be distinct from the decision process of investors. Chapters 2 and 3
use convertible debt issuance to analyze the impact of intertemporal variation in investor
demand on corporate decisions, and the market reaction to these decisions. Chapter 2
shows that convertible debt issuance, pricing, and design decisions are influenced by
demand forces from investors. Chapter 3 finds that a shift in the convertible bond investor
base from long-only investors towards convertible arbitrage funds resulted in an
increasingly negative stock price reaction, induced by short-selling pressure. Thus, the first
two studies in this thesis provide more evidence of corporate opportunism, using data on
issuers of convertible debt. The fourth chapter uses data from repeat issuers of equity, and
provides evidence in line with the hypothesis that investors take opportunism into account
when firms issue new equity. In addition, the paper shows that firms’ choice of capital
structure is influenced by their past behavior.
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